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 Summary 
 
Animal rights extremists have carried out a number of campaigns in the past in order 
to protect animals. The actions they carry out as part of these campaigns are often 
described as acts of intimidation, however little has been done to explore how these 
groups use intimidation on the whole. Past research has focussed mainly on specific 
animal rights campaign types (Donovan & Coupe, 2013; Munro, 2005) or action 
types (Monaghan, 1999). The current research aimed to explore the types of 
intimidating behaviours carried out by animal rights extremists in the UK across all 
campaign types. Literature reviews were carried out in order to understand more 
about the current knowledge of animal rights extremism and intimidation. Study 1 
aimed to catalogue incidents carried out by animal rights extremists in the UK, and to 
identify any regular patterns of behaviour across and between distinct campaign 
groups. The results of this study demonstrated that animal rights extremists show 
patterns in their choice of actions and targets both across the campaigns, and more 
specific patterns emerged for the main five campaigns. Having identified that threats 
are closely associated with intimidation, both from the literature reviews and the 
findings of Study 1, the second study aimed to explore the type of language used by 
animal rights extremists when making threats. The findings of Study 2 indicate that 
animal rights extremists are extremely confident when making their threats, although 
they might not be truthful when doing so. Overall, the findings of this research have 
important practical implications for potential targets of animal rights extremists. 
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Chapter One 
 
Introduction 
1.1. Background to animal rights extremism  
1.1.1 What is animal rights extremism? 
Animal rights extremism in the UK is classed as a form of domestic extremism, 
which is described by MI5 (the UK’s Security Service) as “individuals or groups that 
carry out criminal acts in pursuit of a larger agenda” (MI5, 2013).  People involved in 
the animal rights movement believe that all animals have the same rights as humans, 
and as they cannot protect themselves, activists take it upon themselves to protect the 
animals on their behalf. This means that animal rights supporters follow a vegetarian 
or vegan lifestyle, do not use products that are tested on animals and are likely to 
support charities such as the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
(RSPCA) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA).  In these cases 
this behaviour is not breaking the law, and is therefore not classed as extremism.  
However, there are also a number of animal rights supporters who will do what they 
can to stop what they perceive to be cruelty to animals at all costs including unlawful 
acts, which is where the behaviour becomes extreme.  
The concept of animal rights has been around for a long time, and means 
different things to different people, however the more extreme ‘militant’ animal 
rights movement, as it is commonly referred to, became more popular in the 1970s. 
Although in the UK animal rights movements were becoming evident earlier with the 
formation of the League Against Cruel Sports (LACS) in 1927 and the Hunt 
Saboteurs Association (commonly referred to as Hunt Sabs) in 1963, it was during 
the 1970s that a number of books were published by various scholars on animal rights 
which helped to trigger this new militant animal rights movement. Peter Singers’ 
Animal Liberation (1975) is a key text that is often referred to as playing a role in 
triggering this movement. Singer (1975) introduces the need for an Animal 
Liberation movement, much in the same way as the Black or Women’s Liberation 
movements.  Talking about animal liberation in this way Singer is referring to the 
idea that society should end discrimination against animals, i.e. stop using them for 
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meat and experimental testing, rather than physical liberation of animals, i.e. 
releasing them into the wild. 
 Also during this time, activist Ronnie Lee, who had previously been involved 
with the Hunt Saboteurs and was known to carry out more extreme action, having 
been imprisoned for an arson attack formed the Animal Liberation Front as a 
leaderless animal rights group.  This was the first of many groups where more violent 
tactics were adopted in the fight for animal rights. Many activists today defined 
themselves as being part of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), even though there is 
no clear structure to the group. 
There has been much discussion by scholars on the ‘terrorism question’ and 
whether it is right to be referring to animal rights as terrorism, extremism, activism, 
or indeed none of these things, or something else.  Researchers have focussed on this 
question itself (Hadley, 2009; Munro, 2005; Monaghan, 1999).  The reason for this 
discussion centres on the key argument that animal rights groups do not tend to use 
interpersonal harm against individuals, but rather they focus on the use of 
intimidation.  As a result, the actions carried out by animal rights groups usually do 
not physically harm anyone which is an integral part of the definition of terrorism.  
Although this argument will be addressed in more detail in Chapter Two, it should be 
noted that throughout this thesis, groups and individuals carrying out direct action in 
the name of animal rights will be referred to interchangeably as extremism / activism 
/ supporters / the movement.  Although an important topic to discuss, how animal 
rights groups are defined is not an integral part of the current research. Instead, the 
focus will be on what types of behaviours that animal rights groups are involved 
with, rather than how the collective actions are defined. 
1.1.2 High profile animal rights campaigns 
Animal rights groups do not work in a hierarchical manner, instead they are 
autonomous in that they encourage supporters to take their own action (Carson, 
LaFree & Dugan, 2012; Monaghan, 2000).  However, a number of distinct groups 
have emerged since the 1970s formation of the ALF with many focussing on 
campaigns against a specific target or group of targets.  One of the most prolific 
animal rights groups in the UK is Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC).  SHAC 
have recently announced that after 15 years they will no longer be continuing with 
their campaign.  They stated that due to the changes in the law and the change in 
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animal abuse across the globe they need to re-evaluate their tactics, and as a result are 
ending their current campaign.  SHAC’s main goal was to shut down Huntingdon 
Life Sciences (HLS), which provides research services, with customers including 
many high profile pharmaceutical companies.  HLS has previously been the focus of 
controversy when in 1997 undercover footage of animal testing practices was made 
into a Channel 4 documentary, which included footage of researchers abusing 
animals (Jones, 1997).  In the past SHAC have used a wide range of strategies and 
tactics in order to shut down HLS, such as bribery, arson and harassment (Donavon 
and Coupe, 2013). 
 Another high profile UK animal rights campaign is SPEAK, founded in 2004 
to oppose the building of a new animal research facility at Oxford University.  
SPEAK activists targeted contractors responsible for the building of the lab as well as 
the university itself. Many injunctions were subsequently taken against the activists 
by Oxford University. In 2010 the co-founder of SPEAK was sentenced to 10 years 
in prison for conspiracy to commit arson against the university, having been found 
not guilty for a number of other offences including conspiracy to blackmail.  
Other campaigns currently active in the UK include Stop the Cull which is 
focussed on blocking the UK’s badger cull, being carried out in order to help stop the 
spread of tuberculosis (TB) in cows.  At the peak of the campaign in 2013 when the 
first cull trials began, the group’s now archived website encouraged their supporters 
to take direct action against the farmers involved in the cull, the MPs who support the 
cull, and the supermarkets who sell products from farms in the cull zones (Stop the 
Cull, 2013).  
One of the most recent UK animal rights campaigns to be announced is the 
Animal Justice Project’s Campus Without Cruelty Campaign, launched in 2016.  
According to the campaign website, the focus of this campaign is to raise awareness 
of the issues with animal testing, particularly with university staff and students, and 
to carryout outreach work at these universities.  So far the campaign group appear to 
have only carried out lawful protest and intelligence gathering through calls for 
information from whistle blowers (Animal Justice Project, 2016).  However, 
Support4rs, a security advice provider for issues surrounding animal rights 
extremism, have suggested in a report on the Campus Without Cruelty Campaign that 
some of the founders of the Animal for Justice Project (AJP) are past members of 
SHAC, who were prolific with their extremist tactics (Support4rs, 2016).   
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1.1.3 Countering animal rights extremism 
Although MI5 addresses domestic extremism on their website, domestic extremism 
and animal rights is handled by the police as, unlike international and Northern-
Ireland-related terrorism, there is no significant risk to national security (MI5, 2016). 
The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) is the lead force for coordinating the policing 
of domestic extremism in the UK, which is the focus of the National Domestic 
Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit, or NDEDIU (National Police Chief’s 
Council, 2016).  
 Although the tactics of this unit are not made public by the MPS, starting in 
2011 journalists from The Guardian newspaper ran an investigation into the 
undercover policing practices of the National Public Order Intelligence Unit 
(NPOIU), which has since been taken over by the NDEDIU (Evans & Lewis, 2012). 
In their expose they reveal that many animal rights groups were the focus of 
undercover policing in the 1990s and early 2000s.   
1.2 Impact of animal rights extremism  
In 2004 the UK Government published a paper that outlined the UK’s strategy for 
countering animal rights extremism (Home Office, 2004).  Within this report it states 
that as well as needing to protect the individuals at risk of being targeted by animal 
rights extremists, there is also a large economic impact at stake.  At the time of this 
report being published, the UK bioscience industry was the second biggest in the 
world, and the UK’s pharmaceutical trade was worth £12 billion (Home Office, 
2004).  
The latest medical technology and biopharmaceutical sectors update from the 
Government states that the UK health sciences sector now employs over 220,000 
people and has an annual turnover of over £60 billion (Department for Business and 
Innovation Skills, 2015). In 2011 the Government outlined a new strategy to enhance 
the UK’s status as a world leader in life sciences (Department for Business and 
Innovation Skills, 2011) and in 2014 it was announced that a new joint Office for 
Life Sciences would be created with the aim of increasing the investment in the UK 
life sciences industry and to contribute to economic growth. This has since seen an 
investment of £6 billion into the industry and created 17,000 new jobs (Department 
for Business and Innovation Skills, 2015).  
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Companies belonging to these industries are some of the key targets for 
animal rights groups as they involve animal testing for scientific research. In the past 
companies such as HLS have threatened to leave the UK and move their business 
abroad due to the amount of pressure they have received from animal rights groups. 
The campaign against HLS is what led to the UK Government’s publication of the 
strategy for countering animal rights extremism (Home Office, 2004).  At the height 
of the campaign, HLS were forced to open an account directly with the Bank of 
England due to unwillingness from other banks.  It is estimated that SHAC’s 
campaign cost the life science industry around £100 million (Metcalfe, 2008).  
Having failed to intimidate the company leaders, SHAC targeted companies 
and individuals who were related to HLS, such as their suppliers, delivery services, 
and the banks that dealt with their business.  SHAC described their tactics as non-
violent direct action, and involved acts such as protests, vandalism and sending 
threatening communications.  Although SHAC are no longer active, this shows the 
potential impact that future groups could have on companies as large as HLS, 
particularly as former members of SHAC are now linked to new animal rights 
campaigns, (Support4rs, 2016). 
1.3 Aims of the current research 
The central aim of this research is to understand more about animal rights extremists 
in the UK, with particular focus on the types of intimidating behaviours and language 
that they use towards their targets. In particular, the aims of the thesis are: 
 To identify what is known about animal rights extremism and intimidation 
 To catalogue and provide an overview of the types of actions that animal 
rights extremists in the UK have carried out 
 To identify patterns of targeting and tactical behaviours in animal rights 
extremists in the UK 
 To explore the use of threatening language by animal rights extremism 
 To explore the concept of intimidation in relation to animal rights extremism  
These aims will be addressed in the current thesis through two literature 
reviews and two empirical studies.   
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1.4 Possible implications 
The current research has a number of practical and theoretical implications.  
Firstly, understanding more about the tactics used by animal rights groups has the 
potential to help both companies at risk of being, or currently being targeted, and the 
police units responsible for the policing of animal rights extremism.  For companies 
at risk of, or currently being targeted, having more information on what animal rights 
extremists have done in the past, and to who, could help them to protect their 
employees and assets and give them advice and support for the future.  For example, 
if it becomes clear that specific action types are associated with specific target types 
then clear strategies to protect the targets from these actions could be put in place.  
This information will also be vital for the relevant policing units as they will be able 
to use this information to help predict which companies or individuals might be likely 
to become at risk, or whether they will be at repeated risk. They could then possibly 
provide advice and support, as well as being able to use their own intelligence to 
better effect.   
This research also has implications for the understanding of intimidation as a 
type of behaviour in more depth, by exploring animal rights extremism as an example 
of a campaign of intimidation.  Although the focus of this research is on animal rights 
extremism, it is hoped that the findings could be made applicable to other 
intimidation campaigns in a variety of settings.   
1.5 Thesis outline 
In order to address the aims of the research, the thesis will be broken down into the 
following chapters: 
 
Chapter 2 
Chapter two presents a literature review to address what the current research tells us 
about animal rights extremism.  This will focus on what the research has covered and 
what the gaps in knowledge are.   
 
Chapter 3 
Chapter three presents a second literature review, with a focus on intimidation.  It 
will address what we currently know about intimidation from the existing literature, 
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how intimidation is defined, behaviours associated with intimidation, and settings in 
which intimidation has been studied.  
 
Chapter 4 
Chapter four presents the first empirical study, which will provide a quantitative 
analysis of the acts that animal rights extremists have carried out in the UK.  
 
Chapter 5 
The second empirical study will be presented in chapter five, which will focus on the 
intimidating language used by animal rights extremists when sending threats to their 
targets.  
 
Chapter 6 
The final chapter will discuss what has been learnt from the previous five chapters, 
and will provide a synthesis of the findings, implications of the research and a 
summary of the thesis. 
1.6 My approach to the research  
In order to be transparent about my approach to this research, and my views on the 
groups that I am studying I would like to offer some information about my 
background and views related to animal rights extremism. I worked for the National 
Domestic Extremism and Disorder Intelligence Unit (NDEDIU) from February 2012 
to July 2013 where I initially learnt about animal rights extremism.  Having had this 
experience I have approached this research with the viewpoint that I am against the 
actions carried out by these groups, although in some cases I am not entirely 
unsympathetic to their motivations.   
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Chapter Two 
 
What we know about terrorism, extremism and animal rights: a literature 
review 
2.1 Overview 
The use of intimidation by terrorist and extremist groups as a means to further their 
political goals is a common occurrence, especially for domestic groups such as 
animal rights extremists.  Generally accepted definitions of terrorism include the use 
of intimidation, or an attempt to create fear, alongside or in place of violent acts 
(Kaplan, 1981; M15, 2013; Ruby, 2002). Very little research, however, has attempted 
to explore the use of intimidation in detail, instead favouring to focus on more 
sensational acts of terrorism including personal violence and large-scale attacks.  
Animal rights extremists internationally have had success in using intimidation 
tactics such as protest, threatening communications and criminal damage in order to 
achieve their goals, without the need to use violence. The current literature review 
has been conducted to gain an overview of what the current research tells us about 
terrorism and extremism, with particular focus on animal rights extremism. 
2.2 Defining terrorism and extremism 
There has been a lot of literature discussing terrorism and how to define it.  The 2000 
Terrorism Act states that the use of a threat or action to intimidate the public or 
section of the public would constitute as an act of terrorism (MI5, 2013).  The UK 
definition also covers motivations for an act to include religious, racial and 
ideological as well as political.  MI5 also outlines the main sources of terrorism in the 
UK, which are international terrorism (including Al Qaeda), Northern Ireland related 
terrorism and threats from domestic extremist groups.  In the UK domestic extremists 
groups include right wing extremism, left wing extremism, environmentalism, animal 
rights extremism and other single-issue groups and individuals (MI5, 2013).  Ruby 
(2002) explores the definition of terrorism as used by the US Government, which 
covers three criteria.  In order to be considered terrorism, the US Government state 
that an act needs to be politically motivated, directed at non-combatants and be 
committed by subnational groups or secret agents.  As well as these criteria Ruby 
(2002) also highlights psychological measures that need to be taken into account 
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when defining terrorism.  The first of these is Kaplan’s (1981) concept that an act of 
terrorism must create a ‘fearful state of mind’.  The second is the idea that a terrorist 
act needs to be played out in front of an audience.  The concept of creating a ‘fearful 
state of mind’ is also addressed in the UK definition of terrorism.  
Many researchers have noted the difficulty in defining terrorism, as the nature 
of terrorist attacks is so variable (Jenkins, 1980), as are the terrorist groups 
themselves.  One of a number of views is that terrorists “want a lot of people 
watching, not a lot of people dead” (Jenkins, 1980, p.4). Unlike most violent crimes, 
Rubin and Friedland (1986) point out that terrorism is something that occurs on a 
‘stage’, i.e. terrorists want their audience to pay attention. As a result, the media plays 
an important role in terrorists’ plans, and Rubin and Friedland (1986) suggest that 
terrorism would not be able to exist without the media, or at least not to the same 
effect.  In the past, in order for terrorists’ goals to be achieved they needed the media 
to cover their attacks in order for the news to reach a wider audience.  With the rise of 
social media, however, this is now not the only way for terrorist groups to get their 
message across, and to publicise attacks or action that they have carried out (Oh, 
Agrawal & Rao, 2011).  Many domestic extremist and terrorist groups use websites, 
forums, and social networking sites such as Facebook and YouTube to share their 
messages.  In some cases there are dedicated websites where activists claim attacks 
that have occurred around the world, enabling people to find out what has happened, 
even if it has not made the mass media.  This is especially important for less violent 
attacks, which may not be sensational enough to be included in national and 
international news.  For example, the website ‘Bite Back’ (2015) has a section which 
is used to report direct action that has been carried out by animal rights activists 
around the world.  Hale (2012) discusses how right wing extremists also use the 
internet to support their objectives.  Hale points out that the internet is used for a 
variety of reasons, including the fact that there are limited regulations, large 
audiences, the ability to communicate anonymously and being able to use a variety of 
media forms.   
There has been an extensive amount of research surrounding psychology and 
terrorism, in particular Islamic and international terrorism.  For example, there has 
been speculation in recent years that there is a ‘new’ kind of terrorism, which is more 
dangerous and violent (Field, 2009). This has gained more traction since Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorist groups have continued to gain more media and government 
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attention. Morgan (2004) suggests that ‘traditional’ terrorists focused on political 
issues used violence as a means to an end, whereas the ‘new’ fanatical terrorists are 
using violence as the end in itself.  New terrorists are categorised by their religious 
motivation.  However, the concept of new terrorism has been criticised by a number 
of researchers.  For example, Masters (2008) suggests that the use of the term 
‘religious group’ is not always defined in the same way and some terrorists who are 
defined by their religious affiliation might not actually have a primarily religious 
motivation.  It has also been suggested by Masters (2008) that new terrorists have 
also been distinguished because of their networking; they do not have a main 
command centre, but instead there are a number of groups associated with each other 
because of their similar interests.  Masters (2008) points out that this has been seen 
before in non-religious and less violent groups, such as the association between the 
Earth Liberation Front (ELF) and the Animal Liberation Front (ALF).   
As a result of the attacks in Norway by the right wing extremist Anders 
Breivik in 2011, there has also been more research and discussion recently around 
right wing extremism.  The attack, which killed 77 people, is one of a number of 
attacks carried out by domestic extremists that have resulted in fatalities.  Some of 
the most fatal attacks of terrorism have been carried out by domestic extremists 
across the UK, Europe and America; for example the right wing extremist David 
Copeland killed a number of people in his bombing campaign in London in 1999 and 
the second most fatal attack in the US was carried out by the domestic extremist 
Timothy McVeigh in 1995.  Although attacks by domestic extremists can clearly be 
fatal, the majority of campaigns by domestic extremists tend to be non-fatal and are 
more focused on the creating a fearful state of mind, or intimidation.  The UK 
Security Service states that extremism is a policing matter rather than a security 
matter, as domestic extremism does not pose a significant threat to national security. 
This is true for animal rights campaigns, as these groups target specific companies 
rather than the UK as a whole. Supporting this, Hadley (2009), points out that animal 
rights extremist groups have never actually killed anyone, although they have carried 
out numerous extremist campaigns over the past 40 years. The UK Government also 
highlights the fact that domestic extremists are more likely to pose a threat to 
individual members of public, rather than national security as a whole.  
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2.3 Animal rights extremism as terrorism 
As previously mentioned, the definition of terrorism itself has caused much debate 
within the Government and academic communities.  This has also been the case in 
defining animal rights extremism.  In 2004 the UK Government published a paper 
that outlined the UK’s strategy for countering animal rights extremism (Home Office, 
2004).  Within this paper it is explicitly stated that some actions carried out by animal 
rights extremists are considered to be acts of terrorism.  The Terrorism Act 2000 is 
also used to cover all types of terrorism, including animal rights extremism.  Even 
though the Government has made it clear that animal rights extremists can be labelled 
as terrorists in certain cases, there is still some discussion around whether this 
definition is correct.  A paper by Hadley (2009), for example, examines whether the 
label terrorism is appropriate to use when describing animal rights extremism.  
Hadley suggests that animal rights extremism fails to meet the criteria for terrorism 
for two reasons.  Firstly he suggests that in an act of terrorism victims need to be 
innocent, and debates that this might in fact not be the case for animal rights targets.  
As the majority of victims of animal rights campaigns are involved in the use of 
animals for medical research, Hadley suggests that because they are thought to inflict 
suffering on animals they are a legitimate target, and animal rights extremists are 
acting on behalf of the animals that cannot defend themselves.  This philosophical 
perspective is also reflected in Singers’ Animal Liberation (1975), ideas from which 
seem to have had a great influence over Hadley’s work.  These suggestions made by 
Hadley highlights the fact that the use of animals in laboratories is a subjective topic, 
and shows that support for animal rights extends to the academic community. 
Research has found that there is support for animal rights issues from non-activists, 
although factors such as gender, home country and understanding of animal rights 
issues have an effect on support levels (Kruse, 1999; Pifer, Shimizu & Pifer, 1994; 
Senior, 1995). 
Other academics suggest that even though animal rights extremists have never 
carried out a fatal attack, animal rights extremism can still be described as terrorism.  
Taylor (1998) argues that organisations that do not kill or commit violent acts against 
their targets cannot be described as terrorists, however Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) 
point out that actually only 39% of terrorist organisations active between 1998 and 
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2005 have carried out lethal attacks, raising the question of whether organisations 
should be defined as terrorist or not based on their actions or goals. 
Monaghan (1999) also explores the debate around whether animal rights 
extremism can be described as terrorism.  Unlike Hadley (2009) who looked at all 
types of animal rights groups, Monaghan focussed her research only on groups who 
are, or have been, willing to use violence.  Although she notes that there are no 
proscribed animal rights groups, which is still the case to date, the actions of animal 
rights groups who are willing to use violence still in many circumstances meet the 
criteria for terrorism.  The paper also highlights the fact that animal rights extremists 
manage to effectively cause fear in their intended targets, including individual targets 
as well as larger audiences. Although this paper focuses on the use of violence, 
Monaghan does not define what is specifically meant by violence, and appears to 
include acts of violence against property and the threat of violence as well as physical 
violence against humans.   
The debate on whether animal rights extremism can be categorised as 
terrorism has also focussed on whether animal rights extremists are actually 
committing any crimes.  For example, Munro (2005) points out that the vast majority 
of acts committed by animal rights extremists in the UK, USA and Australia are not 
only non-violent, but also legal.  This being said, however, a number of prominent 
animal rights extremists in the UK have either served, or are currently serving 
sentences in prison for crimes linked to their animal rights campaigns.  For example, 
one of the co-founders of the animal rights group Stop Primate Experimentation at 
Cambridge (formerly known as SPEAC, and since changed to SPEAK to highlight 
that they are the voice for animals) has served sentences for attempting to commit 
arson attacks on animal testing facilities on two separate occasions.  Members of Stop 
Huntingdon Life Sciences (SHAC) have also served time in prison for a variety of 
offences liked to their campaign.  In 2007 for example, 32 people associated with 
SHAC were arrested as part of a large police operation, and in 2009 seven of them 
were sentenced to prison for up to 11 years, for various crimes including blackmail.  
Other research has also clearly shown that certain acts carried out by animal 
rights extremists can be classed as terrorism.  For example, Carson, LaFree and 
Dugan (2012) examined incidents carried out by animal rights and environmental 
extremist groups between 1997 and 2007 in the US and found that 17% of incidents 
could be defined as terrorism.  Included in theses incidents were a number of bomb 
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attacks carried out by animal rights groups.  The use of bombs by animal rights 
groups has also been highlighted by Wilson and Lemanski (2013) who looked at the 
apparent intended lethality of bomb attacks in the United States.  According to 
Schmid (1993) terrorism should be defined by the act that is carried out and not by 
the actor.  The fact that animal rights extremists have committed acts of terrorism by 
definition shows that regardless of the ideology or morality behind their actions, the 
label of terrorism can be appropriate. It is important to make this distinction as it 
highlights the seriousness of animal rights extremism; the effects of the actions 
carried out could have an impact not only on the individuals targeted directly, but 
also on industries and the economy as a whole.  
There are also a large number of people involved in the animal rights 
movement who have never committed any crimes, however it is suggested that this is 
the case in other terrorist organisations with a political agenda.  For example, 
McCauley and Moskalenko (2008) created a pyramid model of political 
radicalization, suggesting that the tip of the pyramid is formed of the terrorists 
themselves and the base represents the people who sympathise with their goals, with 
all other levels of involvement in between.  As the general public form the base of the 
pyramid the terrorist groups need their support to ‘hold them up’.  Further research 
conducted by Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) explores the differences between 
people who are fully radicalised, i.e. the terrorists, and those who are classed as 
activists; in this case defined as willing to participate in non-violent and legal action.  
Through their research, Moskalenko and McCauley (2009) conclude that ‘activists’ 
do not necessarily develop into fully radicalised terrorists, but rather they suggest that 
activism is a stand-alone phenomenon.  If this theory is accepted then it means that 
the large number of individuals involved in the legal side of the animal rights 
movement are unlikely to move on to play a more extreme role, but are there to hold 
up those that do. 
2.4 Strategies and tactics of animal rights extremists 
Regardless of whether animal rights extremism can be defined as terrorism, the acts 
committed by these groups can result in devastating effects for companies as well as 
numerous individuals.  As initially laid out by Singer (1975), animal rights extremists 
believe that all animals should have the same rights as humans, and as a result they 
have targeted institutions along with companies and individuals associated with those 
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that they believe to inflict cruelty to animals.  Included in these are biomedical 
research facilities, pharmaceutical companies, zoos, circuses, fur shops, hunting 
groups and racecourses, among numerous others. Campaigns have also focussed on 
politicians and farmers involved in the badger cull, as well as airlines involved in the 
transportation of live animals and universities involved in animal research. There are 
numerous animal rights groups in the UK, many of which have a focus on one 
particular animal rights campaign, although a lot of these groups also get involved 
and support other issues.  For example, it has already been addressed that SHAC 
were dedicated to shutting down Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS) due to their 
involvement in animal testing, however SHAC are also supporters of a wide range of 
other animal rights campaigns, and have in the past advertised other groups on their 
social networking sites (SHAC, 2013a).   
Unlike traditional terrorist groups, such as Islamic extremists, animal rights 
extremists tend not to use personal violence, preferring to use methods involving 
intimidation (Bailey, Rich & Bennett, 2010; Donovan & Coupe, 2013).  For example, 
in the past animal rights groups have used tactics such as protest, criminal damage, 
threatening letters, bribery and long term hate campaigns.  Animal rights groups also 
encourage supporters to take individual action, which means that action carried out in 
the name of animal rights may not have always been masterminded by an 
organisation (Carson, LaFree & Dugan, 2012; Monaghan, 2000).  Because of this 
autonomous action it is unknown exactly how many individuals are involved in the 
animal rights movement in the UK.  In 2011, Upton claimed that there were over 
10,000 subscribers to the SHAC newsletter, however the number of individuals 
willing to carry out direct action is likely to be far fewer; Metcalfe (2008) estimates 
that this number is likely to be less than 200.    
Serious illegal tactics have also been employed by animal rights extremists, 
although many researchers point out that these cases tend to be in the minority 
(Munro, 2005). Munro (2012) describes this category of the animal rights movement 
as the ‘Radical animal liberation movement’, or ‘RALM’. Included in this movement 
are tactics that can be classed as illegal, violent and/or extreme. Munro (2012) points 
out that actions carried out by RALM, even though more extreme, are still generally 
non-violent.  Tactics that could be classed under the definition of ‘RALM’ include 
criminal damage, animal liberation (freeing animals from breeding or research 
facilities, for example), arson, sabotage, directed intimidation, harassment or 
 
15 
blackmail against individuals.   Animal rights groups in the UK have also been seen 
to use more extreme tactics, with actions including letter bomb campaigns and the 
use of incendiary devices planted in shops (Monaghan, 1997), however non-violent 
methods are generally favoured over these extreme actions.    
Legal protest is one of the most common tactics used by animal rights 
extremists, with many groups holding legal protests on a regular basis, for example at 
the peak of their campaign, SHAC held a weekly protest in London to raise 
awareness of their campaign (SHAC, 2013b), and routine protests are held outside 
the clothes chain Beyond Retro for selling items of clothing made of fur (Coalition to 
Abolish Fur Trade, 2013).  The locations chosen to protest at are wide ranging.  
Many companies have issued restraining orders meaning that animal rights activists 
are not legally allowed to protest at the site of the company grounds, which means 
that they have to choose alternative locations (Donovan & Couple, 2013).  These 
locations have included the home addresses of people working for their target 
companies (Metcalfe, 2008), and public areas not necessarily linked to any targets, 
such as the weekly SHAC protest.  As well as pre-arranged protests, animal rights 
groups have also been known to organise spontaneous demonstrations when they 
receive last minute news.  For example, in 2013 activists linked to the animal rights 
campaign ‘Gateway to Hell’ rallied a number of activists to protest overnight when 
they received news that a shipment of beagles destined for laboratories was being 
flown into the UK (Brown Dog, 2013).  Animal rights activists have also been known 
to carry out other forms of legal protest, such as vigils and mock funerals which have 
been acted out to highlight the suffering of animals used for scientific research 
(Upton, 2011).   
In recent years, animal rights extremists have also used the internet and social 
media to further their campaigns in a number of ways.  As well as using websites to 
advertise and claim action, they also use the internet to carry out campaigns against 
their targets.  Upton (2011), for example, describes how animal rights extremists use 
video sharing sites such as YouTube to their benefit.  Undercover footage first shown 
in a documentary in 1997 in which HLS staff are seen to be mistreating animals is 
available on YouTube (Jones, 1997), and Upton (2011) states that this is an example 
of how animal rights extremists connect with their supporters with few restrictions.  
He also highlights how SHAC used their website to share their message and to 
encourage their supporters to send ‘polite communications’ to their targets. This is 
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done in order to inundate their targets with messages so that they are unable to 
identify the ‘real’ messages from those sent by animal rights activists. This tactic of 
blocking communications online has been used by a number of animal rights 
extremist groups.  For example, anti-badger cull activists hijacked the Twitter 
communications of the National Farmers Union (NFU) during the NFU conference in 
2013, during which they announced that the badger cull would be going ahead (Stop 
The Cull, 2013).  The SHAC website also gave advice on computer security in order 
to avoid potential incrimination.   
There is clearly a big distinction within the animal rights movement between 
legal, non-violent action, and more extreme forms of action.  There have been a 
number of theories around how and why terrorist organisations choose different types 
of tactics to help with their campaign.  Feinstein and Kaplan (2010), for example, 
looked at the strategies that a terrorist organisation might use when carrying out 
attacks.  They suggest that they can choose to carry out either a small-scale attack or 
a large-scale attack. The researchers suggest that terrorist groups will only engage in 
large scale attacks if they have the resources; until they do they might carry out a 
number of small scale attacks to get them noticed and increase their membership.  
Other researchers have pointed out that terrorists are likely to choose the form of 
attack that maximises the results using minimum resources (Drake, 1998a).  In 
addition, it is possible that small scale attacks might be chosen over large scale 
attacks if they are believed to result in a similar outcome, even if the terrorist group 
has the resources for a large scale attack (Feinstein & Kaplan, 2010).  Terrorists 
might also choose to carry out a small scale attack as there is more chance of a large 
scale attack failing; as the plan is less intricate there are less opportunities for failure.  
For example, an explosive device planted in an animal testing facility that failed to 
detonate may not have as much impact as a high profile protest held outside the 
facility. 
Animal rights groups have in the past been successful in achieving their aims 
without using physically violent methods, for example a campaign by supporters of 
the National Anti-Vivisection Alliance (NAVA) succeeded in persuading ferry 
companies to stop importing live animals into the UK for medical research (Sawyer, 
2012). According to news reports, the animal rights campaigners bombarded the 
directors of a number of ferry companies with letters and emails, which was all that 
was needed to be done to persuade them to stop transporting live animals.  Similar 
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tactics have been used against numerous airline companies, as well as on-going 
protests in an effort to stop them from transporting live animals that will be used in 
laboratories.  Campaign groups such as NAVA and SHAC have been successful with 
these tactics, as there are now only three airlines worldwide who are willing to 
transport live animals that are to be used in scientific research (PETA, 2013).  Animal 
rights extremists have also in the past been responsible for closing facilities 
associated with the use of animals in research.  For example, Upton (2011) mentions 
that in 1999 Hillgrove Cat Farm (breeders of cats for use in laboratories) closed as a 
result of three years of action from animal rights campaigners, with tactics including 
protests and intimidation. In 2004 the construction of an Oxford University lab was 
briefly halted due to action carried out by the SPEAK campaign.   
2.5 Target choice and ideology 
The use of targeting is likely to impact on the choice of tactic used by terrorists, 
which may also give some insight into the tactic choices of animal rights extremists. 
Academic research has highlighted the fact that targeting is important for terrorists 
when deciding how they want their message to be sent, and who they want to send it 
to (Drake, 1998a).  There have been numerous pieces of research looking at terrorist 
‘personalities’ and it is generally accepted that members of terrorist organisations are 
rational people and in general do not suffer from mental illness or other psychiatric 
disorders (Horgan, 2003).  Terrorists’ choice of target would therefore be the result of 
a well-planned, rational decision making process.  Previous literature has focussed on 
the decisions that terrorists have to make when choosing their most appropriate 
target.  When deciding on their choice of target, Drake suggests that there are a 
number of things that terrorists need to take into account, including ideology, strategy 
and tactics, support levels and capabilities of the terrorists.  Drake (1998a, 1998b) 
suggests that the ideology of the terrorist group is the main influence on target 
choice.  The ideology of a terrorist group involves the set of values and beliefs they 
have that relate to their political aim.  This ideology creates a ‘moral framework’ for 
who is an acceptable target and who is not.  This will differ between terrorist groups; 
what might be an acceptable target for one group might not be for another.  Previous 
research has demonstrated that for the most part animal rights activists do not believe 
in, or condone the use of violence against the person as a means to further their cause.  
Herzog (1993), for example, interviewed 23 individuals involved in the animal rights 
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movement and found that all but two did not believe that violence was a legitimate 
tactic.  In addition, Plous (1991) found that only seven per cent of a sample of 402 
animal rights activists value non-human life more than human life, indicating that 
these activists are unlikely to want to cause harm to other humans. 
Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) discuss the reasons why terrorist organisations 
do not carry out lethal attacks, and suggest that ideology plays an important role.  The 
authors highlight the fact that animal rights groups are among the least likely to kill, 
along with types of domestic extremism, such as anarchist and environmentalist 
groups.  Asal and Rethemeyer also point out that any group who believes in the 
sanctity of life would be very unlikely to take a life themselves.  As animal rights 
extremists believe that animals have the same rights as humans, and as a result do not 
believe in violence against animals, then it is unlikely that the activists would be 
willing to commit violence against humans.  As a result, animal rights extremists 
have chosen to get around the use of violence by either choosing non-human targets 
to get their message across, or by targeting humans using non-physically violent 
tactics.   
Ideology, however, is not the only thing that will influence targeting choice.  
Terrorist groups need to take into account their choice of strategy and tactics.  The 
strategic goals of the terrorists relate to the reaction they wish to get from their targets 
and how this helps their long-term political goals.  As well as this, Drake (1998a) 
suggests that terrorists need to think about how their target and strategy choice will 
affect their support levels.  Terrorists might decide to choose a target that will help to 
achieve their strategic goals, but this choice of target might lead to a drop in support 
resulting in them having to change their tactics.  
Drake (1998b) makes the distinction between physical targets and 
psychological targets.  A psychological target is a person or group of people the 
terrorists want to get a psychological reaction from, whether this reaction is positive 
or negative.  The physical target is not necessarily the same as the psychological 
target.  For example, a terrorist group might physically attack civilians in order to get 
a psychological reaction from the Government.  The physical target does not need to 
be human; the terrorists may choose to attack a building instead.  Animal rights 
extremists often target buildings in order to get their message across.  As noted by a 
number of researchers, buildings linked to animal testing have been the targets of 
criminal damage committed by a number of animal rights groups (Hadley, 2009; 
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Monaghan, 1999).  Animal rights extremists have been known to explicitly send 
messages to their psychological targets through criminal damage by leaving messages 
on buildings.  
As well as using non-human targets, animal rights extremists have also 
chosen the same psychological and physical human targets.  For many animal rights 
organisations their main targets are companies or institutions that they perceive to 
inflict cruelty to animals.  As a result, the owners or employees of these companies 
often become their targets, both physically and psychologically.  It is rare that animal 
rights extremists will choose a target that is unrelated to their primary target, for 
example they rarely target random members of the public (Asal & Rethemeyer; 
Hadley, 2000).  A distinction is made between primary, secondary and tertiary 
targets.  As mentioned, the primary target for the majority of animal rights extremist 
groups are the companies and institutions that inflict cruelty to animals, who have 
been directly targeted through criminal damage, protest and animal liberations.  
However, animal rights extremists have also chosen secondary and tertiary targets to 
act against, including employees of their target companies, the banks funding the 
companies, and smaller companies who supply products or services to the primary 
targets (Donovan & Coupe, 2013; Upton, 2011).  This is in part due to the fact that 
some of their primary targets may be out of reach due to security or legal issues 
(Donovan & Coupe, 2013), leaving secondary and tertiary targets more attainable. 
2.6 Animal rights extremism and aggression 
As this literature review has highlighted, there has been a wide range of 
research on animal rights extremists and their use of intimidating behaviours. 
However this body of work has largely explored the sociological implications of this, 
particularly whether their acts can be defined as terrorism. Little has been done, 
however, to explore how this intimidating behaviour relates to violence and 
aggression on a theoretical level.  Theories of aggression might help to understand 
the intimidating acts carried out by animal rights extremists. There have been a 
number of different perspectives on aggression, with each highlighting different 
aspects.  The behaviourist definition of aggression by Buss (1961) describes 
aggression as a behaviour that harms or injures another.  This definition, however, 
has been largely criticised as being too simplistic (Krahé, 2001).  The main criticisms 
of this definition are that it might include behaviours that are not meant to be 
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aggressive (causing harm by accident) and that it does not include behaviours where 
harm was intended but not inflicted (Tedeschi & Felson, 1994).  Dollard, Doob, 
Miller, Mowrer, and Sears (1939) offer an attributional definition of aggression, 
whereby an individual intends to cause harm to another.  Tedeschi and Felson (1994) 
also agree that intention plays an important role in aggression. They define an 
intentional action as “an act performed with the expectation that it will produce a 
proximate outcome of value to the actor” (p164).  Krahé (2001) suggests that 
avoidance in the target also plays an important role in the definition of aggression; in 
order for an act to be aggressive the target must want to avoid the aggressive 
behaviour.   
Intention to cause harm, expectation that harm will be caused and avoidance 
in the victim are recurring aspects used in current definitions of aggression (Baron & 
Richardson, 1994; Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Krahé, 2001, for example).  Most 
definitions of aggression also make a distinction between angry or hostile aggression 
and instrumental aggression (Buss, 1961).  An aggressive action might be carried out 
because the actor has negative feelings towards that person, or alternatively because 
the aggressive act will fulfil a certain goal.  Krahé (2001) points out that these two 
types of aggression are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  As well as the distinction 
between hostile and instrumental aggression, other distinctions have also been made.  
These range from the type of aggressive act carried out (physical/non-physical, 
direct/indirect), the type of harm caused (physical/psychological) and the timeframe 
of the aggressive behaviour (short term/long term), among others (Krahé, 2001).  
This shows that even within the definition of aggression, aggressive behaviours 
themselves can be extremely variable.  
Based on these definitions of aggression, intimidation cannot be ruled out as a 
form of aggressive behaviour.  If the intimidator intends and expects to harm their 
target (regardless of whether this is physical or not) and the target makes an effort to 
avoid the intimidation then this behaviour is classified as aggression.  The types of 
behaviours carried out by animal rights extremists in particular also fit in with this 
definition of aggression.  Animal rights groups have the ultimate goal of stopping 
animal cruelty, often using intimidation in order to achieve this. The intention of 
animal rights extremists is clear; they mean to cause fear or distress in their targets in 
order for them to fulfil their goal. Previous acts of intimidation have proved to be 
successful in causing enough harm to in their targets to achieve their goal (Upton, 
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2011) so this may also increase their expectancy of this behaviour being successful in 
the future.  Finally, targets, or potential targets, of animal rights groups have taken a 
range of different measures in an attempt to avoid being the victim of intimidating 
behaviour.  For example, companies might increase security measures (Bailey, Rich 
& Bennett, 2010) and individuals at risk of becoming a target may take steps to 
minimise the amount of personal information available to activists, and when 
aggressive behaviour has been unavoidable some targets have given into the 
aggressors’ demands (Donovan & Coupe, 2013). 
2.7 Summary 
 Regardless of whether animal rights extremism is classified as terrorism, the 
past literature has shown that intimidation campaigns have been used by animal 
rights extremists to create fear in their targets to help them achieve their aims.  There 
does, however, appear to be a limited understanding of how these acts of intimidation 
are used by animal rights extremists, and what behaviours are defined as intimidation 
as opposed to violence. Most of the existing research makes reference to the fact that 
animal rights extremists use intimidation tactics, but they do not offer a definition of 
intimidation, or how they are separating these tactics from violent ones, or if they are 
separating them at all. 
 Furthermore, a large part of the current research appears to focus on the more 
high profile acts of animal rights extremists, such as bombings and arson, or where 
the campaign has resulted in a newsworthy outcome, such as the Huntingdon Life 
Sciences having to move their banking to the Bank of England. As a result groups 
such as SHAC have been the focus of much research, whereas as other low level 
activists and associated activities have been neglected.   
This being said, it is clear that animal rights extremists have been successful 
in achieving their aims in the past without the need to use interpersonal violence. 
Therefore it is important to develop a more holistic picture of the acts that have been 
carried out, and to develop the understanding of how this relates to intimidation. 
Before this can be addressed, we must explore the concept of intimidation in more 
detail, which will be the focus of the next chapter. 
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Chapter Three 
 
What we know about intimidation: A literature review 
3.1 Overview 
As has been highlighted in the previous chapter, intimidation is of key importance to 
the tactics used by animal rights extremists in order to achieve their goals, however 
researchers have failed to address what they are defining as intimidation. Intimidation 
has been the focus of many high profile events in history, with clear examples of how 
this behaviour can be used effectively to create fear in people on both mass and 
personal levels.  The term intimidation first came into use in 1646, however the idea 
of intimidation had been made reference to far earlier.  For example, early writings 
on politics have discussed methods that would now be likely to be referred to as 
intimidation.  In the 15th century the philosopher and diplomat Niccolo Machiavelli 
(1469-1527) wrote about the use of fear in war and ruling.  Machiavelli proposed that 
in order to keep their rule, leaders need to use tactics such as fear, coercion and 
violence; traits which have been used by numerous leaders throughout history.  
Tactics such as these are particularly associated with dictatorships.   
 Intimidation has also been a tactic used by many terrorist groups. Terrorist 
groups may choose to use intimidation tactics over physical violence, or use them 
interchangeably, as they provide a way of creating fear without the risk and resources 
of physically having to carry out an attack (Feinstein & Kaplan, 2010).  Groups such 
as ETA and the Provisional IRA (PIRA) have in the past often used intimidation 
alongside violent acts to keep fear levels up in order to achieve their political goals.  
For example, PIRA were well known for their bombing campaigns in the UK and 
Ireland throughout the 1970s, 80s and 90s, often using hoax bombs interchangeably 
with real bombs in order to create fear. 
 Other high profile instances of intimidation throughout history include the 
tactics used by secret police and intelligence agencies, which are often, but not 
always, associated with dictatorships and authoritarian regimes.  For example, in the 
Soviet Union between 1954 and 1991 the KGB used intimidation to make sure that 
citizens conformed to a certain type of behaviour and to discourage subversive 
actions (Bahry & Silver, 1987).  The Stasi in East Germany also used these tactics 
between 1950 and 1990.   
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Racist groups have also used intimidation tactics, most famously by the Ku 
Klux Klan (KKK) in the southern states of America.  Alongside violent acts such as 
lynching and murder, intimidation was used by the KKK to secure white-only 
Christian areas for them to live in.  Acts such as burning crosses are still carried out 
today, and classed by researchers as a form of intimidation (Gey, 2005). 
These high profile cases of intimidation have happened on a large scale 
against groups of people, or even countries, and have often occurred alongside 
violence.  However, the use of intimidation does not always appear on such a large 
scale, often occurring on a personal level, such as intimidation in the work place and 
witness intimidation. 
High profile historical cases of intimidation give a good overview of how 
intimidation has been used to control behaviour on a large scale, but this is only one 
form of intimidation.  What we do know is that intimidation has been used effectively 
in the past to control masses, but this raises the question of what intimidation actually 
is?  In order to explore intimidation in more detail a literature review has been 
conducted.   
3.1.1 Search criteria 
A number of databases were searched, including APA PsychNet, PsychINFO, 
PsychARTICLES, Psychology and Behavioural Sciences Collection and 
PsychBOOKS.  Searches were limited to “definition of intimidation” or 
“intimidation” or “intimidate” appearing either as a key word, a subject term, or in 
the title.  This was in order to retrieve the most relevant articles and book chapters.  
Other relevant articles that came to light throughout an initial review of the literature 
were also included. Articles that focus on intimidation in non-humans (animals) and 
articles that discuss intimidation in a non-realistic setting, such as video games, were 
excluded.  Articles that had either intimidation in the title, key word or subject term, 
but do not make reference to intimidation in the body of the literature were also 
excluded.   
3.2 Definitions of intimidation  
In order to explore the concept of intimidation, one must begin with how it is defined. 
There are a variety of different definitions of intimidation available, across a number 
of sources.  Definitions have been gathered from reputable English dictionaries and 
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academic literature.  Each of these sources is discussed in turn, along with the 
similarities and differences apparent in the variety of definitions.   
3.2.1 Dictionary definitions 
The term ‘intimidate’ dates back to the 17th Century and comes from the Medieval 
Latin for ‘timid’; thus the literal meaning of intimidate is “to make timid”.   To this 
day Merriam Webster’s and Collins’ definitions of intimidate remain as “to make 
timid” although adding slightly more context.   
Table 1 shows a list of definitions of intimidation provided by major English 
Language Dictionaries. Although not all of the modern definitions make reference to 
‘timid’, all of the definitions state that intimidation is to cause fear in someone.  This 
puts emphasis on both the person ‘doing’ or causing the intimidation and the feelings 
of the person who has been intimidated.  Many of the dictionary definitions also 
make reference to intimidation being carried out with the goal of affecting someone 
else’s behaviour.  The behaviour change is described as either to compel, make 
someone do what you want, to coerce, to subdue or influence, to deter or prevent an 
action. 
The use of threats is also an integral part in many of the dictionary definitions.  
In a number of the definitions threats are given as an example as a form of 
intimidation that might be used to change someone else’s behaviour.  It should be 
clarified that rather than a threat being treated as the same thing as intimidation, the 
definitions state that a threat is only intimidating if it is used in order to influence 
someone’s behaviour against their will.  
Using the dictionary definitions of intimidation as a starting point we can start 
to build up a number of aspects of intimidation, however it leaves a number of 
questions unanswered.  For example, we can see from the definitions that the use of 
threats, coercion and blackmail are examples of behaviours associated with 
intimidation, but no other examples are given.  It is also unclear whether for an act to 
be intimidating both the intimidator needs to intend to make that person intimidated 
and the person needs to feel intimidated, or whether only one of these things needs to 
happen in order for intimidation to take place.  The following sections will attempt to 
address these questions and to build up a comprehensive understanding of 
intimidation.   
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Table 1: Dictionary definitions of intimidation 
Dictionary 
Definition of intimidate Definition of intimidation 
The Student’s English 
Dictionary, (Ogilvie & 
Annandale, 1903) 
To put fear or dread; to inspire 
with fear; to cow; to deter with 
threats 
Act of intimidating; the 
deterring of a person by 
threats or otherwise 
A Concise 
Etymological 
Dictionary of the 
English Language 
(Skeat, 1924) 
To frighten n/a 
Concise Oxford 
English Dictionary 
(Soanes & Stevenson, 
2004) 
Frighten or overawe, especially 
to subdue or influence 
n/a 
Merriam-Webster 
(2014) 
To make timid or fearful: 
frighten; to compel or deter by 
or as if by threats  
n/a 
Collins (2014) 1. To make timid or 
frightened; scare 
2. To discourage, restrain, or 
silence illegally or 
unscrupulously, as by 
threats or blackmail 
 
The use of threats, blackmail, 
or coercion to prevent an 
unwanted action 
Black’s Law 
Dictionary (legal 
definition) (Garner & 
Black, 2004) 
n/a Unlawful coercion; extortion 
Chambers 21st Century 
Dictionary (Chambers, 
1999) 
1. To coerce, especially with 
threats 
2. To frighten, scare or overawe 
n/a 
Longman Dictionary 
of Contemporary 
English (1987) 
1. To frighten or threaten 
someone into making them do 
what you want (intimidate 
someone into doing something) 
2. To make someone feel 
worried and not confident 
n/a 
Macmillan Dictionary 
(2014) 1. To deliberately make 
someone feel frightened, 
especially so that they will do 
what you want 
2. To frighten someone or make 
them feel nervous 
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3.2.2 Definitions offered in the literature 
Dictionary definitions of intimidation provide a basis for understanding of what 
intimidation is and how it is defined.  A review of the academic literature may also 
help to further this understanding and to see how researchers are defining 
intimidation, and whether this is consistent across contexts.  Table 2 shows a 
summary of these definitions. 
As can be seen from Table 2, the academic definitions of intimidation are 
extremely wide ranging, and in many cases they are not explicit enough to rule out 
most types of behaviours.  For example, Clawar’s (1977) definition of intimidation in 
a sales setting would include almost all sales techniques.   
Only one article in particular offers a review of intimidation itself.  
Lamontagne (2010) attempts to analyse the concept of intimidation in order to gain a 
greater understanding of what it means, specifically in healthcare settings. 
Lamontagne states that intimidation is referred to as both a process and an outcome.  
This fits in with what has been learnt about intimidation up to this point; that integral 
parts of intimidation include the fact that an intimidating behaviour is carried out by 
the perpetrator (the process) and that this results in negative feelings of the victim and 
the potential behaviour change (the outcome).  Lamontagne offers a number of 
definitions of intimidation provided by numerous authors, all of which have also been 
included in this review.  Although they have not reviewed intimidation themselves, 
Crawford, Stuart, Smith & Brennan (2004) and Darby (1986) agree that more work 
needs to be done to define intimidation more explicitly. 
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Table 2: Definitions of intimidation in the literature 
Author 
Definition Source 
Clawar (1977) “the use of any conscious technique by the salesperson to control the 
buyer-seller interaction” 
The author(s) 
Jones & Pittman 
(1982) 
“acting threatening to others so they will perceive one as dangerous or 
forceful” 
The author(s) 
Connick & 
Davis (1983) 
(witness intimidation) “threats made by defendants to discourage victims 
or eyewitnesses of crime from reporting or testifying” 
The author(s) 
Darby (1986) “intimidation is defined as the process by which, through the exercise of 
force or threat, or from a perception of threat, a person feels under 
pressure to leave home or workplace against his or her will.” 
The author(s) 
Bahry & Silver 
(1986) 
“fear of the KGB and of other people”  The author(s) 
Sands (1998) “the emotional response to a threatening environment” The author(s) 
Bolino & 
Turnley (1999) 
“where people signal their power or potential to punish in order to be seen 
as dangerous by observers” 
The author(s) 
Fyfe & McKay 
(2000) 
“threats to harm someone and acts to harm them; physical and financial 
harm to the person or property; acts or threats against a third party...with 
the purpose of deterring the witness from reporting the crime in the first 
instance or deterring them from giving evidence in court”  
Criminal 
Justice and 
Public order 
Act, 1994 
Tibbo et al. 
(2002) 
1) behaviour or threats that imply loss of future opportunity, worsening 
abuse, or comprise of education and 2) abuse of power through threats or 
coercion 
The author(s) 
Bolino & 
Turnley (2003) 
“an impression management tactic in which individuals let others know 
that they can make things difficult for them if they are pushed too far, 
deal aggressively with individuals who get in their way, or use forceful 
behaviour to get colleagues to behave appropriately.” 
The author(s) 
Kaeter (1999) “not being treated with respect, or any behavior, no matter how small that 
causes another to doubt their self-worth . . . or causes harm in the 
workplace.” 
 
The author(s) 
Crawford, 
Stuart, Smith & 
Brennan (2004) 
“ability to instil fear or exert control over opponents, particularly through 
physical aggression” 
The author(s) 
Seabrook (2004) “to strike fear into; to influence by threats or violence”  Chambers 20th 
Century 
Dictionary, 
1977  
Gallagher, 
Harris & Valle 
(2008) 
An “influence behaviour tactic” 
 
The author(s) 
Koritsas, Coles 
& Boyle (2010) 
“A patient/client, their friend/s, family member/s, other professional/s or 
work colleague/s purposely threatening, following you, using gestures to 
purposely offend or frighten you” 
The author(s) 
del Prado (2011) “counter-dissuasive action”  The author(s) 
Zimmerman & 
Amori (2011) 
“Any behavior that influences the desire of staff to reduce, limit, or 
eliminate any patient safety interaction with a given individual because he 
or she expects the encounter to be unpleasant fits the definition of 
insidious intimidation.” 
The author(s) 
Tyler, 
Connaughton, 
Desrayaud & 
Fedesco (2012) 
“tend to induce fear and signal the potential threat of negative 
consequences” 
The author(s) 
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3.2.3 Impression Management definitions 
A number of authors who have researched intimidation in organisational settings 
have referred to intimidation as an impression management (IM) tactic and as such 
definitions of intimidation in this context have been created.  Many studies on IM 
quote Jones and Pittman’s (1982) definition of intimidation as: “acting threatening to 
others so they will perceive one as dangerous or forceful” (Jones & Pittman, 1982).  
This definition was developed as part of their attempt to create a taxonomy of IM.  
Using Jones and Pittman’s work as a starting point, Borino and Turnley (1999) have 
offered a number of definitions of intimidation.  Firstly they give a more general 
definition as: 
 
“where people signal their power or potential to punish in order to be seen as 
dangerous by observers” (Bolino & Turnley, 1999, page 190). 
 
They later refined this by adding an explicit link to the use of intimidation in 
organisational settings: 
 
“[Intimidation is] an impression management tactic in which individuals let 
others know that they can make things difficult for them if they are pushed too 
far, deal aggressively with individuals who get in their way, or use forceful 
behaviour to get colleagues to behave appropriately.” (Bolino and Turnely, 
2003a, page 238) 
 
 This definition is restricted to workplace intimidation, and is not appropriate 
for intimidation in other settings, however a proportion of the IM literature included 
in this review use either Jones and Pittman’s or Bolino and Turnely’s definitions, or 
make reference to both of them (Gallagher, et al., 2008; Harris, Gallagher, & Rossi, 
2013; Smith, Whitehead, Melo, Correa, & Inch, 2013; Whitaker & Dahling, 2013).  
Although Bolino and Turnely’s and Jones and Pittman’s references are popular in the 
impression management and workplace intimidation literature, they are by no means 
the only definitions offered, with many other authors using other definitions (such as 
Koritsas, Coles, and Boyle, 2010). 
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 It should also be noted that while most of the literature on IM is restricted to 
an organisational setting, it will often also be the case that intimidators in other 
settings will be engaged in impression management, in that the victim needs to 
believe that the intimidator has the means to harm them, and as a result feels 
intimidated by them. 
3.2.4 Intimidation as a social construct 
In a number of studies a definition for intimidation is not given, and instead their 
participants are asked to use their own definition.  For example, in their study on 
forensic psychiatrists’ experience of intimidation, Norris and Gutheil (2003) have left 
their participants to define intimidation themselves.  In Waddington, Badger and 
Bull’s (2005) research on the definition of workplace violence they also let their 
participants, in this case police officers and social workers, define intimidation, as did 
Dull and Fox (2010) in their research on intimidation in healthcare settings.  
Musselman, MacRae, Reznik & Lingard, (2005) also explore how intimidation is 
defined by their participants, rather than offering a discreet definition themselves.  
Musselman et al. carried out qualitative research to understand whether teachers and 
students define intimidation in the same way. 
 Using participants to define intimidation themselves puts emphasis on the 
importance on the victims’ experience of intimidation.  This is also echoed in the 
dictionary definitions where the experience of fear in the victim is described as an 
integral part of intimidation.  It is therefore necessary that the victims themselves 
should be able to express their own feelings in order to assess whether an act can be 
seen as intimidation, as well as looking at the act carried out by the perpetrator. 
3.2.5 Intimidation as goal orientated behaviour  
Although the majority of the literature reviewed does not provide explicit definitions 
of intimidation, a number of themes occur in relation to intimidation.  One of these 
themes is the idea that intimidation is a goal-orientated behaviour, and in most cases 
the goal is to influence or change another person or group of people’s behaviour. For 
example, intimidating behaviours carried out by pro-life groups are conducted in 
order to deter people from attending abortion clinics, and ultimately to shut these 
clinics down (Doan, 2009; Funk, 2006).  Similarly animal rights groups use 
intimidation tactics in order to achieve their goal of stopping what they perceive to be 
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cruelty to animals (Donovan & Coupe, 2013) by attempting to stop people from 
being associated with those they see as inflicting cruelty to animals.  Darby (1986) 
explored how intimidation was used in the Belfast riots in 1864 to attempt to move 
groups of people away from certain areas, and other research has continued to look at 
how intimidation has been used by political groups in Northern Ireland more recently 
as a way of achieving desired goals (Murphy, 2000; Shirlow, 2005; for example).   
Research on organisational intimidation and impression management is also 
based around the premise that intimidation is one tactic used in order to get 
colleagues to behave in a desired way (Bolino & Turnley, 2003a, 2003b, 1999).  The 
literature has also highlighted other reasons for using intimidation, for example 
victim and witness intimidation is often used to deter individuals from reporting 
crime or testifying in court (Healey, 1995; Tarling, Dowds & Budd, 2000). Other 
examples include intimidation being used to get people to pay their hospital bills 
(Elsbach, Sutton & Principe, 1998; Tyler, et al. 2012) and to gain advantage over 
opponents in sport (Shields, 1999). 
In cases where intimidation is carried out to achieve a certain goal, this 
implies that there is an intention to intimidate (in order to achieve this goal).  This 
appears to be an integral part to the dictionary definitions of intimidation and is for 
the most part reflected in the literature.  However in some cases of intimidation in the 
literature this may not be the case.  For example, Beyea (2004) suggests that in 
medical environments individuals may not realise that they are being intimidating to 
others (in this case nurses).  Seabrook (2004) also makes a point of noting that 
intention to cause intimidation is not necessarily a key part in the definition. The idea 
that behaviour can be intimidating without actually intending to be is the focus of 
Malterud and Thesen’s (2008) research on unintentional intimidation of patients by 
healthcare workers.  Although they do not offer a definition of intimidation, the 
subject of their research indicates that they do not believe that intimidation needs to 
be intentional in order for it to be defined as such.  This does however leave it open 
for numerous different types of behaviours to be characterised as intimidation if no 
boundaries are set. 
3.2.6 Intimidation and threats 
Another recurring theme regularly associated with intimidation in the literature is the 
use of threats.  Like in the dictionary definitions, mention of threats or threatening 
 
31 
behaviour appear in a number of the definitions of intimidation (Jones & Pittman, 
1982; Seabrook, 2004).  Sands (1998) also defines intimidation in relation to threats: 
“[intimidation is] the emotional response to a threatening environment” (Sands, 1998, 
page 807).  This implies that the threat is not treated as the same as intimidation, but 
that intimidation could be the outcome of a threat, as has been shown in the 
dictionary definitions of intimidation.   
References to threats also appear in the literature where no definition is 
supplied, or where a definition is a work in progress.  For example, Darby (1986) 
provides a comprehensive review of intimidation in relation to the troubles in 
Northern Ireland.  He suggests that intimidation can be associated with threat, 
determined as an “anticipation of danger” or fear, determined as an “immediate 
perception of danger”.  He ultimately concludes that: 
 
“intimidation is defined as the process by which, through the exercise of force 
or threat, or from a perception of threat, a person feels under pressure to 
leave home or workplace against his or her will.” (Darby, 1968, page 53). 
 
Other studies have also associated intimidation with either threats or fear (De 
Lara, 2006; Doan, 2009; Funk, 2006; Healey, 1995; Kelly & Waddington, 2006; 
Smith et al., 2013; Tarling, et al., 2000; Tyler, et al., 2012).  A further discussion on 
threats as a type of intimidating behaviour is discussed in the associated behaviours 
section 3.5.   
3.2.7 Intimidation and harassment 
Other terms are also used alongside intimidation throughout a number of studies.  For 
example, harassment is used interchangeably in Norris and Guntheil’s (2003) 
research on intimidation of forensic psychiatrists.  Harassment is also used alongside 
intimidation in a number of other articles (Calof, 1998; Crutcher, Szafran, 
Woloschuk, Chatur, & Hansen, 2011; Doan, 2009; Musselman, et al., 2005; for 
example), with no clear distinction made between harassment and intimidation in 
these cases.  
Like the relationship between intimidation and threats, harassment should not 
be confused as intimidation in and of itself.  Harassment is distinguished from 
intimidation as it refers to a repeated attack.  Therefore a repeated act of intimidation 
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might be seen as harassment but harassment in itself is not necessarily intimidation, 
as it would depend on what the repeated act was.     
3.2.8 Summary 
The review of both dictionary definitions and definitions of intimidation in the 
literature has highlighted a number of key aspects of intimidation.  It is proposed that 
in order for something to be intimidating, or for someone to intimidate, the following 
aspects should be present: 
 The victim must experience a negative emotion, such as feeling 
frightened / timid / threatened / overawed / nervous as a result of the 
act carried out by the perpetrator, and 
 The perpetrator must do this, or be perceived to do this, in order to 
achieve a goal by either attempting to change the behaviour or keep 
the behaviour of the victim the same, against the victim’s will. 
It is proposed that both the goals of the perpetrator and the feelings of the 
victim need to be evident in order for an act to be seen as intimidation.  This is to rule 
out any acts that might have been carried out with an unexpected response from the 
victim, or an act that is not seen to be intimidating by the victim.  This definition is 
inclusive in that it can be applied to all of the settings of intimidation.  This definition 
also does not currently limit intimidation to one of a distinct list of behaviours, rather 
that any behaviour that meets the above criteria can be seen as intimidating.  
3.3 Intimidation in UK law 
Looking at where intimidation appears in the law will help to further our 
understanding of how this term is defined.  Although there is not one specific law 
against intimidation as a general term in the UK, mention of it does appear in a 
number of criminal acts.  In most of these cases intimidation appears as a crime only 
in specific contexts.  One of the clearest pieces of legislation relating to intimidation 
appears in the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1992.  This Act makes it illegal 
for a person to carry out an act that would either stop someone from doing something 
that they have the right to do, or to make somebody do something that they have the 
right to abstain from doing, including using intimidation to do so.   
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Other acts that mention intimidation in order to achieve a goal includes the 
Terrorism Act 2000.  Section 1 defines an act of terrorism, and includes intimidating 
the public in order to further the goals of a “political, religious or ideological cause”.  
The Act gives a list of actions that would be construed as terrorism which include 
both physically violent behaviours such as serious violence against a person, 
endangering lives and creating a serious safety risk, as well as non-physically violent 
behaviours such as property damage and disruption to an electronic system.   
Section 51 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 covers witness 
intimidation.  An offence in this case is committed if the offender both intends to 
intimidate the victim and the victims feels intimidated with the goal of interfering 
with a criminal investigation or court proceedings.  In this case the victim needs to be 
associated with the criminal case, for example as a witness or juror.  The actions used 
to intimidate are defined in the Act, and include both harming and intending to harm 
the victim, and intended to cause fear of harm, including the use of threats.  
Intimidation is also addressed in the Equality Act 2010, Section 26, which 
covers harassment.  The legislation refers to one example of harassment as creating 
an “intimidating environment” for the victim. This Act states that in order for a crime 
to take place there needs to be an intention to create this intimidating environment, or 
the victim needs to feel that there is an intimidating environment.  This differs from 
witness intimidation where both the offender intends to intimidate the victim, and the 
victim feels intimidated in order for it to be a crime.  The intimidation in the Equality 
Act only becomes a crime when the behaviour is directed to someone because of a 
protected characteristic such as race, gender, religion or sexual orientation, among 
others.  It is also important here to mention that in many US States the crime of 
ethnic intimidation also exists.  Whereas the UK’s Equality Act covers intimidation 
against race as one of a number of protected characteristics, the ethnic intimidation 
law focuses solely on this.   
As well as the laws that explicitly mention intimidation, there are other areas 
of the UK law where intimidation appears to be relevant, although the term is not 
specifically mentioned.  For example, the Malicious Communications Act 1988, 
Section 1, states that it is an offence to send a letter or other article that is threatening, 
and has the intention of causing distress or anxiety in the recipient.  Similarly the 
Telecommunications Act 1984 makes it illegal to use a public telecommunications 
system to cause a person anxiety.  Threats to kill are also a crime under the Offences 
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Against the Person Act 1861, as would be any physically violent acts that were 
carried out as a result of these threats. Threatening behaviour in general is also 
covered in the Public Order Act 1986.  The relationship between threats and 
intimidation is discussed in more detail later on in the review, in section 3.5. 
The mention of intimidation in the law helps to build upon the understanding 
of how intimidation is defined by others.  It emphasises the need for both the 
perpetrator to intend to intimidate the victim and/or for the victim to feel intimidated 
in order for an act to be seen as intimidation, which aligns with the previously 
proposed definition of intimidation.  The range of legislation that intimidation 
appears in highlights that intimidation can be diverse and appear in a number of 
different settings.  The criminal law also provides some further examples of 
behaviours that might be construed as intimidation, such as threats and trade union 
action.  The law also highlight reasons the different types of goals that an intimidator 
might have for their actions, such as changing witness’s behaviours in a court case.  
3.4 Situations in which intimidation occurs 
It is also important to review the contexts in which intimidation occurs in order to 
develop a further understanding of intimidation.  The review of the literature has 
found that there is an extremely diverse range of settings where intimidation occurs.  
These settings range from everyday environments, such as intimidation in 
organisational settings, to more extreme intimidation focussed on specific targets.  A 
summary of the most prominent settings is given below. 
3.4.1 Animal Rights 
It has already been highlighted that the animal rights campaign is an example of 
intimidation discussed in the literature.  As we have seen, a number of articles have 
explored the types of behaviours used by animal rights groups, and the success of 
these tactics in achieving their goals.  Donovan and Coupe (2013) focussed their 
research on one animal rights group in particular, in this case Stop Huntingdon 
Animal Cruelty (SHAC) who are widely known in the UK for their extreme 
intimidation campaigns against Huntingdon Life Sciences.  Other researchers have 
focussed on a range of animal rights campaigns, all of which use intimidation tactics 
(Bailey, Rich and Bennett, 2010; Metcalfe, 2008; Munro, 2005).  
 
35 
3.4.2 Terrorism 
The law and previous research suggests that intimidation is an integral part of 
terrorism; the idea of intimidation and fear is frequently mentioned in research on 
terrorism, often alongside physically violent acts of terrorism.  Waldron (2004) 
explores the idea that there is a distinction between intimidation from terrorism and 
intimidation from other types of crime.  He suggests that in non-terrorist forms of 
intimidation the intimidator states that if the victim does not fulfil their demands then 
they will carry out their threat.  In terrorism, however, Waldron (2004) suggests that 
the threat is carried out initially, and then the victim is told that if they do not fulfil 
their demands then the threat will continue to be carried out.  Waldron (2004) argues 
that the fact that the threat is already carried out before the intimidation takes place is 
what makes acts of intimidation through terrorism different to acts of intimidation 
through other crimes.   
There has also been research looking at the use of intimidation by specific 
terrorist groups.  For example, Pena, Carballeira, Solanelles, Garcia and Winkel 
(2010) looked at the use of psychological terrorism by the terrorist organisation ETA.  
The authors suggest that psychological violence can be caused by the threat of 
physical violence, as well as coercion and intimidation.  Pena et al. (2010) propose 
that ETA use a continuum of terrorist tactics, ranging from psychological to physical 
violence.  The psychological acts are described as including coercion, intimidation, 
extortion and threats.  Using this as their basis, the authors developed a taxonomy of 
tactics of psychological violence used by ETA.  They discovered that the 
psychological strategies could be divided into four dimensions: social environmental, 
emotional, cognitive and behavioural.  Generally they found that the strategies either 
aim to isolate the target, or to be directly aggressive towards them.  The authors also 
note that all of these tactics involve the use of threat or intimidation. 
Research focussing on the troubles in Northern Ireland has also explored the 
use of intimidation.  For example, Darby (1986) describes how intimidation was used 
during the troubles in Northern Ireland, with a specific focus on how intimidation 
was used in an attempt to move people out of certain areas.  Although intimidation is 
often referred to in the literature on the conflict in Northern Ireland, for both 
intimidation against large populations, and individual targets, it is often 
overshadowed by more extreme violent behaviour or the political implications 
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(Murphy, 2000; Shirlow, 2003; for example).  As a result, intimidation does not 
always appear as a main focus in the literature even though intimidation is prevalent 
in this setting. 
Rather than focussing on intimidation, a number of researchers have chosen to 
look at other concepts such as terror or fear.  Marshall (2012), for example, suggests 
that terrorism plays on the human fear of death in order to achieve their goals, and 
only those immune to the fear of death would be immune to the effects of terrorism.  
Other researchers have suggested that the fear of death could explain why people 
might choose to join a terrorist group.  Terror Management Theory, or TMT 
(Greenberg, Pyszczynski & Solomon, 1986), proposes that the biggest threat to 
humans is the inevitability of death, and therefore people live in constant terror of 
death.  The most basic human instinct is to reduce this terror.  Greenberg et al. (1986) 
suggest that fear of death can lead to group formation with people who share similar 
worldviews.  This can reduce the fear of death and increase self-esteem through the 
feeling of belonging to something.  However, Pyszczynski, Rothschild and Abdollahi 
(2008) state that this can lead to problems when other groups challenge another’s 
worldviews.  Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg (2003) suggest that the need to 
defend one’s cultural worldviews can go as far as attempting to annihilate groups 
who threaten their own worldview.  Therefore, in extreme cases, acts of terrorism 
may be committed in an attempt to get rid of the threatening group.   
3.4.3 Pro-life groups 
A number of articles included in this review also focus on intimidation campaigns 
carried out by pro-life groups against abortion clinics and those associated with them, 
particularity in the United States.  In Doan’s (2009) book on intimidation campaigns 
by pro-life groups, she explores how political models could be used to explain 
intimidation, and gives an in-depth summary of the types of intimidation campaigns 
that have been carried out by pro-life groups.  She also discusses the successes and 
failures of these campaigns and the impact that they have had on their targets.  Azriel 
(2005), Freilich and Pridemore (2007) and Funk (2006) also highlight the extent and 
seriousness of intimidation and violence from pro-life groups.  
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3.4.4 Victim and witness intimidation 
Another setting that is discussed in the literature is the intimidation of victims and 
witnesses, which is also highlighted in UK law.  Specifically, research articles have 
focussed on witnesses and victims of organised crime and street gangs, as well as 
victims of domestic violence.  The Home Office has produced a number reports on 
victim and witness intimidation in the UK.  One such report using results from the 
1998 British Crime Survey (Tarling, et al., 2000) found that 15% of victims who had 
knowledge of their offender experienced some form of intimidation. Furthermore, 8% 
of witnesses to either vandalism, vehicle related crime or assault experienced some 
form of intimidation.  Similar results had also been found in a previous Home Office 
publication (Maynard, 1994).  Tarling et al. (2000) found that in the majority of cases 
the intimidation was carried out by the original offender, however in some cases the 
offender’s friend or a family member carried out the intimidation.  Further research 
by the Home Office indicates that the prevalence of witness intimidation might 
become higher for those who attend court (Whitehead, 2001).  Data collected in the 
Witness Satisfaction Survey found that 25% of witnesses going through the court 
process felt intimidated by an individual.  Unlike the previous Home Office research, 
this study also measured feelings of intimidation by the general process of going to 
court, and found that 18% of witnesses experienced this.  Other authors have also 
pointed out that it can be difficult to identify intimidated witnesses, especially in 
circumstances where the witness is particularly vulnerable, for example if they are a 
child, or in an on-going relationship with the defendant (Burton, Evans & Sanders, 
2006). 
Other research has looked at more specific cases of victim and witness 
intimidation.  For example, Healey (1995) focussed on drug and gang related victim 
and witness intimidation in the US.  According to interviews with prosecutors, 
Healey states that at the time of reporting up to 75% of the victims and witnesses 
from areas dominated by gangs experienced intimidation.  Fyfe and McKay (2000) 
also comment on how witness intimidation from organised crime gangs has come to 
be such a problem in the UK that witness protection measures have been put in place. 
Melde and Rennism (2010) acknowledge that intimidation is a key feature of gang 
culture. However using data from the National Crime Victimization Survey they 
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found that victims and witnesses were actually not any less likely to give evidence if 
they thought that the crime was committed by a gang member.     
3.4.5 Organisational 
Intimidation in organisational settings also features in the literature.  This shows the 
more everyday experience of intimidation.  Much of the organisational intimidation 
research has looked at intimidation as an impression management tool, with studies 
looking at the use of this by both employees (Bolino & Turnely, 2003a; Gallagher et 
al., 2008) and management (De Lara, 2006), and even by US Presidents (Smith et al., 
2013).  A lot of the organisational research on intimidation has focussed on 
intimidation directed by management towards their staff.   De Lara (2006), for 
example, looked at whether organisational intimidation affects workplace deviance – 
in this case overuse of the Internet for personal reasons.   
Other research has looked at the use of intimidation by staff, rather than by 
managers, as a form of impression management.  For example, both Bolino and 
Turnely (2003a) and Whitaker and Dahling (2013) found that in some cases the use 
of intimidation by staff actually had a positive effect on managers’ views of the 
intimidators.  Research on organisational intimidation has also highlighted the 
negative effects of intimidation in the workplace.  For example, Gallagher et al. 
(2008) found that job tension is positively related to the use of intimidation in the 
workplace.  Harris et al. (2013) also found that intimidation in the workplace was 
positively related to burnout and job stress, and working in an intimidating culture 
was negatively related to job satisfaction.  In many cases in this area of research there 
are no specific examples of intimidation given, rather there is just mention of 
‘intimidating behaviours’ or ‘threats’.   
3.4.6 Sport 
A number of articles relating to intimidation in sport have been identified.  
Intimidation is described in two distinct settings within sport; intimidation between 
the players, and intimidation directed towards the players from management.   
 Shields (1999) explored the use of intimidation in high school athletics in 
North Carolina.  Shields (1999) suggests that intimidation is a tactic used in sport, not 
only to help win games by gaining advantages over opponents, but as a way of 
keeping the spectators entertained.  Data from questionnaires carried out by 148 
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athletic directors in the state showed that verbal intimidation (taunting, mocking, 
ridiculing, etc.) was evident in over half of their respective athletic programmes, and 
physical intimidation (physical contact short of striking) in about a third.  Other 
studies have focussed exclusively on physical intimidation in sport (Crawford et al. 
2004; Grange and Kerr, 2010; Miller, Roberts & Ommundsen, 2005). 
From an alternative perspective, Kelly and Waddington (2006) explored the 
use of intimidation by managers in soccer in the UK and Ireland.  Like intimidation 
between players, managerial intimidation is seen to be a part of the culture of sport, 
and accepted by the players, highlighting that intimidation can be normalised in 
certain settings.  
3.4.7 Educational settings 
Intimidation in educational settings has been looked at from a number of different 
perspectives in the literature.  These include examples of where intimidation occurs 
due to a perpetrator intentionally causing it, as well as situations where intimidation 
occurs purely because of the situation, but nobody actually intended to cause it.  
Based on the previous discussion on definitions of intimidation this clearly would not 
be defined as true intimidation, but rather perhaps a general perception of what 
intimidation is.     
One area discussed in the literature where intimidation is intentionally caused 
is the intimidation experienced by medical students from their teachers.  Many 
authors comment on the prevalence of intimidation in certain medical educational 
settings, and describe this as part of the culture in teaching medical and dental 
students (Musselman, et al, 2005; Rowland, Naidoo, AbdulKadir, Moraru, Huang, & 
Pau, 2010; Seabrook, 2004).  Not all research into medical educational settings found 
that there was an intimidating culture in existence.  For example, Tibbo et al. (2002) 
found that in a psychiatric educational environment in Canada there was no evidence 
of intimidation.  Other research into general education settings has also failed to find 
high levels of intimidation.  For example Micari and Drane (2011) found little 
prevalence of intimidation among university students in small learning groups, again 
showing the importance of using a clear definition of intimidation, which may have 
ruled out the need to explore something that might not actually be intimidation.  
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3.4.8 Clinical settings 
The literature has commented on the experience of intimidation in clinical and 
psychiatric settings. Coverdale, Gale, Weeks & Turbott (2001), for example found 
that in one medical school in New Zealand the majority of trainee physicians had 
been either physically or verbally intimidated by their patients.  Other research has 
found that there is evidence of healthcare workers experiencing intimidation from 
non-patient populations (Norris & Gutheil, 2003; Miller, 1985).  For example, Norris 
and Gutheil (2003) found that out of 14 forensic psychiatrists, the majority had 
experienced intimidation as a result of being an expert witness in court.  The authors 
state that these cases of intimidation occurred as a result of a disagreement with the 
psychiatrists’ testimony, and the intimidation was perpetrated by a variety of people, 
including the attorneys involved in the court proceedings.   
Intimidation against nurses is also mentioned in the literature, which is similar 
to the intimidation perpetrated against medical students.  Beyea (2004) suggests that 
nurses might feel intimidated both by doctors and by senior nurses.  
 Malterud and Thesen (2008) have also demonstrated that patients as well as 
clinicians can be intimidated unintentionally.  Their qualitative study on health and 
social care professionals revealed that the healthcare workers had inadvertently 
intimidated patients either by neglecting their needs, patronising them or overruling 
them.   
 The literature on clinical settings shows that the term intimidation is used for 
quite general feelings that one might experience every day, but might not represent 
true intimidation.   
3.5 Behaviours associated with intimidation 
Having explored the definition of intimidation, and the different settings that the 
literature on intimidation has explored, the following section will review the different 
types of behaviours that are associated with intimidation.  A list of the individual 
behaviours that have been associated with intimidation in the literature are shown in 
Table 3.  The majority of behaviours associated with intimidation were mentioned 
across a variety of settings, however other behaviours were more distinct in particular 
settings.  A short discussion of these behaviours is provided below.   
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Table 3: Behaviours associated with intimidation 
Behaviour  
Physical violence  
Acting forcefully/aggressively 
Attempted hit and run 
Bombings in an area (acts of terrorism) 
Bumping 
General violence in an area 
Hitting 
Physical assault 
Pushing 
Rough play 
Shoving 
Throwing things 
Verbal communications 
Being berated 
Being made to feel stupid / being expected to know more than has been taught 
Communicating with sarcasm 
Condescending language 
Derogatory and malicious statements 
Embarrassing students by highlighting their ignorance 
Fits of anger / loss of temper 
Gossiping 
Hate speech 
Impatience with questions 
Inappropriate verbal comments 
Let others know that you can make things difficult for them 
Passive-aggressiveness 
Patronising/condescending language 
Public shaming 
Screaming 
Taunting/insults/mocking/ridiculing/trash-talking 
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Vague verbal warnings 
Verbal abuse including being sworn at 
Non-verbal communication 
Brandishing weapons 
Bullets sent in envelopes 
Hanging around a person’s house 
Negative or threatening body language 
Pointing 
Reluctance or refusal to answer your questions, return phone calls or pages 
Sending of tampons allegedly contaminated with the AIDS virus 
Staring, sighing, glaring, gestures, making faces, eyeing up 
Threatening body language including displays of fists/ squaring up 
Threatening looks/gestures 
Using hate symbols, such as burning crosses and swastikas 
Threats 
Death threats 
Poison Pen/ threatening letter 
Threatening/anonymous/nuisance/harassing phone calls 
Threats involving child custody 
Threats of deportation 
Threats of destroying families 
Threats of physical violence 
Threats to kill loved ones 
Property / Criminal Damage  
Arson 
Disruptive trespasses into the premises (aggravated trespass) 
General criminal damage 
General property damage 
Graffiti/vandalism 
Gathering and/or sharing personal information 
Creating ‘wanted’ posters for individuals online 
Encouraging others to write a letter to specific people 
Finding location of families 
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Putting personal details online 
Work related  
Blame atmosphere 
Disciplinary procedures at work 
Formal complaints 
Over ruling 
Reporting to a manager 
Reporting you to your manager (actual or threat) 
Work as punishment 
Bullying  
Being picked on 
Protests 
Demonstrations and damage at the homes of members of staff (‘home visits’) 
Noisy protests outside the premises 
Picket lines outside offices 
Online  
Distributed denial of service attacks (blocking websites) 
The coordinated sending of emails to block companies’ email systems 
Other 
Creating ‘hit lists’ 
Delivery of unwanted material from mail order companies 
Economic intimidation 
False allegations of paedophilia 
Foreceful sales techniques 
Hoax bombs 
Interference with attorney/client relationship 
Large groups showing up to court 
Lawsuits/legal action 
Making students learn rules by getting them wrong, rather than being taught in the 
first place 
Masked men calling at the door 
Mass cards posted with intimidating messages  
Neglecting basic needs 
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Privileges/opportunities taken away 
Recrimination for reporting inappropriate/unwanted physical contact 
Sexual harassment 
Stalking 
Withholding drugs (from addicts) 
 
As can be seen in Table 3, the range of behaviours associated with 
intimidation are extremely diverse, with behaviours ranging from physically violent 
to non-physically violent, specific to general, legal to illegal and everyday behaviours 
to the more extreme.   
From the review of both the dictionary definitions and mentions of 
intimidation in the law, it has already been highlighted that threatening acts are 
closely associated with intimidation.  This is also reflected in the literature reviewed, 
and appears in a wide range of settings, including political, institutional, sporting and 
victim and witness intimidation.  Threats appear in the literature in a variety of forms, 
ranging from threats stating a specific outcome, to more general threats and including 
both written and verbal, and threats of both physical and non-physical harm.   
A number of studies identified acts of physical violence or harm as a type of 
intimidating behaviour.  In particular acts of physical violence appear in the literature 
on intimidation in sport (Crawford et al., 2004; Grange and Kerr, 2010; Miller et al., 
2005) and victim and witness intimidation (Fyfe & McKay, 2000; Healey, 1995; 
Tarling et al, 2000).  A number of academic articles use the term intimidation 
alongside violence, or physical harm.  In some cases the authors attempt to 
differentiate between intimidation and physical harm, either by describing 
intimidation as a type of violent behaviour (Waddington et al., 2005), or by creating 
separate definitions for physical harm or violence, and physical or non-physical 
intimidation (Darby, 1986; Shields, 1999).  Others, however, have used the term 
violence alongside intimidation without differentiating between the two terms.  For 
example, Padgett (1984) uses the word ‘intimidation’ or ‘intimidate’ 17 times 
throughout his article on racially motivated violence and intimidation.  In 12 of these 
17 uses, the term intimidation is used alongside either violence or assault, i.e. 
“violence and/or intimidation” or “assault and intimidation”.   
In many cases, articles in the literature review look at both physical and non-
physical intimidation. For example, Shields (1999) makes a clear distinction between 
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these behaviours in his study on intimidation in high school athletics.  Shields gives 
examples of physical intimidation as "pushing, shoving, bumping, or other physical 
contact short of striking, including unnecessarily rough play” (page 507).  He 
differentiates between physical violence as being acts with the intent to injure, 
whereas physical intimidation as being acts used in “an attempt to gain an advantage 
over an opponent” (page 507).  This reflects the definitions of intimidation, whereby 
physically violent acts could be construed as intimidation if this is done in order to 
attempt to get the victim to do something, or stop them from doing something, rather 
than simply being done with the intent to cause physical harm. 
The literature on pro-life and animal rights campaigns makes reference to 
intimidating behaviours exclusively carried out online (Azriel, 2005; Bailey et al, 
2010; Donovan & Coupe, 2013; Funk, 2006).  These online behaviours in themselves 
are fairly diverse, and include acts such as posting personal details about an 
individual online, bombarding individuals with emails and carrying out denial of 
service attacks in order to crash targeted websites.  Groups might choose to use these 
types of behaviours due to the ease and speed of being able to carry them out and it 
also may help to keep the perpetrator anonymous. 
There are a number of behaviours associated with intimidation that might not 
immediately seem to be particularly intimidating, including common acts such as 
gossiping, blaming, sales techniques and being impatient with questions.  
Nonetheless these are provided as intimidating behaviours in particular contexts, 
which helps to provide an understanding of what others perceive intimidation to be. 
 The review of the behaviours associated with intimidation has again 
highlighted how intimidation can be interpreted in such a wide range of ways.  It also 
reinforces the need for an inclusive definition of intimidation that does not exclude an 
act as intimidating based on behaviours alone.  Definitions reviewed in the literature 
have tended to suggest that the main behaviour associated with intimidation is the use 
and experience of threat, however it is clear that this is just one of many behaviours 
associated with intimidation.  Therefore intimidation should not be restricted to 
threats alone.  With this in mind it is proposed that an extra aspect to the definition of 
intimidation should be added to state that any behaviour could be seen as intimidation 
provided that the other two aspects are met.  As a result a definition for intimidation 
is proposed as “any act or set of acts that is carried out against a victim, provided 
that: 
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 The victim experiences a negative emotion, such as feeling frightened / timid 
/ threatened / overawed / nervous as a result of the act carried out by the 
perpetrator or the potential thereof, and 
 The perpetrator has carried out this act(s) in order to achieve a goal by either 
attempting to change the behaviour or keep the behaviour of the victim the 
same, against the victim’s will.” 
3.6 Summary 
This review has highlighted the diverse nature of intimidation, both in the range of 
settings in which it occurs and in the different behaviours that are associated with 
intimidation.  Of the literature reviewed, only a small proportion actually defined 
intimidation in their research.  This may be because the authors expect readers to 
understand what is meant by intimidation and did not feel the need to define it 
further.  In other cases intimidation is seen as social construct and participants in the 
studies were left to define it for themselves (Dull and Fox, 2010; Musselman et al., 
2005; Norris & Gutheil, 2003; Waddington et al., 2005).    
The large number of settings that intimidation occurs in range from 
intimidation being a regular and almost accepted behaviour (for example in some 
organisational and educational settings, as well as in certain aspects of sport), to 
intimidation being a more extreme and unacceptable behaviour, and in many cases 
illegal (for example, in political intimidation and victim and witness intimidation).  
Reflecting the range, the types of behaviours associated with intimidation also appear 
to cover more everyday behaviours, such as loss of temper, verbal cautions at work 
and mocking, to more extreme behaviours including verbal abuse, pushing and 
shoving and threats of physical violence or even death.  This gives a good overview 
of what others perceive intimidation to be, however it also highlights a need for a 
working definition of intimidation, as currently there seems to be little restriction of 
what is interpreted as intimidation.   
Throughout the broad range of literature a number of key aspects relating to 
intimidation have been identified.  This review has highlighted that in many cases the 
term intimidation is used alongside other similar terms, such as harassment, violence, 
and threats.  The definition of intimidation proposed as a result of this review makes 
sure that these terms are not included in the review of the definition in order to 
eliminate any confusion over whether these terms are the same as intimidation.  
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Instead, the definition has been written in such a way that an act of harassment, 
violence or a threat could be seen as an intimidating act or behaviour provided that it 
meets certain requirements.  This is also the case for any other behaviour that might 
be associated with intimidation.  This will help to form a basis for assessing whether 
the acts carried out by animal rights extremists can be defined as intimidation. 
 Finally, it should be noted that although the review has covered a variety of 
literature, searches for the current literature review only picked up articles and book 
chapters that made an explicit reference to intimidation.  However, there may be 
some literature that looks at intimidating behaviours, but uses different language to 
describe them.  For example, this review has shown that a number of authors have 
used terms such as harassment interchangeably with intimidation, so an article 
referring to harassment only will not have been included in this review.  This review, 
however, serves as a solid basis to form a definition of intimidation and will help to 
inform the empirical studies carried out in the proceeding chapters.   
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Chapter Four 
 
Study 1: Quantitative analysis of animal rights extremist behaviours in the UK 
4.1 Overview 
A review of the literature has highlighted that there is currently no complete analysis 
of the acts that animal rights groups have carried out, with past research focussing on 
either a specific campaign or group (Donovan & Coupe, 2013 for example) or violent 
acts only (Monaghan, 1999, for example).  However, there are a number of actions 
that animal rights extremists carry out alongside the more violent or news worthy acts 
that must not be ignored.  In order to get a fuller picture of what these groups do, and 
to develop a more in depth understanding, this study aims to look at all of the acts 
that the animal rights groups have carried out, across all campaign types.   The 
current study aims to provide a quantitative analysis of the acts that animal rights 
extremists have carried out.  This study will help to build up a picture of animal 
rights extremist acts in the UK.   
4.2 Introduction  
Research on animal rights extremism has focused on a number of subjects, such as 
how it should be defined, case studies of specific campaigns, and the use of violent 
behaviour. However, a model of animal rights actions is yet to have been conducted. 
Some researchers have attempted to collate the incidents carried out by certain 
campaign types, such as Donovan and Couple (2013) who focussed on SHAC, 
however there has not been a holistic study of incidents across all campaign types. 
There is, however, a body of research that has attempted to catalogue and model 
other terrorist and criminal behaviours. Each of these pieces of research has focussed 
on specific group or attacks types. For example, Wilson and colleagues have 
modelled terrorist behaviours such as plane hijackings, bomb attacks and 
assassinations (Wilson & Lemanski, 2013; Wilson, Scholes & Brocklehurst, 2010), 
hostage taking incidents (Wilson, 2000) and school shootings in America (Bradford 
& Wilson, 2013).  
 Some of the key variables that have been looked at across these studies are the 
tactics that are employed by these groups. This is unsurprising as this has been the 
focus of a large amount of research on the psychology of terrorism.  These studies 
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have shown that the tactics chosen by terrorist groups tend to be regular in nature. For 
example Wilson (2000) used multidimensional scaling techniques to model 
behaviours used by terrorists when carrying out hostage taking incidents.  The 
findings of the research indicate that different terrorist groups can be categorised 
based on variables such as demands, use of weapons and how the hostages were used. 
In addition to this, Bradford and Wilson’s (2013) research on terrorist school 
shootings was able to classify the incidents based on variables relating to how 
expressive or instrumental they were. Wilson et al. (2010) modelled incidents of 
bomb attacks and assassinations carried out by the terrorist group ETA based on 
variables relating to the intended lethality.   
Another key focus of this type of research is the target choice of the terrorist 
or extremist groups.  As a review of the literature has shown, the choice of target is 
an integral part to terrorists’ strategies as it might influence their choice of tactic, as 
well as the level of support received from the public (Bloom & Horgan, 2008; Drake, 
1998a, 1998b). One of the key features of animal rights extremism as opposed to 
other terrorist groups is their targeting techniques.  Whereas large terrorist groups 
tend to target the general public for maximum impact (Rubin & Freidland, 1986), 
animal rights groups are much more focused on whom they target. Websites 
belonging to specific animal rights campaigns often publish a list of targets. For 
example the Stop The Cull campaign published a full list of all of the MPs supporting 
the badger cull, and the names of farmers involved in the cull along with a number of 
details including their addresses (Stop The Cull, 2013). 
The types of actions chosen by animal rights extremists have been described 
as intimidation tactics rather than interpersonal violence by many researchers. 
However, the majority of research that refers to actions carried out by animal rights 
extremists as intimidating acts do not actually state what these acts specifically are.  
Other articles refer to the violent or militant actions carried out by the same groups, 
but there is no clear differentiation by what acts are classed as intimidation and what 
acts are classed as violence, or whether they fall into the same category (Monaghan, 
1999). A lot of the research on animal rights focuses on case study type methods and 
anecdotal evidence rather than attempting to catalogue and quantify clear acts carried 
out by animal rights groups. Donovan and Coupe (2013) have, however, attempted to 
quantify the types of acts carried out by SHAC using crime data. Although this gives 
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a good overview for this campaign in particular, the analysis does not take into 
consideration the relationship between the types of behaviours used.  
 One of the issues that previous research has faced when conducting this type 
of study on extremist behaviour is access to data.  As Wilson (2000) points out, it can 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to get accounts of terrorist incidents from 
law enforcement agencies and so one must look elsewhere for data.  Past research on 
terrorist behaviours has relied upon newspaper articles and compendiums of terrorist 
incidents, such as the Mickolus texts (Wilson, 2000 for example).  Research on 
animal rights extremists have managed to use a variety of sources such as police data 
(Donavan & Coupe, 2013), data collected by pharmaceutical companies (Monaghan, 
1999) and reports by the activists themselves (Flükiger, 2008).   
Each of these data sources of course have advantages and disadvantages.  
Newspaper articles are an obvious choice to collect data for incidents of larger scale 
attacks as they are often corroborated and can be accessed without any privileges.  
Many databases are now online so they can be easily searched and downloaded.  
However, if an incident is not ‘news-worthy’ then it might be unlikely that all 
incidents will be reported; therefore, one will not be able to get full coverage of all 
incidents that have taken place.  Somewhat uniquely to animal rights extremists, 
companies themselves keep their own databases of incidents that have been carried 
out against that company and their employees.  These may provide more detail than 
newspaper articles, as they will cover all incidents, regardless of how small.  A 
problem with this method however is that you would only be able to get data from 
one specific campaign and therefore disregard all other actions carried out against 
other targets.  There are also a number of independent targets that are unlikely to 
keep a database of the actions taken against them, such as independent farmers and 
people who are far removed from the main target themselves.  Police databases offer 
a good alternative, as they will cover all actions regardless of target.  However this 
data source has two problems: first of all that it is hard to gain access to the full 
information, and secondly that the database will not hold information of any actions 
that have not been reported to the police and correctly identified as an animal rights 
incident.   
One alternative is to use self-reported information supplied by the activists 
themselves.  This could provide a way to get an accurate representation of what 
animal rights extremists have done across the board, regardless of whether it is 
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newsworthy or not.  Also because a lot of their actions are carried out against 
individuals and not companies we cannot rely on a company database only as this 
would not include those actions carried out against people like independent farmers, 
or anyone who does not report the incident, either to the police or their company. For 
example, Flükiger (2008) carried out a study into animal rights incidents carried out 
by animal rights activists in Switzerland using data reported by activists for a specific 
campaign type.  
4.2.1 Aims  
The current research aims to catalogue the actions carried out by animal rights 
extremists in the UK and to identify patterns of behaviours apparent in these groups.  
The study will focus on a number of variables relating to the types of behaviours 
carried out, with particular focus on behaviours associated with the target type and 
action type. This is due to the fact that regular patterns of behaviour have been found 
in other terrorist groups in previous research  (Bradford & Wilson, 2013; Wilson, 
2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013; Wilson et al., 2010) and can give an insight into the 
strategies used. This study also aims to identify whether regular behaviours can be 
found across all campaign types, as well as within specific campaigns.  
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4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Data Collection 
The data used in this study were taken from the website http://www.directaction.info 
(also known and henceforth referred to as ‘Bite Back’).  This website has been 
created anonymously by animal rights supporters and includes a large database of 
actions claimed by animal rights groups worldwide from 2002 to present.  The 
information supplied on this website has been submitted completely anonymously so 
that the people who have supplied the information are unable to be identified.  The 
email address for reports to be sent to is supplied on the website so that anyone is 
able to submit an action report.  This is necessary due to the fact that there is no 
formal structure in the animal rights movements and anyone is encouraged to carry 
out action.  
The incident reports are uploaded to the website along with the date, country, 
incident category, and a brief description of the report.  At this point the data is 
publically accessible to anyone worldwide and does not require a subscription or 
login to access it.  The amount of detail supplied in each action report is variable, 
ranging from one or two sentences, to a couple of pages of information.   
It should be noted that the data used in this study is self-reported by the 
activists themselves and not corroborated by other information.  However, due to the 
small scale of the majority of these types of actions it is unlikely that they would be 
reported elsewhere.  It is also unlikely that government agencies will make detailed 
intelligence on extremist campaigns publically available, so it is therefore necessary 
to access data through other means.  Data held by the police might also be incomplete 
due to the fact that not all actions will have been reported and some might not have 
been flagged as animal rights related.  For example, in cases where the actual target is 
far removed from the primary target it might not be immediately obvious that the 
incident had anything to do with an animal rights campaign.  Previous research has 
been successful in using this type of data in the analysis of animal rights incidents in 
Switzerland (Flükiger, 2008).   
There are a number of criteria that an incident must meet in order to be included 
in the dataset.  The incident must have taken place in the UK, between and inclusive 
of 2002 and 2014. The incident must also include some form of action that has a link 
to an animal rights campaign, as opposed to another type of campaign such as 
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environmental action.  In addition to this, the following cases are excluded from the 
dataset: 
 Reports of a new animal rights prisoner, prisoner release, or sentence update, 
 Reports of the death of an animal rights activist, and 
 Reports where the type of attack is unclear. 
The initial data download included all 957 reports recorded on Bite Back for 
the UK from 2002 up until and inclusive of 2014. Eighty-nine of these reports were 
excluded from the dataset, as they did not meet the inclusion criteria. In the 
remaining 868 reports there were a number of reports that included information of 
more than one incident and were therefore coded as multiple cases.  As a result, in 
total 1,064 incidents were included in the final dataset. Figure 1 demonstrates this 
process.   
 
Figure 1: Flow chart to demonstrate the data collection and exclusion process 
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4.3.2 Data Coding 
Content analysis was used as the first stage of analysis for this study.  Content 
analysis is a form of data coding that was originally used to analyse media messages 
in the early twentieth century, but is now used for all types of qualitative data 
(Coolican, 2004).  Once the qualitative data has been selected, the researcher needs to 
decide on which ‘coding units’ to use.  These could be single words, themes, items, 
characters or time and space.  In the case of this research, themes, or behaviours, 
relating to a number of aspects of the animal rights incidents were chosen.  As the 
data for this study was supplied as descriptive accounts of actions carried out by 
animal rights groups, the majority of the variables were coded as the presence or 
absence of a particular behaviour occurring.  Other variables were coded based on 
categories, such as who claimed the incident and type of animal rights campaign.  
The full coding dictionary can be found in Appendix A.  
In order for the coding scheme to be reliable it must be unambiguous to the 
extent that a second researcher can code the data in exactly the same way, therefore 
achieving inter-rater reliability.  This involves a second researcher coding a 
proportion of the data in order to establish inter-rater reliability.  This reliability must 
be at least 0.7 (Gregory, 2004).  In this study, 25 cases were selected at random from 
the overall sample and were given to a second researcher to code based on the 
definitions in the coding dictionary.  Inter-rater reliability was calculated based on the 
percentage of items that were coded in exactly the same way by both of the 
researchers, and it was found that the inter-rater reliability was .98.  This is high 
enough for the coding scheme to be classed as reliable.  Small changes were made to 
the coding dictionary based on the comments of the second researcher.   
4.3.3 Data Analysis 
Initially the data was analysed using basic descriptive statistics to describe the 
features of the animal rights incidents.  The descriptive results focussed on what was 
carried out, whom it was carried out against and who did it, in order to get an 
overview of animal rights incidents in the UK.  
 Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA) was then used to identify patterns of 
behaviour in the animal rights incidents.  CFA identifies patterns in categorical data 
by searching for configurations of variables that occur more often than expected, 
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identified as types, and also searching for patterns of variables that occur less often 
than expected, referred to as antitypes (von Eye, Spiel & Wood, 1996).  First Order 
CFA assumes that there are no relationships between the variables, although main 
effects may exist (i.e. differences in the base rate frequency of categories of each 
variable).  If the CFA identifies types and antitypes then this suggests that the 
variables are not independent of each other, and relationships do actually exist.         
For the CFA, variables looking at the type of target and type of action carried 
out were included, and coded on a dichotomy based on presence or absence of these 
variables.  In order to have the full data set in the analysis all variables that have been 
coded as unknown or not applicable will be recoded as absent.  It should be 
highlighted that this does not necessarily mean that this type of behaviour did 
definitely not occur; instead it means that this behaviour did not appear to have been 
reported in the incident report.  This type of missing data is often found to be the case 
in similar research, and has been taken into consideration during the analysis (for 
example, Wilson, 2000).   
4.3.4 Ethical Considerations 
This study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the Faculty of Health and 
Medical Sciences Ethical Review Committee, a copy of which can be found in 
Appendix B.  A number of ethical considerations were taken into account, in line 
with those proposed by the Association of Internet Researchers list of considerations.  
One consideration in particular focused on the naming of individuals and personal 
details in the data.  Information on the Bite Back website includes names, addresses, 
phone numbers, email addresses, photographs, and on occasion bank account details 
of the animals rights groups’ targets.  This information was downloaded as part of the 
main data download, however (other than the exception of names), none of these 
details were recorded in the SPSS dataset, other than the presence or absence of them 
(see Appendix A for details of the coding scheme).  The names of the targets were 
recorded in the SPSS data set only for the purposes of finding out whether animal 
rights activists are likely to target the same individuals multiple times.  The names of 
individuals are not included in the results.  
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Descriptive Results 
4.4.1.1 Frequency over time  
 Between 2002 and 2014 inclusive, 1,064 incidents of animal rights actions in 
the UK were identified.  Figure 2 shows a timeline of these incidents.  As can be seen 
in Figure 1, the highest number of incidents occurred in 2004, with 187 (17.6%) 
incidents occurring that year.  This increase in incidents is partly due to a peak in 
activity by the campaign group Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), who 
conducted 101 incidents alone in 2004.  The lowest number of incidents occurred in 
2014, with only 12 (1.1%) incidents reported.  With the exception of 2002, the graph 
can clearly be divided in two.  A higher number of incidents occurred up until 2009, 
with 78.9% (839) of incidents occurring before this year, compared to the number of 
incidents occurring from 2009 onwards (21.1%, 225).  This drop in incidents 
coincides with the imprisonment of a number of prominent animal rights activists. 
2002 is an exception as this was the year that the Bite Back website began with 
incidents only being reported for the last two months of the year.   
 
 
Figure 2: Animal Rights incidents over time 
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4.4.1.2 Characteristics of the incidents  
 A number of variables relating to the characteristics of the incident were 
coded in order to get an overview of what happened during these incidents.  A list of 
all action types can be found in Table 17, Appendix C.  The most common type of 
action taken by animal rights activists was property damage, with 61.2% (651) of 
incidents involving property damage of some sort (not including graffiti, which is 
coded as a distinct action).  35.2% (374) of incidents involved property damage as the 
sole action, whereas the other incidents involving property damage also included 
another form of action.  For example, 28.1% (183) of all incidents involved property 
damage and graffiti, and 11.5% (75) of all incidents involved property damage 
alongside animal liberation.  In these cases property damage was usually carried out 
as a means to liberate animals, for example cutting holes in fences to allow animals to 
escape.   
 The most frequent type of property to be attacked was a vehicle, or vehicles, 
with 45.0% of property damage incidents (293) falling in this category.  Incidents 
involving vehicle damage often reported that methods such as paint stripper being 
poured over them, smashing the windows and slashing the tyres were used.  
Windows were also a frequent target for property damage, with 10.3% of incidents 
(67) involving damage to windows.  Nine point two per cent of property damage 
incidents (60) targeted hunting paraphernalia such as release traps, cages and hunting 
stands.  Another popular form of property damage was to glue the locks of doors on 
buildings and vehicles, with 10.1% (107) of all incidents (16.4% of property damage 
incidents) involving this type of action.  This was in order to delay people from being 
able to enter or leave a property or vehicle.  In a small number of incidents (5, 0.5%) 
other methods such as D-locks, were used instead of glue to the same effect.  A wide 
variety of other items of property were also damaged in other incidents, a full list of 
these can be found in Table 18, Appendix C.   
 A third of incidents (33.2%, 353) involved graffiti as a form of action, with 
just under half of these involving graffiti as the only form of action (15.3% of all 
incidents; 163).  Out of all of the incidents involving graffiti, 56.9% (201) of the 
incident reports shared the content of the graffiti.  The graffiti message often included 
‘ALF’, either as the individual graffiti item or alongside something else as a form of 
sign-off (31.8% of reported messages, 64).  One of the most common graffitied 
messages to be left involved the target of the graffiti being referred to as a murderer 
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or killer (33.3%, 67). Thirty incidents (14.9%) specifically used the phrase ‘puppy 
killer’.  Reference to the target being an animal abuser or torturer was also used in 12 
incidents (6.0%).  The activists referred to their target as ‘scum’ in 29 incidents 
(14.4%), and in 12 they used the phrase ‘meat is murder’ (6.0%).  In 29 incidents 
(14.4%) the graffiti message specifically referred to HLS (Huntingdon Life 
Sciences), often alongside the phrase ‘Drop/Dump/Smash HLS’ (18 incidents, 
9.0%)).  Thirty-one incidents (15.4%) referred to another company, other than HLS, 
and 10 graffiti messages (5.0%) shared the name of the individual that the message 
was aimed at.  In addition to ‘drop HLS’ a further 31 graffiti messages (15.4%) gave 
some sort of instruction.  For example, instructions such as ‘Go Vegan’ (1.5%, 3), 
‘Stop Hunting’ (0.5%, 1) and Hands Off The Animals’ (1.0%, 2) were used.  Ten 
graffiti messages included a specific threat or warning to the intended target, such as 
‘we’ll be back’ (1.0%, 2) and ‘we’re watching you’ (2.0%, 4).  A full list of verbatim 
graffiti messages can be found in Table 22, Appendix D.    
Animal liberation1 was another common type of action, with a total of 19.2% 
(204) of incidents involving animal liberation.  Across the 204 incidents of animal 
liberation, a total of 67,891 animals were reported to have been liberated.  This 
number, however, has been highly skewed by one particular incident where animal 
rights activists were reported by the media to have liberated 50,000 small fish from a 
fishery.  Other liberations involving high numbers of animals being liberated 
included partridges being liberated from breeding cages (one incident claiming to 
have liberated 3,000 at once and another 1,000) and a similar liberations of hens and 
pheasants with 1,000 of each.  On a smaller scale 16 incidents only claimed to have 
liberated one animal at a time, such as three separate incidents where dogs were 
liberated from their owners due to reports of bad treatment.  The most frequent type 
of animal to be liberated were chickens, with a total of 63 animal liberations (30.9%) 
                                                 
1 When referring to animal liberation as an action this literally means to remove animals from an 
enclosure and take them to safety, either by releasing them into the wild or rehoming them.  This should 
not be confused with the key aims of the group the Animal Liberation Front, which refers to liberating 
animals in the sense of ending discrimination against them, rather than literally freeing them from cages 
(although as we have seen this is a tactic used by people associating themselves with the Animal 
Liberation Front). 
 
59 
involving chickens.  Other frequent liberations included boar (23, 11.3%), turkeys 
(18, 8.8%), deer (17, 8.3%) and pheasants (13, 6.4%).   
A small number of incidents involved a bomb hoax or suspicious package (22 
incidents, 2.1%), real bombs (2 incidents, 0.2%) and a number of arson (35, 3.3%) or 
attempted arson attacks (1, 0.1%).  It should be noted that none of the incidents made 
any report of individuals being physically harmed as a result of these incidents. 
Other types of incidents included nuisance communications (11, 1.0%), such 
as nuisance phone calls, texts and emails and sending unwanted deliveries to the 
target’s address.  Malicious communications were also found to have happened in a 
small amount of cases (9, 0.8%) that included acts such as threatening letters and 
phone calls.  Smear campaigns were also used against their targets in 0.8% (8) of 
incidents.  All of these incidents except one involved the activists sending letters to 
the target’s neighbours spreading rumours about them, particularly that they are a 
danger to the local community.  For example, in five cases (0.5%) the activists told 
neighbours that their target was a rapist or paedophile.   
Five incidents (0.5%) involved a product contamination; the products 
contaminated were either health and beauty products (3) or drinks (2).  A number of 
other incidents included theft (2.2%, 23), fraud (0.5%, 5) and online actions such as 
hacking and online exposure (0.8%, 8).  A number of other types of action were 
found to have happened in very few cases, these are listed in Table 4.   
 A number of incidents involved a visit to the home of the individual targeted 
(295, 27.7%).  The majority of incidents that involved a visit to the target’s home 
involved property damage (200, 67.8%) and/or graffiti (123, 41.7%).  The majority of 
property damage incidents occurring at the home were against a vehicle, house or 
driveway (88.0%, 176).     
A number of other variables in relation to the reporting of the incident were 
coded.  These focussed on what information about the target was shared in the 
incident report.  19.6% (209) of the incidents shared the target’s address, 27.4% (292) 
shared the name of the target, 6.9% (73) shared a phone number of the target and 
1.4% (15) of incidents reported the email address of the target.  In 4.3% (46) of 
incidents a call for action was made; this involved the reporter of the incident asking 
or encouraging others to carry out similar action.  Almost half of the incident reports 
also included a threat or a warning of some sort (45.8%, 487). 
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Table 4: Low incidence action types (N=1,064) 
Action Type 
Frequency Per cent of incidents 
Fireworks set off at house 6 0.6 
Home visit (no further details) 3 0.3 
Stink bombs 2 0.2 
Personal safety alarm set off at house 2 0.2 
Posters 1 0.1 
Nails left on driveway 1 0.1 
Destructive weed planted on university grounds 1 0.1 
Information gathering 1 0.1 
Sharp objects posted through letter box 1 0.1 
Marbles left at house 1 0.1 
Grave desecration 1 0.1 
Restaurant sabotage  1 0.1 
Protest 1 0.1 
Note left at house 1 0.1 
 
4.4.1.3 Characteristics of the activists  
 The vast majority of the incident reports were submitted anonymously 
(90.9%, 968).  A small number of incidents were reported by the media (3.4%, 36) 
and other animal rights websites or anarchist websites (5.2%, 55). Just under three 
quarters of incidents (72.8%, 775) were also claimed by, or associated with a group 
name.  A full list of group names can be found in Table 19, Appendix C.  The most 
frequent group name that the incidents were associated with was the Animal 
Liberation Front (ALF) with 65.1% of incidents (693) being claimed in some way by 
them.  A number of incidents used a form of ALF to claim responsibility, for 
example five incidents (0.5%) referred to ALF Tupper and one each (0.1%) to ALF 
Longdogs and ALF Militants Group.  There were no other groups who were 
frequently associated with the reported incidents.  A number of incidents were 
claimed by a group name which appeared to be named specifically after that 
particular incident, for example an incident against an angling club was claimed by 
the Angling Retribution Squad (0.1%), a boar liberation was claimed by the Boar 
Liberation Front (0.1%), and similarly four incidents against lobster fisherman were 
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claimed by the Lobster Liberation Front (0.4%).  A number of other similar group 
names were given, which can be seen in Table 19, Appendix C.   
 There was limited information supplied about the number of individuals who 
were involved in carrying out each incident.  However, in 427 incidents (40.1%), the 
language used implied that there was more than one individual involved in the 
incident.  For example, some incident reports referred to ‘the activists’ or ‘we’ when 
describing the incident.  Specific numbers of people were given in 16 incidents only 
(1.5%), with seven of these stating that only one person was involved (0.7%) and the 
other nine incidents reporting two (7, 0.7%), three (1, 0.1%) or six (1, 0.1%) 
individuals were involved.   
 
4.4.1.4 Target choice 
 The targets of the animal rights actions fell into four categories; company 
targets, individual targets, farm targets and woodland targets.  These target categories 
were not mutually exclusive, for example a target could have been an individual who 
was targeted due to their involvement in a specific company.   
 The most frequent target choice was related to a company, with 71.1% (756) 
of all incidents associated with a company target.  Of these incidents, 40.7% (308) 
were targeting an individual who worked for, or was associated with the target 
company.  For example, employees and directors of target companies were popular 
choices of individual targets.  The most popular companies to target were 
pharmaceutical companies, with 9.0% (96) of all incidents targeting these companies.  
Other frequent company target types were transport companies (5.6%, 60), 
universities or colleges (3.8%, 40), butchers and meat suppliers (3.8%, 40), industrial 
suppliers (3.0%, 32), and banks (3.0%, 32).  A full list of company target types can 
be found in Table 20, Appendix C.   
 The targets were individuals in 35.8% (381) of incidents, including those 
where they were also attached to a company target.  In 286 of these incidents (75.1%) 
the name of the individual was reported in the action report.  Two hundred and sixty 
one separate individuals were named as targets and majority were reported to have 
been targeted only once (229 individuals, 87.7%).  Seventeen of the named 
individuals (6.5%) were targeted twice and 15 individuals (5.7%) were reported to 
have been targeted three times or more, with the highest number of actions carried 
out against an individual being seven.   
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 Farms were also a popular target choice, with 19.7% (210) of all incidents 
involving a farm target.  The name of the farm was shared in less than half of these 
incidents (40.5%, 85).  The most frequent farm to be targeted (on 36 occasions, 
42.4% of the named farms) was the Darley Oaks Farm (also referred to as New 
Church farm), which is a farm that bred guinea pigs for animal experimentation.  
Jay’s Boar farm, Highgate farm (a farm for breeding rabbits for animal 
experimentation), and Manor Farm (also a boar farm) were the only other farms 
named to have been targeted more than twice (seven, six and three times 
respectively).  All other named farms were only targeted once (23 farms, 27.1%) or 
twice (five farms, 5.9%).  19.0% of all incidents involving a farm target also targeted 
an individual (40), who tended to be farm workers or owners.  
The final group of targets were general woodland areas, such as moors and 
shooting estates with a small number of incidents (71 incidents, 6.7%) focussing on 
this as a target. 
 
4.4.1.5 Reasons for action  
A number of different campaigns were apparent in the dataset.  Most of the 
incident reports did not refer to a specific campaign, however trends within the data 
were detected and coded accordingly.  Five campaign types were found to account 
for 66.3% of the data (705 incidents).  A further 27 campaigns were also identified, 
with a small number of incidents associated with each one.  Appendix C, Table 21 
shows a full list of all identified campaigns.   
By far the most active campaign was Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty 
(SHAC), with 31.1% (331) of all incidents falling within this category.  Incidents that 
fell into this campaign targeted Huntingdon Life Sciences (HLS), either directly or 
through their customers or suppliers.  HLS is a large research company based in 
Huntingdon, Cambridgeshire, known to animal rights groups for their biomedical 
research which involves animal testing.     
The second most frequent campaign type was classed as general animal 
liberation (174, 16.4%).  Incidents classed as general animal liberation were acts 
where animals were liberated with no other clear goal of the incident other than the 
liberation itself.  A campaign against hunting and angling was identified and had 90 
(8.5%) associated incidents.  Another recurring campaign was against Oxford 
University.  This campaign appeared to mainly focus on the building of a new lab, 
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which, according to the activists, would be used for animal testing.  60 incidents were 
linked to the Oxford University campaign (5.6%).   Targets were also chosen due to 
their involvement in the consumer meat industry, such as butchers and meat suppliers 
(4.7%, 50).   
A smaller number of incidents were associated with the campaign against the 
Newchurch Guinea-pig farm (4.0%, 43); this farm was targeted due to the fact that 
the guinea pigs were bred for animal experimentation.  Other campaigns identified 
were against fur or leather shops (2.6%, 28), foie gras (2.2%, 23), circuses (2.2%, 
23), animal testing (not linked to another specific campaign; 2.1%, 22), the 
pharmaceutical company Novartis (2.0%, 21) and fast food chains (2.0%, 21).  All 
other campaign types identified were each associated with less than 2.0% of the data, 
and can be found in Table 21, Appendix C.     
 
 4.4.1.6 Campaign and target type 
 Incidents relating to the five main campaign types are explored in more detail 
in terms of their targeting choice.  Table 5 shows the frequency of each target type 
broken down for the five main campaigns.   
As can be seen from Table 5, almost all of the SHAC incidents targeted a 
company. The majority of companies targeted were suppliers for HLS (195, 58.9%), 
such as transport companies (55, 16.6%), banks (31, 9.4%), and commercial lettings 
(20, 6.0%).  Other types of companies targeted included customers of HLS, such as 
pharmaceutical and healthcare companies (73, 22.1%).  
 The campaign against Oxford University shows a similar targeting pattern to 
SHAC, as can be seen in Table 5.  The company target types fell into distinct 
categories, with 30.0% (18) of the incidents targeting Oxford University directly, 
another 30.0% (18) targeting contractors responsible for the construction of a new 
laboratory, 21.7% (13) targeting Oxford University’s phone and internet supplier 
(Vodafone) and the remaining incidents (10, 16.7%) targeting various other suppliers.  
The campaign against hunting and angling most frequently targeted woodland 
area. The companies targeted hunting or angling clubs (13.3%, 12) and shops (4.4%, 
4).  The council and political parties (6.7%, 6) were also targeted in a small number 
of incidents due to their support of hunting.  The individuals targeted included people 
who were associated with hunt clubs, or had pro-hunt stickers on their cars, for 
example.  
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As can be seen from Table 5, the animal liberation campaign mainly targeted 
farms. In cases where individuals were targeted, the target was either an independent 
breeder as in five of the incidents, or an individual known for keeping their pet in bad 
conditions in the other four incidents.   
Like SHAC and the Oxford University campaign, the campaign against the 
meat industry mainly targeted companies.  These companies were mainly made up of 
either butchers or meat suppliers (76.0%, 38).  Other company target types included 
abattoirs (6.0%, 3), supermarkets (6.0%, 3) and restaurants (4.0%, 2).  
Table 5: Percentage of target type by campaign type (frequency) 
 
Individual 
target 
Company 
target 
Farm 
target 
Woodland 
target 
SHAC (N=331) 
65.6% 
(217) 
97.9%  
(324) 
0.9%  
(3) 
0.3%  
(1) 
Oxford University (N=60) 
28.3% 
 (17) 
100.0%  
(60) 
0.0%  
(0) 
0.0%  
(0) 
Hunting (N=90) 
24.4% 
(22) 
27.8%  
(25) 
2.2%  
(2) 
56.7%  
(51) 
Animal Liberation  (N=174) 
5.2%  
(9) 
4.0%  
(7) 
86.9% 
(146) 
5.7%  
(10) 
Meat Industry (N=50) 
2.0%  
(1) 
98.0%  
(49) 
2.0%  
(1) 
0.0%  
(0) 
 
4.4.1.7 Campaign and type of action 
 The main five campaign types were also explored in relation to the variables 
associated with the type of action carried out for each campaign.  Table 6 gives an 
overview of the frequency of each incident type broken down by campaign type.  
Only the action variables that had over 30 incidents in the overall dataset were 
included.   
As can be seen in Table 6, the frequency that specific types of action apparent 
in each incident differs across the campaign groups.  Property damage is highly 
prevalent across the meat industry, hunting, SHAC and Oxford University 
campaigns, and less so for general animal liberation. The use of graffiti varies across 
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the five campaign types, with it being most frequent in the SHAC campaign and used 
least frequently in the animal liberation campaign. 
Table 6: Percentage of action type by campaign type (frequency) 
 
Property 
damage 
Graffiti 
Animal 
liberation 
Locks 
glued 
Home 
visit 
Threat 
made 
SHAC 
(N=331) 
70.1% 
(232) 
40.8% 
(135) 
0.0% 
(0) 
9.4% 
(31) 
59.4% 
(193) 
60.1% 
(199) 
Oxford 
University 
(N=60) 
68.4% 
(39) 
26.7% 
(16) 
0.0% 
(0) 
10.0% 
(6) 
20.3% 
(12) 
83.3% 
(50) 
Hunting 
(N=90) 
78.9% 
(71) 
17.8% 
(16) 
14.4% 
(13) 
4.4% 
(4) 
7.0% 
(6) 
28.9% 
(26) 
Animal 
Liberation 
(N=174) 
33.3% 
(58) 
3.4% 
(6) 
100.0% 
(174) 
0.6% 
(1) 
2.4% 
(4) 
21.3% 
(37) 
Meat 
Industry 
(N=50) 
90.0% 
(45) 
34.0% 
(17) 
6.0% 
(3) 
30.0% 
(15) 
0.0% 
(0) 
24.0% 
(12) 
 
As expected, all of the incidents associated with the general animal liberation 
campaign involved animal liberation. The campaigns against hunting and the meat 
industry also involved a small proportion of animal liberations. These animal 
liberations were clearly associated with these campaign types, for example those 
linked to the hunting campaign involved animals being liberated from release pens, 
or animals bred for shooting purposes.  Neither the SHAC campaign nor the 
campaign against Oxford University involved any animal liberations.  
The gluing of locks was most prevalent within incidents associated with the 
campaign against the meat industry.  Butchers shops were often the targets of glued 
locks, which fell into this campaign type.  Locks being glued occurred at least once in 
the other four campaigns, however at a lower rate to the campaign against the meat 
industry.  
The use of arson was low across the majority of the campaigns, however the 
campaign against Oxford University accounted for 40.0% of all arson attacks across 
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the full data set. Over half of all of the incidents associated with the SHAC campaign 
included a visit to the target’s home, whereas the other campaigns had a much 
smaller frequency of homes visits.  Threats were made frequently in the incidents 
associated with the campaign against Oxford University and the SHAC campaign.  
Although still prevalent, the other three campaign types used threats less often. 
4.4.2 Identifying Patterns of Behaviour 
 4.4.2.1 Configural Frequency Analysis for Targeting and Tactic Choice 
A first order Configural Frequency Analysis (CFA) was performed to identify 
patterns of behaviour in the targeting and tactic choices among the dataset of animal 
rights incidents (N = 1,064).  The following eight categorical variables are analysed: 
Individual Target, Company Target, Farm Target, Woodland Target, Property 
Damage, Graffiti, Animal Liberation and Home Visit.  All of the categorical 
variables are coded as 1 = present, 2 = not present.  The four targeting variables were 
chosen as they represent all of the targeting options across the data.  The four action 
variables were chosen because these were the most prevalent action choices across 
the data, with 91.6% of all incidents involving at least one of these actions.   
The eight variables formed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 contingency table.  
A z-test was chosen for the first order CFA as the sample size was 4.2 times the 
number of cells.  A Bonferroni correction of the 0.05 significance level was used; p = 
.05/256 = .0001953.  The full CFA results can be found in Table 23, Appendix E.   
The CFA identified 16 types and 12 antitypes within the data (see Appendix E 
for a full list of types and antitypes).  The types represent incidents that represent 
combinations of targets and actions that occurred more often that expected.  Nine 
types in particular were found to be of interest, all of which had a difference between 
the expected count and the observed count of over 37.  These types are shown in 
Table 7.  The types can be split into four groups; the first three types relating to 
incidents that targeted individuals and companies, the following three relating to 
incidents that targeted companies only, the seventh and eighth relating to farm targets 
and the final type to woodland targets.   
The first type has the configuration of 11221121, which represents incidents 
in which an individual and a company were targeted and property damage, graffiti 
and a home visit were carried out.  Similarly, incidents where an individual and 
company were targeted with property damage and a home visit (11221221), and 
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incidents where an individual and company were targeted with graffiti and a home 
visit (11222121) were also identified as types.  
Table 7: CFA types of interest for target and action variables (Individual 
Target/Company Target/Farm Target/Woodland Target/Property 
Damage/Graffiti/Animal Liberation/Home Visit, N=1,064) 
Configu-
ration 
Observed 
Count 
Expected 
Count 
z-
Statistic 
p Detail 
11221121 54 9.22 14.74 <.00001 Individual/Company/Prop 
damage/Graffiti/Home visit 
11221221 128 18.58 25.39 <.00001 Individual/Company/Prop 
damage/Home visit 
11222121 54 5.85 19.90 <.00001 Individual/Company/Graffiti/ 
Home visit 
21221122 109 43.11 10.04 <.00001 Company/Prop damage/Graffiti 
21221222 180 86.82 10.00 <.00001 Company/Prop damage 
21222122 87 27.35 11.41 <.00001 Company/Graffiti 
22121212 47 2.06 31.28 <.00001 Farm/Prop damage/Graffiti 
22122212 94 1.31 81.02 <.00001 Farm/Animal liberation 
22211222 40 2.53 23.56 <.00001 Woodland/Property damage 
 
The second group of types relate to incidents where a company only was 
targeted, not including an individual belonging to that company.  The first company 
type, with a configuration of 21221122, represents incidents that targeted a company 
and carried out property damage and graffiti.  The next company types refer to 
incidents where a company was targeted and either property damage alone 
(21221222) or graffiti alone (21222122) was carried out.  These types relating to the 
company targets show a regular pattern in behaviour by the animal rights groups.  
They indicate that when a company is targeted, regardless of whether it is the 
company as a whole or an individual relating to that company, that property damage, 
graffiti, or a combination of the two is likely to be carried out.  When an individual 
belonging to this company is targeted, this type of action is also likely to occur at the 
home of the individual targeted.   
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The next two types relate to incidents that targeted a farm.  The type with 
configuration 22121212 represents incidents that targeted a farm, where property 
damage and graffiti was carried out. The next type, 22122212 identifies incidents 
where a farm was targeted and animal liberation only was carried out.  The final type, 
with configuration 22211222, represents woodland targets where property damage 
was carried out.  These types occurring more often than expected show that there are 
specific types of actions that are likely to be carried out against farms and woodland 
areas.   
Table 8: CFA antitypes of interest for target and action variables (Individual 
Target/Company Target/Farm Target/Woodland Target/Property 
Damage/Graffiti/Animal Liberation/Home Visit, N=1,064) 
Configu-
ration 
Observed 
Count 
Expected 
Count 
z- 
Statistic 
p Detail 
11221122 2 24.05 -4.50 <.0000
1 
Individual/Company/Prop 
damage/Graffiti 
11221222 15 48.43 -4.80 <.0000
1 
Individual/Company/Property 
damage 
 
Out of the 12 antitypes identified for the eight variables, two were of interest.  
These antitypes indicate configurations of incidents that occurred less often than 
expected and can be seen in Table 8.  The first antitype of interest identified had a 
configuration of 11221122, which represents incidents where an individual and a 
company were targeted and property damage and graffiti were carried out.  The 
second related to incidents were an individual and company were targeted and 
property damage only was carried out (11221222).  Both of these antitypes were 
identified as types when a visit to the targets home was added to the configuration.  
This shows that fewer incidents occur than expected when property damage, with or 
without graffiti, is carried out against an individual associated with a company but 
not at their house.  This indicates that the home visit is an important aspect to actions 
carried out against individuals associated with a company target.   
The other ten antitypes that were identified represented incident types that 
would not have occurred in real life, for example incidents that involved home visits 
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where an individual was not targeted or incidents where no target type was identified.  
These antitypes can be seen in Table 23, Appendix E. 
 
4.4.2.2 Configural Frequency Analysis for Target Type and Campaign Type 
A first order CFA was carried out to identify the targeting choices of the main 
five campaign types; SHAC, campaign against Oxford University, Hunting and 
Angling, Meat Industry and the General Animal Liberation campaign (N = 705).  
Five categorical variables were included in this CFA; Individual Target, Company 
Target, Farm Target, Woodland Target and Campaign Type.  The four targeting 
variables were coded as 1 = present, 2 = not present and the Campaign Type variable 
was coded as Campaign against SHAC = 1, Oxford University = 2, Hunting and 
Angling = 3, Butchers = 4 and General Animal Liberation = 5.  The five variables 
formed a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 5 contingency table.  The sample size was 8.8 times the 
number of cells and as such a z-test was carried out for the first order.  A Bonferroni 
correction of the 0.05 significance level was used; p = .05/80 = .0006250.  
Table 9: CFA types for target and campaign type variables (Individual 
Target/Company Target/Farm Target/Woodland Target/Campaign Type, N=705) 
Configu- 
ration 
Observed 
Count 
Expected 
Count 
z- 
Statistic 
p Detail 
11221 212 58.93 19.94 <.0001 Individual/Company/SHAC 
21222 43 17.63 6.04 <.0001 Company/Oxford 
21224 48 14.69 8.69 <.0001 Company/Butchers 
22125 143 7.25 50.40 <.0001 Farm/General Animal 
Liberation 
22213 45 1.32 38.08 <.0001 Woodland/Hunting 
 
The CFA identified five types and nine antitypes in the data.  Each of the five 
types related to one of the campaigns, and can be seen in Table 9.  The first targeting 
type to occur more often than expected in the data referred to incidents that targeted 
an individual and a company, within the SHAC campaign (11221).  The second type 
identified a company target within the campaign against Oxford University (21222) 
and the third represented incidents that targeted companies within the campaign 
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against the meat industry (21224).  The next type identified represent incidents that 
involved a farm targeted and the general animal liberation campaign (22125) and the 
final type was associated with incidents that targeted woodland area and involved the 
campaign against hunting and angling (22213).  These results indicate that each 
campaign type has a specific targeting choice associated with that campaign.   
Table 10: CFA antitypes for target and campaign type variables (Individual 
Target/Company Target/Farm Target/Woodland Target/Campaign Type, N=705) 
Configu- 
ration 
Observed 
Count 
Expected 
Count 
z-
Statistic 
p Detail 
11121 0 16.20 -4.03 <.0001 Individual/Company/Farm/ 
SHAC 
11225 0 30.98 -5.57 <.0001 Individual/Company/General 
Animal Liberation 
12221 3 30.42 -4.97 <.0001 Individual/SHAC 
21121 0 26.73 -5.17 <.0001 Company/Farm/SHAC 
21125 0 14.05 -3.75 <.0001 Company/Farm/General Animal 
Liberation 
21225 7 51.13 -6.17 <.0001 Company/General Animal 
Liberation 
22221 1 50.20 -6.94 <.0001 Unknown target/SHAC 
22223 1 13.65 -3.42 <.0001 Unknown target/Hunting 
22225 5 26.39 -4.16 <.0001 Unknown target/General Animal 
Liberation 
 
The nine antitypes discovered can be seen in Table 10.  Most of these 
antitypes relate to targeting combinations that are unlikely to have occurred in real 
life and therefore do not tell us much about the data.  However, the final three types 
indicate that we would expect to observe more incidents where the target type was 
unknown for the campaigns against HLS (22221), Hunting (22223) and General 
Animal Liberation (22225).  Although this does not give us much information about 
the incidents themselves, it does suggest that the reporting of the incidents provided 
more information than expected for the type of target.   
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 Another antitype of interest is incidents where companies were targeted in the 
General Animal Liberation campaign (21225).  Seven of these types of incidents 
were identified, whereas 51.1 were expected to have taken place.  It is likely that 
these incidents would not have occurred in this set of the data as animal liberations 
against pet shops were classified as a campaign of their own, and therefore not 
covered in the General Animal Liberation campaign.   
 
4.4.2.3 Configural Frequency Analysis for Action Type and Campaign Type 
A first order CFA was also carried out in order to identify patterns of type of 
action among the main five campaign types (N= 705).  The variables Property 
Damage, Graffiti, Animal Liberation, Home Visit and Campaign Type were included 
in this CFA, forming a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 5 contingency table.  The four action variables 
were coded as 1 = present, 2 = not present and the Campaign Type variable was 
coded as SHAC = 1, campaign against Oxford University = 2, Hunting and Angling 
= 3, Meat Industry = 4 and General Animal Liberation = 5.  As in the previous CFA, 
the sample size was 8.8 times the number of cells and as such a z-test was carried out 
for the first order CFA.  A Bonferroni correction of the 0.05 significance level was 
used; p = .05/80 = .0006250.  
The CFA identified eight types and ten antitypes.  The types can be seen in 
Table 11.  Three action types were identified for the Campaign Against HLS, all of 
which were incidents associated with a home visit.  These were property damage, 
graffiti and a home visit (11211), property damage and a home visit (12211) and 
graffiti and a home visit (21211).  Incidents involving property damage and the 
campaign against Hunting were identified as a type (12223), as were incidents 
involving property damage and the campaign against the Meat Industry (12224).  
Incidents involving property damage and graffiti associated with the anti-Meat 
Industry campaign (11224) was also identified as a type occurring more often than 
expected.  Two action types associated with the General Animal Liberation campaign 
were identified, unsurprisingly with both involving animal liberation.   The first type 
is associated with incidents involving property damage as well as animal liberation 
(12125) and the other just involving animal liberation (22125).  No types were 
identified for the Campaign Against Oxford University. 
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Table 11: CFA types for action and campaign type variables (Property 
Damage/Graffiti/Animal Liberation/Home Visit /Campaign Type, N=705) 
Configu- 
ration 
Observed 
Count 
Expected 
Count 
z-
Statistic 
p Detail 
11211 36 12.54 6.62 <.0001 Prop damage/Graffiti/Home 
visit/SHAC 
12211 106 34 12.35 <.0001 Prop damage/Home 
visit/SHAC 
21211 41 7.33 12.44 <.0001 Graffiti/Home visit/SHAC 
12223 59 21.07 8.26 <.0001 Prop damage/Hunting 
11224 13 4.32 4.18 <.0001 Prop damage/Graffiti/Butchers 
12224 31 11.71 5.64 <.0001 Prop damage/Butchers 
12125 52 15.03 9.54 <.0001 Prop damage/Animal 
lib/General Animal Liberation 
22125 112 8.78 34.83 <.0001 Animal lib/General Animal 
Liberation 
 
The ten antitypes identified related to the SHAC campaign and General 
Animal Liberation only, which can be seen in Table 12. Four of the antitypes relating 
to SHAC involved animal liberation in various combinations with the other action 
variables and none of these actions were observed in the dataset (11121, 12111, 
12121, and 22121).  These antitypes indicate that the animal rights groups do not 
attempt to liberate animals from Huntingdon Life Sciences, even though it is highly 
likely that the company keeps animals on their property.  The antitype involving 
property damage, animal liberation and a home visit associated with SHAC (12111) 
would be unlikely to happen in real life as this would involve liberating an animal 
from a company member’s home, which would unlikely be connected to SHAC.  The 
fifth antitype relating to SHAC involved none of the main four actions.                  
All of the action antitypes related to the General Animal Liberation campaign 
involved combinations of actions excluding animal liberation.  These incidents would 
not occur in the dataset as they would not be classified as General Animal Liberation 
so it is unsurprising that these incidents were identified as antitypes.  
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Table 12: CFA antitypes for action and campaign type variables (Property 
Damage/Graffiti/Animal Liberation/Home Visit /Campaign Type, N=705) 
Configu- 
ration 
Observed 
Count 
Expected 
Count 
z-
Statistic 
p Detail 
11121 0 10.55 -3.25 <.001 Prop damage/Graffiti/Animal 
lib/SHAC 
12111 0 12.54 -3.54 <.001 Prop damage/Animal lib/Home 
visit/HLS 
12121 0 28.59 -5.35 <.0001 Prop damage/Animal lib/SHAC 
22121 0 16.70 -4.09 <.0001 Animal lib/HLS 
22221 22 45.28 -3.46 <.001 None of the actions/SHAC 
11225 0 15.03 -3.88 <.0001 Prop 
damage/Graffiti/GeneralAnimal 
Liberation 
12215 0 17.87 -4.23 <.0001 Prop damage/Home visit/General 
Animal Liberation 
12225 0 40.74 -6.38 <.0001 Prop damage/General Animal 
Liberation 
22215 0 10.44 -3.23 <.001 Home visit/General Animal 
Liberation 
22225 0 23.80 -4.88 <.0001 None of the actions/General 
Animal Liberation 
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
This study aimed to catalogue the behaviours used in actions carried out by animal 
rights extremists in the UK, and to attempt to identify patterns of these behaviours in 
order to understand the types of tactics used by these groups.   In order to address 
these aims, variables relating to the types of actions carried out, target type and 
campaign type were examined.  The main finding of the study showed that regular 
patterns of behaviour occur in the acts carried out by animal rights extremists. This 
finding reflects findings from similar research conducted on other terrorist and 
extremist groups, further supporting the claim that this type of behaviour is highly 
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regular (Bradford & Wilson, 2013; Wilson, 2000; Wilson & Lemanski, 2013; 
Wilson, et al., 2010). The research also found that although the activists used a vast 
number of different types of actions, there are a small number of actions that are used 
frequently, and clear target types are also evident. The results of this study will be 
discussed in relation to the existing research, as well as identifying the implications 
of the findings, and suggesting some areas for future research. 
One of the first things that should be addressed is the drop in frequency of 
animal rights incidents after 2008.  This change in frequency coincides with the 
imprisonment of seven prominent members of SHAC (referred to as the SHAC 7), 
including their founding members, in January 2009.  This is a good indication that 
these seven may well have been responsible for the masterminding and/or execution 
of the majority of animal rights actions in the years leading up to their imprisonment.  
This supports Metcalfe’s (2008) research, which suggests that there are only a small 
number of activists who are willing to carry out direct action.  It might also indicate 
that their sentences deterred other activists from continuing their actions as 
frequently.  However, it is important to note that this did not stop actions relating to 
animal rights completely, as the actions have continued since 2008, although at a 
much lower frequency.  Many of these activists have now been released from prison, 
and although SHAC have now finished their campaign, a number of the activists may 
be involved in new campaigns (Support4rs, 2016).   
We can see from the characteristics of the incidents that property damage, 
graffiti and animal liberation are key types of actions carried out by animal rights 
groups, and in many cases a combination of these tactics were used.   Although the 
number of different types of actions carried out was high, the fact that these three 
actions were the main choices to be used repeatedly indicates that the animal rights 
groups have preferred tactics. The use of graffiti indicates that the animal rights 
groups want to spread their message and leave their mark, and indeed in many cases 
of graffiti it was signed by ‘ALF’. In some cases graffiti was the only form of action, 
indicating that letting people know that they are active in a certain area is as 
important as taking any other form of action. This is in alignment with previous 
research suggesting that terrorist groups want to be watched, rather than wanting to 
cause harm (Jenkins, 1980).   
Although the vast majority of actions committed by animal rights activists are 
what would be classed as low level criminal behaviour, the results show that in a 
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number of incidents more serious actions have taken place, such as hoax and real 
bombs as well as arson and attempted arson attacks. These types of actions are more 
commonly associated with terrorist groups. The fact that animal rights extremists do 
carry out these attacks, although rarely, offers support for claims by researchers that 
animal rights extremism can at times be classified as terrorism (Carson et al., 2012). 
However, regardless of how these actions are classified, these types of incidents are 
rare and, as will be discussed in more detail later, appear to be associated with a 
specific type of campaign.   
The activists’ choice of targets was extremely specific, reflecting the fact that 
animal rights extremism is more of a threat to specific parts of the public, rather than 
national security.  For example, all of the incidents either targeted specific 
companies, individuals (often belonging to these companies), farms, or woodland 
areas.  No incidents were targeted at the public or government as a whole, as is often 
the case for international terrorism.  The specificity of the targeting is highlighted by 
the fact that over a third of the incidents carried out targeted an individual, and in the 
majority of these cases the name of the person targeted was stated in the action 
report.  This focussed targeting is also reflected in the location of the incidents, with 
over a quarter of them taking place at the target’s home address.  
 When breaking down the data into the five main campaign types (SHAC, 
Oxford university (SPEAK), anti-hunting, general animal liberation and anti-meat 
industry) this study has shown that even more distinct targeting patterns emerge. This 
is particularly important to know in advance of new animal rights campaigns 
occurring, as it might be useful in understanding who future targets could be. For 
example, campaigns such as SHAC and SPEAK focus their targeting on the 
companies they are opposing, as well as individuals associated with those companies. 
The anti-meat industry campaign also focuses their targeting on the companies 
involved in the meat industry, but they do not tend to target specific individuals. The 
campaign opposing hunting has a more varied targeting pattern, with individuals, 
companies, and general woodland areas all at risk of being targeted. This knowledge 
would be particularly important when conducting risk assessments for new 
buildings/companies or hunt groups, for example.  
 As well as targeting tactics, each of the main campaigns also appears to have 
preferences towards different action types. For example, although the use of arson 
across the whole was at a very low level, this type of incident made up a quarter of 
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the reported actions used in the campaign against Oxford University (SPEAK). A 
number of these arson attacks occurred at telephone poles belonging to the 
university’s telecommunications provider, and others occurred at buildings belonging 
to the university. It is important to know that activists are willing to carry out these 
more serious incidents under certain circumstances. As suggested by Drake (1998a), 
this may be down to their moral identity; perhaps the activists are so opposed to the 
construction of a new animal research lab that they see committing arson offences as 
just.   
 Visits to the home of targeted individuals were a key feature of incidents 
associated with the SHAC campaign. Although over a quarter of all incidents 
involved a visit to the target’s home, this rose to over half of all SHAC related 
incidents. This reflects past research stating that the SHAC campaign was focussed 
on targeting individuals associated with HLS (Donovan & Coupe, 2013).   
 Having identified the types of targeting associated with each campaign type, 
as well as the types of tactics associated, the use of CFA has also allowed for patterns 
between the targets and tactics to be identified. This allows us to see which 
combinations of behaviours are likely to occur. This adds to findings from previous 
research, which has focussed on behaviours or targets individually (Metcalfe, 2008; 
Monaghan, 1999; Upton, 2011, for example). The current study has shown, for 
example, that individuals who are targeted as a result of their association with a 
specific company, are likely to be targeted at their home with property damage, 
graffiti, or a combination of both. However, the results also show us that these 
individuals are less likely to be targeted with the same type of action, but outside of 
their home. Knowing where the type of action is likely to take place could be of key 
importance to protecting these individuals and their property.  
One of the advantages of this using CFA is that as well as identifying types of 
incidents that occur more often than expected, we can also identify patterns of 
behaviours that occur less regularly than expected, or not at all. This gives a unique 
insight into the tactics of animal rights extremists. For example, the use of animal 
liberation as a tactic was rarely used when companies were targeted. This is true even 
for the SHAC campaign where it is likely that the target companies would hold 
animals in research laboratories that animal rights groups would want to set free. 
Taking into account Feinstein and Kaplan’s (2010) research on terrorist strategies and 
tactics, this could possibly be due to the fact that the liberation of animals in this case 
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was either impossible or too risky due to the security measures at these facilities. As a 
result, alternative tactics were chosen. This suggestion is supported by previous 
research, which has demonstrated that SHAC have had to focus their targeting at 
companies associated with HLS as they have been unable to gain access directly to 
their main target due to enhanced security. 
4.5.1 Strengths and limitations 
One of the main limitations of this study lies in the data. This is a typical limitation of 
research on terrorist and extremist behaviour, as due to the nature of the incidents 
researchers are unlikely to get access to all of the information. The data used in this 
study was self reported acts of animal rights actions, reported by the activists 
themselves. This means that there is a chance that the information provided could be 
inaccurate, lacking detail or even false.  However, many of the findings of this study 
reflect factual reports of animal rights behaviour, as well as findings from previous 
research. For example, the fact that the frequency of incidents dropped after the 
imprisonment of key animal rights activists indicates that they did not fabricate extra 
incidents to make it seem as though the number of actions still remained high.  Also, 
the prevalence of the actions carried out by the campaigns against Huntingdon Life 
Sciences and Oxford University reflect the SHAC and SPEAK campaigns 
respectively, which are widely known to have carried out high numbers of incidents. 
A number of the incidents reported were also about very low-level action that makes 
it seem unlikely that the activists would bother to make it up. For example, a small 
number of reports refer to stealing lobster pots, and one refers to the removal of 
pigeon netting under a bridge.  These stories are unlikely to gather much attention, 
and therefore it seems unlikely that the reporters would waste their time making up 
such actions.   
 One of the key aspects missing from the data was information about how the 
activists operate. Understandably the people carrying out this action will want to keep 
this secret from the police, so we were not able to gather much information about 
how many people were involved in each incident or who they were.  Therefore we 
are unable to assess how many activists are operating, and how involved in the 
specific groups they are. The term ‘ALF’ was used in over half the incidents as a 
form of signing off the action report, but this doesn’t tell us much about the activists, 
as ALF and many other associated names are part of a leaderless movement and all 
 
78 
animal rights supporters are encouraged to carry out their own actions on their behalf 
(Carson et al., 2012; Monaghan, 2000). As a result, although this study has helped to 
categorise the types of targeting and action behaviours associated with animal rights 
groups, it has not been able to create a typology of activists. 
 A key strength that this study has, particularly over previous research in 
animal rights extremism, is the large amount of data that was analysed. The dataset 
includes 1,064 incidents of animal rights extremist actions across all campaign types 
during a 12 year period. Previous research has only focussed on either specific types 
of action or specific campaign types. For example, Monaghan (1999) and Munro 
(2012) focussed on violent acts, Wilson and Lemanski (2013) on bomb attacks, 
Metcalfe (2008) on protests and Upton (2011) and Donovan and Coupe (2013) on 
SHAC. Because of the inclusivity of the data collection, this study has been able to 
look at trends in the behaviours of animal rights extremist across and between 
campaigns, and to identify the wide range of tactics used. 
4.5.2 Practical implications 
The results of this study have numerous practical implications relating to the victims 
and targets, or future targets, of animal rights extremists. For example, the recently 
announced Cruelty Free Campus campaign is currently in the early stages, and one of 
the tactics that has already been announced is the gathering of evidence against 
animal testing going on in universities.  The current study has shown that in the past 
the campaign against Oxford University targeted an individual in over a quarter of 
incidents, so this is something that might be reflected in future campaigns.  The fact 
that the Cruelty Free Campus campaign has called out for whistle-blowers implies 
that the activists have the intention of gathering the names of the individuals involved 
in animal research. Although universities are likely to know that they need to protect 
their staff involved in animal research, the findings of this study gives more of an 
insight into the type of actions that they need to protect them from.  
 In addition to taking into account future campaigns that might be similar in 
nature to the SPEAK campaign, the SHAC campaign can also provide vital 
information when assessing the likelihood of a similar campaign occurring.  The fact 
that over half of the incidents associated with SHAC involved a visit to the target’s 
home indicates that similar individuals at risk in the future should extend security 
measures to their homes as well as the workplace.  
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 The fact that very few more serious incidents involving bombs and arson have 
been identified, as well as no acts of interpersonal violence, may help to ease the 
anxieties of individuals who fear that they might be targeted by animal rights 
extremists, or indeed those who have already faced targeting. Although the 
psychological effects of the types of actions carried out in individuals are currently 
unknown, the knowledge that it is highly unlikely that they will be physically harmed 
might help to lessen the effects.    
 This study also has implications for the police and security agencies. 
Knowing the types of actions that have happened in the past will help lay the 
foundations for risk assessments to be carried out at similar organisations. Although 
there are specific teams within police that are dedicated to the policing of domestic 
extremism, these are not the police officers that will likely be called out to the crime 
initially.  Using the database of incidents that this study has created may be able to 
help build up training packages for police officers so that they know what types of 
incidents could be related to animal rights extremism, meaning that they can offer the 
correct support to the victims, assess whether this is something that is likely happen 
again, and alert the relevant teams within the police. This will then make sure that the 
dedicated domestic extremism units have a full oversight of animal rights incidents 
that are occurring in the UK.  
4.5.3 Future recommendations 
The findings of this study have given a holistic picture of the actions carried out by 
animal rights extremists in the UK. A large database has been created which could be 
used as a basis for more in depth research into these actions. For example, the current 
study has identified patterns in behaviour within distinct campaign types, and this 
could be explored in more detail. The data could be scrutinised further to create case 
studies of the main campaigns. 
 This study has addressed what the animal rights activists have carried out 
themselves, but it has not touched upon how these incidents have been experienced 
by the targets and victims.  Due to the fact that a large number of companies, and 
indeed individuals, were named as the targets of these actions, further research should 
be conducted to see how these incidents have affected those companies and the 
people associated with them. This could help to build up a better understanding of 
whether the actions carried out by animal rights groups are having the desired effect, 
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and whether there are any elements to the actions that make them more or less 
intimidating for the victims. This is also important when assessing whether 
intimidation has taken place.  
 Further research could be conducted in collaboration with the police in order 
to learn more about the individuals carrying out these actions. One of the limitations 
of the current study is that we are unable to gather much information about the 
activists themselves, so we are unable to assess how many individuals are responsible 
for the 1,064 incidents. The types of targeting and tactics associated with each 
campaign are currently being explained in terms of them being associated with the 
nature of the campaign, however it could be the case that the tactics used are 
associated with an individual who is part of that campaign. For example, a 
particularly active member of SPEAK might favour the use of arson as a tactic, 
making it seem as though that is a key feature of the campaign, when actually it is a 
key feature of the activist. In fact, the leader of SPEAK has served time in prison for 
arson offences related to the campaign, so the fact that the tactic might be associated 
with this member rather than the group is a possibility. Having more information 
about the active members of each campaign type would help to identify which 
actions are key features of the campaigns, and which are key to the individual. 
Collaborating with a police team such as the National Domestic Extremism and 
Disorder Intelligence Unit might open up the opportunity to gather this kind of 
information and potentially help to create a typology of the activists responsible for 
the incidents. 
 The current research has not gone into detail about the relationship between 
the target and the campaign goals. Previous research, however, has shown that for 
specific campaigns where the main target has been unattainable, the activists have 
chosen to target people and companies further removed. This has been seen to a 
certain extent in this study, with the wide range of companies associated with some 
of the main targets such as HLS and Oxford University being identified. However, 
there is an opportunity to scrutinise this in more detail. This may help to build up a 
targeting model, and increase the likelihood of identifying individuals and companies 
at risk of action taken against them in the future. 
Future research could also address the use of threats alongside the actions 
carried out. As has been seen from the literature reviewed in chapter three, the use of 
threats is closely associated with intimidation and so this is an important aspect to 
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explore in more detail. Almost half of the action reports in the data collected involved 
a threat or warning of some form so this will stand as a good data source to base this 
research on.  The focus on threatening language used by the activists will form the 
basis for the study in chapter five of this thesis.  
4.5.4 Conclusions 
The aim of this study was to explore the behaviours used by animal rights extremists 
when carrying out incidents in the UK. This study has successfully produced a 
catalogue of 1,064 incidents, which have been coded for a high number of 
behaviours. Although there is a moderate amount of previous research on the actions 
carried out by animal rights extremists, this is the first to look at these behaviours 
across all campaign and action types.  This study has shown that although animal 
rights groups carry out a wide range of tactics, they have a small number that are 
used frequently, and that they use these actions against a distinct number of specified 
targets. This study has also shown that the behaviours carried out by these animal 
rights activists are extremely regular, especially considering previous research has 
demonstrated that activists are encouraged to carry out their own action (Carson et 
al., 2012; Monaghan, 2000). The behaviour patterns within each of the main 
campaign types also highlight the fact that they each have preferred targets and 
tactics. This finding in particular has important implications for future targets of 
animal rights extremists, and the policing of these activists.   
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Chapter Five 
Study 2: Analysis of threats used by animal rights extremists in the UK 
5.1 Overview 
Chapter four (Study 1) presented an overview of the behaviours carried out by animal 
rights extremists in the UK between 2002 and 2014 as reported by the activists on the 
Bite Back website. This study highlighted the fact that almost half of the incident 
reports included a written threat to the target. Additionally, chapter three highlighted 
that the use of threats has also been identified as a type of behaviour closely 
associated with intimidation throughout both dictionary definitions and the academic 
literature (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Sands, 1998; Seabrook, 2004, for example). 
Threats appear to be an integral part of intimidating behaviour and therefore this 
study aims to explore the use of threatening language by animal rights extremists.  
5.2 Introduction 
As has been seen in the results of Study 1, animal rights extremists do not 
appear to carry out physical violence. However, the use of threats is evident and 
might be used in place of bodily force in order to coerce the target to comply with 
their demands. Threats are discussed in the literature as a type of aggressive 
behaviour. For example, Tedeschi and Felson (1994) make reference to coercive 
actions as a form of aggression. Coercive actions are defined as an action that intends 
to harm a person or force them to comply, where one of these outcomes is of value to 
the actor.  Harming a target might be desirable if the actor was looking for justice, for 
example, or compliance might lead to a benefit for the actor.  Coercive actions fall 
into one of three categories according to the authors: threats, punishment and bodily 
force.  A threat is treated as the communication of an intention to cause harm, 
whereas a punishment is the act that is performed with an intention to cause harm.  
Even though with a threat no action has been taken, the communication itself might 
result in a type of harm, in this case fear.  An alternative result of a threat might be 
compliance from the target.  
Pruitt et al. (1993) describe threats as a type of struggle tactic used by a 
person or group of people during social conflict.  The authors explain that threats can 
be an easy way of gaining compliance due to the fact that if the target complies, the 
actor has no need to carry out the threat.  However, if the target does not comply the 
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threat will need to be carried out, which could be costly to the perpetrator.  The 
authors suggest that the act of harm might lead to a drop in support for group carrying 
out the threat if they do not agree with the action, or if they sympathise with the 
target.  The actor might also risk the target responding with acts of harm towards 
them.  However, if the threat is not carried out then the actor could lose credibility. 
Pruitt et al. (1993) also make reference to harassment as being a type of threat where 
the harmful act is actually carried out before the threat.  The threat is therefore that 
the harm will continue if the target does not comply with their demands  
Threats have been discussed as an integral part of terrorism both in place of 
physical action, and alongside it. For example, threats are a key part of the definition 
of terrorism in the UK (MI5, 2013) and in the terrorism literature (Kaplan, 1981; 
Ruby, 2002, for example). Waldron (2004) explores the idea that there is a distinction 
between threats from terrorism and threats from other types of crime.  He suggests 
that in non-terrorist threats, the intimidator states that if the victim does not fulfil 
their demands then they will carry out their threat.  In terrorism, however, Waldron 
states that the threat is carried out initially, and then the victim is told that if they do 
not fulfil their demands then the threat will continue to be carried out, which is 
similar to Pruitt et al’s (1993) definition of harassment. Waldron argues that the fact 
that the threat is already carried out before the act takes place is what makes acts of 
intimidation through terrorism different to acts of intimidation through other crimes, 
and serves to show that the terrorists are capable of carrying out their threat, therefore 
leaving no question around their capabilities.  
Previous research has also focussed on the language used in threats. For 
example, Smith and Shuy (2002), discuss how analysing threatening language can 
help with criminal investigations within the FBI. The authors suggest that through 
linguistic analysis of written and verbal threats they might be able to uncover certain 
characteristics of the offender, for example sex and race, while also making an 
assessment of the threat and identifying false allegations. The method of coming to 
these conclusions appears to be based on the experience of the individual analysing 
the communication.  
Chung and Pennebaker (2011) provide a review of different text analysis 
methods for assessing threatening communications. They point out that qualitative 
approaches such as thematic content analysis is time consuming and the coding 
schemes developed might not be applicable to future threats due to the varying nature 
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of threatening communications. Computerised methods can be used to identify 
language patterns and count different types of words in a quick and easy manner. 
Chung and Pennebaker suggest that computerised word pattern analysis is useful in 
identifying trends in language, however large samples of text are needed in order for 
the results to be reliable. Word count analysis methods, such as LIWC (Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count, Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010), have been used in research 
looking at a variety of psychological phenomena, including terrorism. For example, it 
has been used to analyse terrorist texts, such as Al-Qaeda transcripts (Pennebaker & 
Chung, 2009). The researchers were able to use LIWC to identify differences in the 
language used by Al-Qaeda compared to other terrorist groups.  Baele (2016) used 
LIWC to compare the language used by lone-actor terrorists with non-terrorist 
writings. They found that although lone-actor terrorists display a lot of negative 
emotion in their writings, they have a high level of cognitive sophistication. Glasgow 
and Schouten (2014) also argue that analysing threatening language can be useful in 
predicting violent behaviour alongside existing tools used by mental health 
practitioners.  
LIWC has also been used to attempt to identify deception. Newman, 
Pennebaker, Berry and Richards (2003) carried out a series of studies to identify 
differences in the language used in true and false stories. They found that people 
telling lies use language that is less focussed on the self, use more negative words and 
have a lower level of cognitive complexity than those telling the truth. Using the 
LIWC results, they were able to detect deception in over 60% of cases. Taylor et al. 
(2013) were able to identify insider threats using LIWC analysis during a simulation, 
where participants were given the task of an ‘insider’, or someone willing to provide 
covert information outside of the company. Contrary to Newman et al’s. (2003) 
findings, they found that those who were covering up the fact that they were an 
insider tended to use language focussed on the self, rather than the collective group.  
5.2.1 Aims 
The current study aims to explore the use of threats by animal rights extremists. In 
particular, the study aims to explore which types of actions are associated with threats 
and to explore the type of language used by the animal rights activists when making 
threats.  
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5.3 Method 
5.3.1 Data collection 
The data used in this study was taken from the same data set collected for Study 1. 
This data included 1,064 incidents of animal rights extremist actions carried out in 
the UK between 2002 and 2014, taken from the Bite Back website (for details see 
section 4.3.1). As has been mentioned previously, the data used in this study is self-
reported by the activists themselves and not corroborated by other information.  
However, in this study the focus is on the content of the messages sent by the 
activists themselves, and as the activists themselves have produced this information 
this data source is appropriate. 
 Content analysis was used to code the data. One of the variables that this data 
was coded for was whether a threat had been made in the text of the incident report. 
A threat was coded as present if: 
 A statement of intention was made for future action 
 Future action was implied 
 Specific mention that the action being reported was meant as a warning to the 
target 
 Statements that they are watching the targets 
 Specific mention that a threat was made to the target throughout the course of 
the action 
Action reports that included a threat were coded as 1 (threat present) and the verbatim 
threat or warning was copied into a separate document for analysis. Incidents that did 
not include a threat or warning were coded as 0 (not present). 
 In almost half of the 1,067 incident reports a threat or a warning was coded as 
present (45.8%, 487). All of these incidents were included in the descriptive statistics, 
however a number of incidents were subsequently excluded from the quantitative 
analyses for the following reasons: 
 In one incident it was stated that a threat was made to the target but not what 
this threat was.  
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 94 incidents were reported in the same incident report and therefore the threat 
made was identical. To remove duplication these threats were removed. For 
more information of duplicate incident reports see section 4.3.1.  
With this taken into account, 392 threats were included in the LIWC analysis.  
5.3.2 Data analysis 
The data was initially analysed using descriptive statistics to describe the features of 
the incidents that involved a threat being made. The descriptive results focus on the 
type of incident that was associated with the threat, which campaign it belonged to, 
and who the target was. This is to get an insight into the types of incidents that carry 
threats with them.  
 Word count analysis was then carried out on the data using LIWC (Linguistic 
Inquiry and Word Count; Tausczik & Pennebaker, 2010). LIWC counts the 
percentage of words in a body of text that fall into different categories, for example 
different emotions or thinking styles. LIWC was chosen as a method of analysis due 
to the fact that it is able to uncover psychological dimensions in the text. LIWC has 
been successful in providing insight into a variety of settings, such as deception and 
aggression in terrorist groups (Pennebaker et al., 2008; Chung and Pennebaker, 
2011), emotion and cognitions of lone-actor terrorists (Baele, 2016) and insider 
threats (Taylor et al., 2013). 
In this study, LIWC was used to analyse the text based on the following 
variables (referred to as summary variables by LIWC): 
 
Analytic thinking  
The analytical thinking variable identifies whether there are logical thinking patterns 
in the text. This variable is derived from eight function word dimensions, which were 
tested on 50,000 college application essays (Pennebaker, Chung, Frazee, Lavergne & 
Beaver, 2014). The results of this study showed that the use of categorical language, 
indicative of analytical thinking, is associated with higher achievement in college. 
Language associated with a lower level of analytical thinking includes focus on 
personal experiences and is more narrative. The score given for this variable is a 
standardized percentile, based on a scale of 0-100, with 0 indicating a low level of 
analytical thinking, and 100 indicating a high level of analytical thinking.  
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Clout 
This variable identifies whether the activists are showing social status, confidence or 
leadership in the text. The dimensions of this variable was derived from a series of 
five studies by looking at the use of pronouns in verbal and written language 
(Kacewicz, Pennebaker, Davis, Jeon & Graesser, 2013). The findings of these studies 
indicate that the use of words focussed on others indicates a high social status and 
words focussed on the self indicate a lower social status. The clout variable is scored 
on a standardised percentile on a scale of 0-100, with 0 indicating a low level of 
clout, and 100 indicating a high level of clout. 
 
Authenticity  
The authenticity variable identifies how authentic or honest the author of the text is. 
This variable was created based on studies focussed on the use of deception 
(Newman et al., 2003). These studies indicate that when people are lying they focus 
less on the self, have a low level of cognitive complexity and use more negative 
language. The authenticity variable is scored on a standardised percentile of 1-100, 
with 0 indicating a low level of authenticity and 100 indicating a high level of 
authenticity.  
 
Emotional tone 
This variable identifies positive and negative emotions in the text. LIWC categorises 
the text based on positive and negative words and combines these to create a score on 
a scale of 0-100, with a higher the score indicating a more positive tone. Numbers 
above 50 represent a positive tone, and numbers below 50 represent a more negative 
tone. This measure has been successful in identifying the change in positive to 
negative emptions following the terrorist attacks on September 11th, 2001 (Cohn, 
Mehl & Pennebaker, 2004).  
 
Words associated with the following categories were also searched for: 
 Affect – positive words, negative words, anxiety, anger, sadness 
 Social – family and friends 
 Cognitive processes – insight, cause, discrepancies, tentativeness, certainty, 
differentiation 
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 Perceptual processes – seeing, hearing, feeling 
 Core drives and needs – affiliation, achievement, power, reward focus, 
risk/prevention focus 
 Time orientation – past/present/future focus 
 Informal speech – swear words, netspeak, assent, nonfluencies, fillers 
The score given for these words are in the form of the percentage of total words 
in the text.  
In order for LIWC to be effective the correct spelling of words need to be 
used in the text. The verbatim text was therefore spellchecked to make sure that all 
words were spelt correctly, meaning that the text analysed was altered slightly, but 
only to account for incorrect spelling.  
5.3.3 Ethical considerations 
This study received a favourable ethical opinion from the Faculty of Human and 
Medical Sciences Ethical Review Committee, a copy of which can be found in 
Appendix B.  As stated in section 4.3.4, a number of ethical considerations were 
taken into account, in line with those proposed by the Association of Internet 
Researchers list of considerations.  One of these considerations pertinent to the data 
used in this study focuses on the use of named individuals. As has been seen in Study 
1, a number of individuals targeted by animal rights groups were named in the data. 
Therefore, verbatim quotes will not be used at all in cases where extracts from the 
text could be used to search for the name online and identify the target, i.e. if the 
name of the target is used anywhere in the action report where the quote was taken 
from. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Descriptive results 
Four hundred and eighty-seven incident reports were identified as including a threat 
or warning, which accounts for 45.8% of the incidents found to have been carried out 
by animal rights activist in the UK between 2002 and 2014 (N=1,064), as reported by 
Bite Back.   
Table 13: Frequency of incident types for incidents including a threat and all 
incidents  
Incident Type 
Frequency of incidents 
including a threat 
(N=487) 
Frequency of all incidents  
(N=1,064) 
Property damage 64.7% (315) 61.2% (651) 
Graffiti 35.9% (175) 33.2% (353) 
Animal liberation 9.4% (46) 19.2% (204) 
Locks glued 9.9% (48) 10.1% (107) 
Home visit 37.2% (181) 27.7% (295) 
Arson 4.7% (23) 3.3% (35) 
Theft 2.3% (11) 2.2% (23) 
Bomb hoax 3.1% (15) 2.1% (22) 
 
Table 13 shows the frequency of the types of actions carried out in the reports 
including a threat compared to all actions (regardless of whether a threat was made), 
where more than 10 incidents occurred. For a full list of incident types associated 
with threats see Table 24, Appendix E. As can be seen, most of the incident types 
occur at a similar frequency regardless of whether a threat was carried out or not, 
with property damage and graffiti being the most frequent in both cases. Animal 
liberation, however, occurs less frequently for incidents that include a threat, and a 
home visit occurs more frequently. Note that as in Study 1, these actions are not 
mutually exclusive, so an incident might have involved graffiti and property damage 
at an individuals’ home address, for example.  
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Table 14: Frequency of target type for incidents including a threat and all incidents  
Target Type 
Frequency of incidents 
including a threat 
(N=487) 
Frequency of all incidents  
(N=1,064) 
Company 80.9% (394) 71.1% (756) 
Individual 46.4% (226) 35.8% (381) 
Farm 13.6% (66) 19.7% (210) 
Woodland 4.5% (22) 6.7% (71) 
 
Table 14 shows the type of targets associated with the incidents that included 
a threat compared to the target frequencies for all incidents. The main target types are 
individuals and companies, with a slightly higher frequency of actions involving a 
threat being carried out against these targets compared to all actions. Very few threats 
were associated with a woodland target. This is likely to be because the woodland 
targets are not necessarily associated with a specific individual, and therefore the 
activists have no one in particular to threaten.  
The campaign types with ten incidents or more associated with the threats are 
presented in Table 15, along with the frequency of each campaign type within all 
incidents. As can be seen from this table, by far the most frequent campaign to be 
associated with a threat was the campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences (SHAC).  
The top five campaign types associated with the incidents involving threats differ 
slightly to the top five campaign types over all.  The top four remain the same 
(SHAC, SPEAK, General Animal Liberation and Hunting/Angling), however the 
campaigns against Newchurch Farm (a guinea pig breeding farm) and the campaign 
against fur and leather had more incidents associated than the campaign against 
Butchers, which is the fifth most frequent campaign for all incidents.  
There are a number of other campaign types associated with threats not 
presented in this table, however the numbers are very small. A full list of these can be 
found in Table 25, Appendix E.   
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Table 15: Frequency of campaign type for incidents including a threat and all 
incidents (above 10) 
Campaign Against 
Frequency of incidents 
including a threat 
(N=487) 
Frequency of all 
incidents  
(N=1,064) 
Huntingdon Life Sciences (SHAC) 40.9% (199) 31.1% (331) 
Oxford University (SPEAK) 10.3% (50) 5.6% (60) 
General Animal Liberation  7.6% (37) 16.4% (174)  
Hunting/Angling 5.3% (26) 8.5% (90) 
Newchurch Farm 5.1% (25) 4.0% (43) 
Fur/leather 2.7% (13) 2.6% (28) 
Butchers 2.5% (12) 4.7% (50) 
Circuses 2.3% (11) 2.2% (23) 
Novartis 2.1% (10) 2.0% (21) 
Animal testing (other) 2.1% (10) 2.1% (22) 
 
5.4.2 LIWC analysis 
A Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count programme (LIWC2015) was used to analyse 
the written threats. The data used for this analysis consisted of 392 individual threats, 
once duplicate threats were removed. Over the 392 threats there were 8,997 words, 
with an average of 18 words per sentence. Table 16 shows the results for the 
variables analytical thinking, clout, authenticity and emotional tone. 
Table 16: LIWC summary variables  
Variable 
Percentile 
Analytical thinking 46.71 
Clout 96.24 
Authenticity 38.23 
Emotional tone 3.83 
 
As can be seen from Table 16, the text shows an average level of analytical 
thinking, scoring close to the 50th percentile.  The text scores below average on the 
scale of authenticity, indicating that the extremists might not be truthful with their use 
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of threats. The data scores in the 96th percentile for clout, meaning that the language 
used when threatening their targets indicates a high amount of confidence, social 
status or leadership displayed by the authors of the threats. This is computed based on 
the assumption that language focussed on others, rather than the self, is indicative of 
social status (Kacewicz et al., 2013). This is demonstrated in a number of threats 
where the focus is on the person or people being threatened, rather than the activists 
themselves. For example: 
 
“Sever your contract with Oxford University, as if you don’t actions against 
you are only set to increase and you will end up remaining on the ALF hit-list as a 
valid and high-profile target for many, many years to come.” 
 
“This is the start - you can finish it - a simple statement is all that's needed 
saying you no longer will be a customer of HLS and we will vanish into the night for 
good.” 
 
In cases where the threats refer to what the author is threatening to do, the focus is on 
the activists as a collective group, rather than actions carried out by an individual. For 
example:  
 
“Try as hard as you want to hide your filthy little secrets, we're always 
watching and always will be.” 
 
“We will continue our fight until all animals are free.” 
 
The very low score associated with emotional tone indicates that the text is 
made up of more words associated with a negative tone of voice than a positive tone. 
This reflects the fact that the threats are stating that something bad will happen to the 
target. For example: 
 
“they could visit a friend or family member in hospital, the morgue, on 
sacrificial alters, the chapel of rest or their own funeral.” 
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“RCM, terminate your involvement in the construction of the Oxford animal 
mutilation centre, not next month, not next week, but now! If not things will only get 
worse for you… much worse!” 
 
Table 17 shows the percentage of words falling into the categories relating to 
affect, cognitive processes, perceptual processes, core drives and needs, time 
orientation and informal speech.   
Table 17: Percentage of word types occurring in the text 
Word type 
Percentage 
Affect words 6.14 
Positive emotion 1.92 
Negative emotion 4.17 
Anxiety 0.24 
Anger 2.21 
Sadness 0.43 
Social words 13.87 
Family 0.12 
Friends 0.23 
Cognitive processes 9.15 
Insight 1.57 
Cause 1.08 
Discrepancies 1.43 
Tentativeness 2.29 
Certainty 1.75 
Differentiation 3.08 
Perceptual processes 1.40 
Seeing 0.80 
Hearing 0.27 
Feeling 0.31 
Core drives and needs 11.24 
Affiliation 5.06 
Achievement 0.79 
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Power 2.63 
Reward focus 1.22 
Risk/prevention focus 2.02 
Time orientation  - 
Past focus 1.30 
Present focus 12.02 
Future focus 4.92 
Informal speech  0.22 
Swear words 0.18 
Netspeak 0.04 
Assent 0.01 
Nonfluencies 0.00 
Fillers 0.00 
 
As can be seen from table 17, although the overall tone of the threats was 
negative, there were only a small percentage of negative words used in the data 
(4.17%). The most frequently occurring set of words used in the data were social 
words (13.87%), however the LIWC analysis did not give any further insight into 
what these types of words were, as the only social words that they look for 
specifically are family and friends which both did not feature much in this dataset.  
 The threats were focussed more on the present (12.02%) than the past (1.30%) 
or the future (4.92%). This could suggest that the activists are more interested in what 
is happening right now and focus their threats on what they are doing at the moment, 
rather than what they have done, or will do.  
Informal speak did not appear much, if at all, in the data set, with only 0.22% 
of the words meeting this category. Only 0.18% of the data included a swear word, 
which indicates that the animal rights activists do not feel the need to swear when 
making their threats.  
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5.5 Discussion 
This study aimed to identify the types of actions associated with threats and to 
explore the language that animal rights extremists use when making threats against 
their targets. The findings of the LIWC analysis suggests that the threats made by 
animal rights activists have an extremely negative tone and that the activists have a 
lot of confidence when making their threats, although they might not be completely 
truthful in their intentions. The results of this study will be discussed in relation to the 
existing literature as well as addressing the strengths and limitations of the research, 
and the implications of the findings. 
 The descriptive statistics give some insight into the types of incidents that 
have a threat attached to them. Incidents that targeted a company and/or an individual 
accounted for a large proportion of the incidents associated with threats, as did 
incidents relating to the SHAC (against Huntingdon Life Sciences) and SPEAK 
(against Oxford University) campaigns.  This could be because there are clear targets 
for these campaigns, and therefore a person or persons to direct the threat to. As was 
also found in Study 1, the most frequent types of incidents to be associated with the 
threats were property damage and graffiti. A higher proportion of incidents involving 
a threat occurred at the home of the target compared to all incidents, which indicates 
a more personal element to the incidents with a threat. Animal liberation did not 
occur as frequently for the incidents involving a threat, which could be a result of the 
fact that there is not a specific person to threaten. A small proportion of threats were 
associated with animal liberations however, although these threats tended to be more 
general in nature, for example threatening that the animal liberations would continue 
until all animals are free. 
 The findings from the LIWC analysis gives insight into the underlying 
psychological dimensions to the text. For example, the language used by the animal 
rights activists scored very highly for clout, which indicated that the activists are very 
confident when making these threats. Clout is calculated based on the use of the 
language focussed on the self, compared to language focussed on others (Kacewicz et 
al., 2013). The fact that the activists focus their language on their targets and their 
own collective group indicates that they see themselves as having a high social status. 
This could be due to a number of reasons. Firstly, the activists are making their 
threats alongside reporting on action that they have already carried out. In these 
 
96 
cases, they are not only threatening to carry out some kind of harmful action, but they 
have already done so. This might give the activists a feeling of power over their 
targets, which has been picked up on in the language that they use. The fact that there 
have been high profile cases of their actions being successful in achieving their aims 
might also add to their sense of power (PETA, 2013; Upton, 2011).  
The LIWC analysis also indicated that the authenticity of the language used 
scored relatively low on the scale (39th percentile), which might suggest that the 
activists are not being entirely truthful when they are making their threats. As has 
been discussed, the scale for authenticity is based on a series of studies carried out by 
Pennebaker et al. (2013), which indicates that when people are lying they use more 
negative language as well as focussing less on the self, and have a low level of 
cognitive complexity. The authenticity score is therefore likely to be pulled down by 
the fact that the threats score so highly for negative language. The fact that the results 
also show that the language scores highly for clout, therefore indicating a focus on 
others rather than the self, is also likely to have an influence on bringing the 
authenticity score down. The research that this variable is based on was successful in 
detecting deception in 61%-67% of cases across five studies (Newman et al., 2003), 
however this still leaves over 30% of cases incorrectly classified. Therefore, we 
cannot rely on this variable alone to identify whether the activists are being truthful in 
their demands, although it gives an indication. In order to assess whether this is 
accurate, further research would need to be conducted to ascertain whether the threats 
were carried out or not.  
5.5.1 Strengths and limitations 
One of the key strengths of this study is the data used. Having a large dataset of 
threats written by the animal rights activists themselves gives a unique insight into 
the type of language and threats used by this group of people. The size of the dataset 
also gives a good pool of data to draw conclusions from and gives examples of the 
threats written by activists to a large number of different targets, for a variety of 
campaign types.  
 As the data provided on Bite Back is anonymous we are unable to ascertain 
how many different individuals wrote the threats. However it is likely that numerous 
individuals contributed to the action reports due to the variety of campaigns and 
locations included in the dataset. Because of this, the data used in the analysis is 
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made up of a number threats written by multiple authors. Using this dataset, the 
LIWC analysis is able to give an insight into the type of language used by a group of 
people with the same goals, and as the results have shown, themes within the text 
have been identified.   
The data collected for this study consisted of threats made in the reporting of 
an act that had already been carried out. For example, an action report might have 
stated that the victim has had their car windows smashed, and the activists have then 
threatened that this will happen again. We do not, however, have a sample of threats 
made without an action being carried out in the first place.  As Waldron (2004) 
suggests, it may be the case that threats are only made by activists after they have 
carried out action, but without having access to more data we cannot know this for 
sure. In order to ascertain whether these groups make threats before carrying out any 
action more data will need to be collected. This might prove difficult as other than 
Bite Back there is no clear source that collects data from a variety of campaign 
groups, meaning that the data would need to come directly from companies and 
individuals who have been targeted, and the websites of each animal rights group.   
 LIWC itself has its limitations as a method of analysis, many of which are 
outlined by the creators of the programme (LIWC, 2016). For example, LIWC (2016) 
highlights the fact that the programme might have trouble categorising words in 
isolation and that it is unable to pick up on sarcasm or metaphors. In addition, 
although the catalogue of terms used in the LIWC analysis was created based on 
psychological research, this research is limited to a distinct number of studies using 
specific samples. For example, the variable ‘analytical thinking’ was developed based 
on a sample of college admissions essays (Pennebaker et al., 2014), which is not 
representative of all the different types of data that might be analysed by LIWC.  
There appears to be a crossover in some of the components that make up the 
algorithms for the clout and authenticity variables. For example, a focus on words 
relating to others is associated with a high level of clout, but a low level of 
authenticity. As a result it is unclear whether a body of text could score highly for 
both clout and authenticity. As has been discussed in terms of the results for this 
study, the aspects that make the data score highly in clout might also lead to it being 
unauthentic. More research needs to be done to understand how much these two 
variables are related to each other.  
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5.5.2 Implications 
The differences in the actions associated with threats give an insight into the types of 
targets that might be the focus of on-going action by animal rights activists, rather 
than a one-off incident. For example, the SHAC and SPEAK campaigns accounted 
for a large proportion of incidents that involved a threat, suggesting that people being 
targeted by these groups might be at risk of continued action. With this in mind, 
future targets of similar campaigns could be better protected and prepared for 
continued action against them, which might help to lessen the amount of harm they 
receive as a result of these actions.  
 Further research on the authenticity of the threats made could help to predict 
whether a threat will be carried out or not. The use of LIWC to uncover deception has 
begun to show successes (Newman et al., 2003), however more work could be done 
on this data to test whether predictions could be made. In order to achieve this, data 
could be collected to check whether the threats made in the current dataset were 
carried out or not, and then each of these datasets could be analysed for authenticity 
using LIWC. If the results show a higher level of authenticity for the threats that were 
carried out compared to those that were not then the LIWC analysis could help to lay 
the groundwork for assessing the validity of future threats.   
5.5.3 Conclusions 
This study aimed to explore the threatening language used by animal rights 
extremists. The results of Study 1, along with previous research on intimidation, 
identified threats as a recurring theme in relation to intimidation. The LIWC analysis 
has given an insight into a number of underlying psychological variables to the 
threatening language used, suggesting that the activists have a high level of social 
status and they are very much focussed on the negative. Although the threats score 
below average on authenticity, more work needs to be done in order to confirm this 
assessment is accurate. The use of threats appear to be an integral part of the acts 
carried out by animal rights extremists, particularly for certain campaign types, and 
might be used on order to increase the impact of the actions carried out against their 
targets. This highlights the importance of taking the threats into consideration as 
forming part of the initial action carried out, rather than an afterthought of the action.  
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Chapter Six 
 
General Discussion 
6.1 Overview  
Although there has been a body of research focussed on animal rights extremism, 
there has been no research looking at the acts carried out by these groups across all 
campaign groups and action types. Previous research has also neglected to look at 
animal rights extremism as an example of a campaign of intimidation, linking this 
with the previous literature and what we already know about intimidation as a 
behaviour.  Having identified these gaps in the literature, the current research aimed 
to catalogue the acts carried out by animal rights extremism in the UK and explore 
the threatening language used by these groups. Particularly, the research aimed to 
identify any patterns in the behaviours carried out by animal rights extremists, 
whether there were any regular behaviours found within or between campaign types, 
and explore the type of threatening language used by these groups. In order to 
achieve these aims, literature reviews on animal rights extremism and intimidation 
were explored, followed by two empirical studies. This chapter will summarise the 
findings of the thesis and highlight the themes across the research in relation to the 
pre-existing literature. Finally, the limitations and implications of the research as a 
whole will be discussed.  
6.2. Summary of findings  
Chapter two was a literature review on animal rights extremism. Previous research on 
animal rights extremism was found to focus on specific campaign types (Donovan & 
Coupe, 2013; Metcalfe, 2008), or action types (Monaghan, 1999; Munro, 2012). A 
number of articles also addressed the question of whether animal rights extremism 
can and should be defined as terrorism (Hadley, 2009; Monaghan, 1999). The 
literature review also identified that there appear to be a wide variety of action types 
carried out by animal rights extremists, but that there has been no research looking at 
these acts as a whole across the UK. A number of studies refer to the acts carried out 
by animal rights extremists as intimidation (Donovan & Coupe, 2013, for example), 
but little has been done to explore this concept in detail, and it is unclear whether 
intimidating acts are counted as separate from violent acts.  
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 Chapter three explored the current knowledge on intimidation with a review 
of the literature focussing on definitions of intimidation, settings in which 
intimidation has been researched and behaviours associated with intimidation.  The 
definitions of intimidation were found to be wide ranging, however a number of 
themes recurred in the definitions, including intimidation being an impression 
management tactic and a goal orientated behaviour, the use of threats and harassment 
being closely associated with intimidation, and intimidation being seen as a social 
construct. A wide range of behaviours were associated with intimidation throughout 
the literature, ranging from violent acts such as physical assault and bomb attacks, to 
verbal acts such as embarrassing or taunting someone. Finally, as well as animal 
rights extremism, a variety of settings were the focus of past literature on 
intimidation, such as sport, witness intimidation and terrorism (Shields, 1999; Tarling 
et al., 2000; Waldron, 2004. for example).  
 Chapter four consisted of a quantitative analysis of the acts carried out by 
animal rights extremists in the UK, between 2002 and 2014. Regular patterns of 
behaviour were identified across all of the incidents, with specific target types and 
action types frequently occurring across the data. Property damage, graffiti and 
animal liberation were identified as the most popular choice of tactics, and 
companies, individuals, farms and woodland areas were target choices associated 
with all of the incidents. Threats were also found to be a key factor in the reporting of 
the actions carried out. The five main campaign types were identified as Stop 
Huntingdon Animal Cruelty (SHAC), the campaign against Oxford University 
(SPEAK), general animal liberation, anti-hunting and anti-meat industry campaigns. 
These campaign types were explored in more detail, and the Configural Frequency 
Analysis showed that each campaign type had a distinct pattern of targeting and 
action choice. This study demonstrated the patterns of behaviours across campaigns 
as well as within them, and has practical implications for both law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, as well as those targeted by animal rights groups.  
 Chapter five explored the use of threatening language by animal rights 
extremists. Having identified that threats were an integral part of both intimidation, 
and the incidents carried out by animal rights extremists, this study aimed to identify 
the types of actions associated with threats as well as the psychological dimensions of 
the threats, such as the emotional tone, analytical thinking and clout associated with 
the threat. The findings indicated that types of target and actions associated with the 
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threats were not dissimilar to the types of actions carried out by animal rights 
extremists overall, although a more personal element is apparent. The language used 
when making the threats had a negative emotional tone with a lot of confidence, 
although scored low on authenticity, indicting that the authors of the threats might not 
be entirely truthful.  
6.3 Key themes across the thesis  
A number of themes were identified across both empirical studies and the literature 
reviews. These are animal rights extremism as an example of intimidation, threats 
and intimidation being implicitly linked, and patterns of behaviour being identified. 
These themes will be explored in terms of how they support the use of the behaviours 
associated with animal rights extremism being as an example of a campaign of 
intimidation.   
6.3.1 Animal rights extremism as intimidation 
One of the main aims of the current research was to use the actions carried out by 
animal rights extremists as an example of intimidating behaviours used by a group of 
people with similar goals. As has been discussed, many authors who have researched 
animal rights extremism have referred to the acts carried out by these groups as 
intimidation (Donovan & Coupe, 2013, for example), but they have not explored 
what aspects of the actions align themselves with the concept of intimidation. A 
review of the literature on intimidation identified a number of concepts associated 
with intimidation, all of which can be argued to be evident in the behaviours found to 
be used by animal rights extremists.  
Firstly, the idea that intimidation is a goal-orientated behaviour was evident in 
both the definitions of intimidation and the literature exploring intimidation. This has 
clear links with animal rights extremism. The results of Study 1 showed that all of the 
incidents included in the study fell into one of, or a combination of, four target types: 
companies, individuals, farms and woodland areas. None of the incidents targeted the 
general pubic, indicating specificity to who they are targeting, and a clear reason 
why. A large number of campaign types were identified, all with specific goals of 
what they want to achieve through their actions. All of the campaigns have the same 
goal of stopping all pain and suffering to animals, however each has a more specific 
focus. For example, SHAC wanted to shut down Huntingdon Life Sciences, SPEAK 
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aimed to stop the building of an animal research lab at Oxford University and the 
anti-hunting campaign want to put an end to hunting and angling as sports.  
 The use of threats and harassment were both also associated with intimidation 
in the definitions and across the literature. Study 1 found that almost half of the 
incidents reports included a threat, which formed the focus of Study 2. The results of 
this study indicate that the action carried out by the animal rights activists might play 
part of the threat itself as the threat is made at the time as the reporting of previous 
action carried out by the activists. Although the concept of harassment has not been 
the focus of this research, Tedeschi and Feslon (1994) suggest that harassment takes 
place when an action is carried out, and then a threat is made that this action will 
continue in the future. This type of behaviour was found to be evident throughout the 
actions and threats carried out by animal rights extremists, indicating that harassment 
is also associated with these groups. Waldron (2004) also suggest that this type of 
threat is particularly associated with terrorist behaviour. 
 Another key theme that was identified as being associated with intimidation 
in the literature review was the idea that it is an impression management (IM) 
technique (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Borino and Turnley, 1999). IM definitions state 
that intimidation is a behaviour carried out in order to make someone think of you a 
certain way, in particular as dangerous. This aligns with the tactics used by animal 
rights extremists. As many of the acts carried out by animal rights extremists also 
include a threat of further action, they are showing that they are capable of carrying 
out their threats and highlighting their credibility.  
6.3.2 Threats and intimidation 
Throughout the literature reviews and the empirical studies a strong link between 
threats and intimidation has been identified. Threats not only appear to be an 
important part in the definition and associated behaviours of intimidation but they 
also factor into about half of the incidents carried out by animal rights extremists. It 
appears that rather than the threat being separate to the incident, the threat and the 
incident carried out work together. For example, some of the incidents involved a 
threat made through graffiti or a threatening letter, whereas others used the incident 
itself as a threat of similar action to follow.  
 The threat of more action being carried out against the target might be as 
important, if not more, than the initial action itself. For example, if a company 
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experiences property damage at the home of one of its employees this might not be 
enough to make the company give in to the demands of the activists. However, if the 
same action is carried out with the threat that this action will be taken repeatedly 
against a number of other employees then this is likely to have far more impact, even 
though exactly the same action has been carried out, with no extra resources needed 
by the activists.  Therefore, as suggested by Feinstein and Kaplan (2010) and Drake 
(1998a) the activists are achieving maximum impact with minimum resources.  
 The findings of Study 2 also give some insight into the underlying 
psychological processes of the activists when making their threats. The LIWC 
analysis indicated that the activists are very confident when making their threats, 
which suggests that they know that they have power over the person or people that 
they are threatening, perhaps because they have been successful with achieving their 
goals in the past. The findings also indicate that the activists might not be completely 
truthful when making their threats, however more research would need to be done to 
confirm this. 
6.3.3 Regular patterns of behaviour 
Another key theme throughout the findings is that the animal rights extremists are 
carrying out regular patterns of behaviour, both across incidents and within the main 
campaign types. The results of Study 1 show that certain combinations of targets and 
actions occur more often than expected, suggesting typical patterns. This aligns itself 
with previous research on other extremist and terrorism actions, which has shown 
that terrorists have a preference for certain targeting and tactic types depending on the 
type of group or campaign they are involved in (Drake, 1998a). 
 Literature on terrorists targeting and tactical choices has suggested that the 
perpetrators’ moral code plays an important role when deciding whom to target and 
what to do to them (Drake, 1998b; Feinstein & Kaplan, 2010). This is evident in the 
target and strategy choices of animal rights extremists. For example, Study 1 
demonstrated that the activists used distinct groups of targets, and that even when 
individuals were targeted they only chose individuals who were seen to be working 
against their main goal of protecting animals.  The tactics used were also non-
physically violent, which fits in with the view of animal rights supporters that no 
animal, including humans, should be harmed. This is even explicitly demonstrated in 
one of the threats made by an activist, who stated that the target was lucky that they 
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do not believe in violence. The data used in this thesis covers 13 years of animal 
rights activities across the UK, yet regular patterns were still identified. This 
demonstrates how aligned the goals of the activists are, and that even though 
everyone and anyone is encouraged to carry out action in the name of animal rights 
(Monaghan, 1999), they all appear to be working together.  
  Identifying trends in the behaviours within the main campaign types, as well 
as for the animal rights campaign as a whole, is also an important finding, and adds to 
previous studies on animal rights extremism. In the past, literature has focussed on 
only one campaign type, such as SHAC, which has then been used as an example of 
what animal rights activists do (Donavon & Coupe, 2013; Metcalfe, 2008). This 
study has shown that different campaign types have slightly different targeting 
patterns and prefer different actions types, highlighting that we should not use only 
one campaign to base all knowledge of animal rights extremists on. Indeed, the 
SHAC campaign has played a huge role in the animal rights movement but as this 
study has shown there are many more campaigns being carried out, and with the 
recent demise of SHAC these may become more important.  
6.4 Methodological limitations  
The main limitations of this research lie within the data used. Gathering data on 
extremist or terrorist acts is known to be difficult (Wilson & Lemanski, 2013) as 
many of the details of these types of incidents are held by law enforcement or 
intelligence agencies, or known only to the activists themselves. In order to overcome 
these difficulties, this research used open source data, collected and published by 
animal rights activists themselves. In this case the data have not been corroborated by 
other sources. Traditionally in research of this kind, data is gathered from a variety of 
data sources. For example in previous research on terrorist behaviours, data was 
collected from sources such as books that have catalogued terrorist attacks (such as 
Mickolus, 1993) as well as respected newspapers (Wilson, 2000; Wilson & 
Lemanski, 2013). The use of two data sources not only help to corroborate the 
information, but it also helps to fill in any gaps in the data, especially as incidents of 
this kind are often not fully reported. Data in this research was only pulled from one 
data source due to the fact that a large number of the incidents reported by the animal 
rights activists were extremely low level in nature and therefore it is unlikely that 
these would have been reported in national newspapers. In addition to this, a number 
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of incidents carried out by these groups might not be recognised as animal rights 
incidents themselves. For example an act of property damage might be recorded as 
any other crime if there is no clear link to animal rights, either due to unawareness of 
the officers reporting the incident, or no clear victim being identified. Therefore Bite 
Back was chosen as a source of the data. As a result, there is an opportunity for future 
researchers to collect data from other sources, such as LexisNexis, to corroborate the 
data used. However, this research has been successful in cataloguing the incidents 
reported on Bite Back across a 13-year period, and identifying a number of trends 
and patterns in the behaviours reported. This serves as a solid basis for future analysis 
of the data.  
 Although the data from Bite Back was able to provide a good level of insight 
into a large number of variables, it did not provide much information on variables 
relating to who were carrying out the incidents. This is due to the fact that the 
information is provided anonymously, and in incidents where the activists are 
carrying out illegal behaviour it is not in their interest to be identified. Because of 
this, we are unable to assess how many people are responsible for the actions carried 
out in the name of animal rights. Previous literature indicates that there are a few 
active members in the animal rights movement that are responsible for the majority 
of the actions (Metcalfe, 2008; Monaghan, 1997). If this is the case then the fact that 
distinct patterns of behaviour have been identified is, perhaps, not that surprising. 
The fact that the data used in this study looks at incidents across all campaigns, in all 
areas of the UK spanning 13 years might mean that there is a larger number of people 
active than previous research looking at only one campaign types has identified. Not 
knowing this information might have an impact on how the results of this research 
are interpreted, although it does not make the findings any less important.  
 One aspect associated with intimidation that has not been explored at this 
stage in the research is the idea that intimidation is a social construct. In order for 
intimidation to take place the person being intimidated needs to feel fearful. The 
current research has been unable to identify this as the victims of animal rights 
extremism have not been studied. The findings have shown what animal rights 
extremists do, who they do it to, why they do it and what they have threatened to do 
in the future, but in order to understand the full impact of their behaviour we also 
need to identify how this has affected their victims. It might be the case that although 
the extremists are attempting to intimidate their targets they are being unsuccessful. 
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This seems unlikely, however, as anecdotal evidence indicates that a number of 
individuals and companies have given in to the demands of animal rights groups, 
indicating that they felt intimidated into doing so.  
6.5 Practical implications  
The current research, in particular the findings from Study 1, has identified a number 
of practical implications. Previous literature has shown that terrorist and extremist 
groups show regular patterns in their behaviour, and are therefore likely to show 
similar behaviour again in the future (Wilson, 2000). Study 1 also found that animal 
rights extremists show behaviour patterns when carrying out their actions, meaning 
that we can use this information to assess what they are likely to do in the future. This 
will be important for farms, companies or individuals who identify themselves as 
being at risk of being targeted by animal rights extremism as they could use this 
information to make a risk assessment as to the types of actions that they might 
become victims of. For example, if an individual is working for a company that is a 
high profile target of animal rights extremism, similar to Huntingdon Life Sciences, 
they could assess that if they were to become a target then this might involve direct 
action taking place at their home. As a result they can increase their security 
measures at their home, such as by installing CCTV or putting in gates, meaning that 
it will be much harder for the activists to carry out their actions. This change in 
behaviour from the targets, however, might also lead to a change in the behaviour 
from the activists and so it is important to continue to gather information on the 
action carried out in order to identify any changes in tactics.  
 The findings from the first study showed a large decline in the number of 
incidents carried out by animal rights extremists after 2008, which coincides with the 
imprisonment of a number of prolific animal rights activists, including the leaders of 
SHAC. Other members were arrested and imprisoned over the next few years, with 
the final member being sentenced in 2014. Since then SHAC have announced that 
they have ended their campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences. This highlights 
that there are a core group of activists responsible for the more serious offences, but 
that there are also a number of activists carrying out actions, although on a much 
smaller scale. Many of the sentences of the core group of activists will be coming to 
an end soon, if not already (BBC, 2009), which means that there is a chance that they 
will continue to carry out direct action after their release. Although their campaign 
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against HLS has ended, the data used in Study 1 could help to identify possible future 
targets of these activists.  HLS were able to deter the activists through expensive 
security measures and legal action (Donovan & Coupe, 2013), whereas smaller 
companies might not be able to do so. The data gathered from Study 1 included a 
wide range of targets including a number of smaller companies that might be at risk 
of becoming targets again in the future. Other companies might also be able to be 
identified based on similar attributes to those targeted in the past.  
6.6. Theoretical implications  
The studies carried out in this thesis have theoretical implications in terms of 
understanding the concept of intimidation. The current research has been able to 
identify the actions carried out by animal rights extremists as an example of a 
campaign of intimidation. A number of the aspects associated with intimidation, both 
from the definitions of the term and from the existing literature, are evident in the 
actions of animal rights extremists. Therefore, the animal rights campaign can serve 
as an example of a campaign of intimidation and can be used to test theories of 
intimidation, as well as create new ones. The data collected in this study could be 
used as the foundation for this, and with additional data on the outcome of the actions 
used, and how these are experienced by the victims of animal rights extremism, it 
would be possible to create a theoretical framework for the process of intimidation 
from start to finish.    
6.7. Implications for future research  
This research has been successful in showing what actions animal rights extremists 
have carried out and the type of threats that they have made. However, as discussed, 
it has been unable to identify whether the activists followed up on these threats or 
how the targets experienced the action taken against them. Future research could 
focus on this to create a holistic picture of not only what animal rights extremists do, 
but what effect their actions have on the companies and individuals being targeted. 
Based on the past literature and the findings from the current research, it is clear that 
the actions carried out by animal rights extremists could be defined as intimidation, 
however in order to assess this fully we need to find out whether the people targeted 
actually felt intimidated. One of the key aspects to intimidation is the way it is 
experienced by the victim, and therefore in order to understand animal rights 
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extremism as an example of intimidation fully, the experience of the victims needs to 
be taken into account. For example, companies and farms that were identified as 
targets in this study could be contacted to take part in a research study exploring the 
effect that the attacks had on their businesses as a whole, and the individual 
employees. Interviews could focus on the psychological effects of the incidents on 
individuals who have been targeted, as well as their colleagues. This will help to 
assess whether the impact of the animal rights actions spread wider than just the 
immediate target, and if the victims felt fearful as a result of the actions carried out. 
As well as looking at the experience of the victim, the outcome of the actions 
carried out by the activists also need to be researched in order to build up a complete 
picture. In cases where the actions of the activists led to people leaving their job, a 
company cutting ties with the main target, or a farm shutting down, future research 
could be used to identify why these outcomes happened. For example, was it because 
the individuals involved felt intimidated into it, or was it because of economic 
difficulties due to the actions carried out against them? If it was due to intimidation 
then it would also be useful to identify whether there are any differences in the way 
that the incidents were experienced by individuals who left their jobs or moved away 
as a result of the intimidation, compared to those who stayed. This might help to 
identify protective factors for people at risk of being targeted, and could subsequently 
be used to help lessen the effects for people not only at risk of intimidation by animal 
rights groups, but intimidation from other means. For example, if it was found that 
individuals who had a strong attachment to their job were more resilient to the 
intimidation then companies at risk of targeting might want to invest more time and 
money into increasing job satisfaction. In planning for the current research a third 
study had been proposed to focus on the experiences of the victims. This study aimed 
to have a particular focus on the psychological effects of intimidation and whether 
there are any mitigating factors that allow victims to deal with the intimidation 
effectively. Unfortunately due to access to victim information this was not possible in 
the current research in the allowed time period.  
 Further research could look at the threats made by the animal rights 
extremists. The findings of this research indicate that the threats made might not be 
entirely truthful. Follow up research could be used to identify whether the threats 
were carried out in cases where the demands had not been met, and what impact this 
had on the targets of the action. Previous research suggests that if a threat is not 
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carried out then this will have an impact on the credibility of the group that made the 
threat (Pruitt et al., 1993). If the threats made by the animal rights groups were not 
carried out then the credibility of the groups as a result could be assessed.  
The data used in this research was made up of incidents reported on the Bite 
Back website from the beginning of the incident reports in 2002, up until the end of 
2014. The website is still being updated regularly, so in future data can continue to be 
collected and update the analysis to identify any further trends, or to see whether the 
behaviour patterns are remaining the same.  
6.8 Conclusions  
Although a large body of existing research has focussed on animal rights extremism, 
and separately intimidation in a variety of settings, this thesis is the first to pull these 
two elements together and take a holistic view of animal rights extremism as a 
campaign of intimidation. The research studies have identified that animal rights 
extremism is strongly associated with intimidation, threats are an integral part of the 
this and that regular patterns of behaviour are evident in the acts carried out by the 
activists. The findings of this research have clear practical implications for assessing 
and protecting against what animal rights activists might do in the future. This thesis 
has also demonstrated how animal rights extremism can be used as an example of a 
campaign of intimidation and can therefore be used to advance our understanding of 
intimidation. Although the findings of the studies carried out in this thesis alone have 
important implications, the studies can also be used as basis to develop our 
understanding of animal rights extremism and how it relates to the use of intimidation 
further.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix A: Coding Dictionary used in Study 1 
 
For all numeric or categorical variables the following missing values are specified: 
888 - Unknown 
999 - Not applicable 
 
For all string variables please specify whether the information was unknown or not 
applicable by typing the following: 
Unknown 
N/A 
 
Most of the categorical variables are coded on a dichotomy, with a 0 representing a 
‘no’ (or not evident) and a 1 representing a ‘yes’ (or evident).  All of these are coded 
based on the information provided in the incident reports – if something is mentioned 
to have happened it will be coded as a 1, and if something is not mentioned to have 
happened then it will be coded as a 0.  
 
The variables in the coding scheme are as follows: 
 
1. Incident number – numeric  
Input the number of the incident on top of the incident report. 
 
2. Date reported – string   
Input the date that the incident was recorded on Bite Back (downloaded directly from 
website). 
 
3. Date of action – string  
Input the date that the action was carried out, if the incident reports it. If not reported 
then code as ‘unknown’. 
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4. Country – string  
Input the country in which the incident occurred (downloaded directly from the 
website). 
 
5. Location – string  
Input the town, county or area of the UK that the incident occurred, as specific as 
provided on Bite Back. 
 
6. Description of action – string  
A copy of the tag line of the incident as provided by Bite Back (downloaded directly 
from the website). 
 
7. Reported by – categorical  
Input the name of whom the incident was reported by, as specified at the top of the 
incident details.  
1 – Anonymous 
3 – Stop the Cull 
4 – Freeda Brocks 
5 – Act for freedom now 
6 – Media (any newspaper/local media reports) 
7 – Indymedia 
8 – Anonymous activists in the UK 
(add any other groups not yet coded) 
 
8. Claimed by - categorical 
Input the name of the group or individual who claimed the incident.  This can either 
be who signed off the incident report, the name of the group who signed the 
graffiti/letter (if applicable) or the name of the group/individual who claimed that 
they carried out the incident.  
1 – Not claimed 
2 – ALF (Animal Liberation Front)  
3 – Stop the Cull 
4 – FAI/ELF (International Anarchist Federation/Earth Liberation Front) 
5 – FAI (international Anarchist Federation) 
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6 – Geeky Badgers 
7 – Angry Foxes Cell/ACAB (All Coppers Are Bastards) 
8 – BrockCyberClan 
9 – ARM (Animal Rights Militia) 
10 – ALF/ELF 
11 – Foie Gras Retribution Squad 
12 – Locust Liberation League 
13 – Pig Liberation Front 
14 – MFAH (Militant Forces Against Huntingdon) 
15 – LARF (London Animal Rights Front) 
16 – Provisional RSPCA 
17 – The Rebellious Spray Paint Brigade 
18 – Pixie  
19 – Vegan Vengeance 
20 – The Stinky Bandits 
21 – Poultry Liberation Front 
22 – Breeders Attack Unit 
23 – Anti-Capitalists Action Brigade 
24 – Angling Retribution Squad 
25 – Militant Antispeciests 
26 – Oxford Arson Squad 
27 – Lobster Liberation Squad 
28 – Boar Liberation Squad/ALF 
29 – Cambridge Interior Designers, Inc/ALF 
30 – ALF Militants Group 
(add any other groups not yet coded) 
 
9. Number of activists – numeric 
Enter the number of individuals who carried out the action (if specified). 
Code as 777 if the incident report implies that a group of individuals carried it out, 
but it is unclear how many specifically.  For example, if there is mention of ‘us’, ‘we’ 
‘they’. 
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10. Photos – categorical  
0 – Photos not provided 
1 – Photos provided (either link to or embedded in the incident report) 
 
11. Videos – categorical  
0 - no videos were provided  
1 - videos were provided (either link to or embedded in the incident report) 
 
12. Web links – categorical  
0 - no web links to additional information were provided 
1 – web links to additional information provided (not including links to prisoner 
details) 
 
13. Incident category – categorical  
Enter the type of incident that was carried out: 
1 - Animal liberation (releasing animals) 
2 - Online exposure (releasing details of an individual or group of individuals online) 
3 - Property damage 
4 – Arson (not including bombs) 
5 – Graffiti 
6 – Graffiti AND property damage 
7 – Hacking  
8 – Posters placed in public 
9 – Product contamination 
10 – Animal liberation AND property damage 
11 – Theft 
12 – Letter warning 
13 – Nuisance phone calls 
14 – Smear campaign  
15 – Bomb 
16 – Animal liberation AND graffiti 
17 – Theft AND [property damage 
18 – Attempted arson 
19 – Doors locked open 
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20 – Home visit to an individual, no further details 
21 – Grave desecration 
22 – Fireworks (either set off at the target or left for the target)\ 
23 – Threatening letter 
24 – Fraud  
(add any other incident not yet coded) 
 
14. Prisoner support - categorical 
0 – no mention that the incident was carried out in support of a prisoner or comrade 
1 - incident was carried out in support of an animal rights comrade/prisoner/group of 
prisoners 
 
15. Prisoner name - string 
Input the name of the prisoner/ comrade that the action was carried out in support for. 
 
16. Individual target - categorical 
0 - if the action was not carried out against an individual. 
1 - the action was carried out against an individual target, e.g. an employee of a 
company, a hunter or fisherman etc. 
 
17. Individual target named - categorical 
0 – The individual target was not named 
1 – The individual target was named 
 
18. Individual name 1 - string 
Input the name of the first target if it was an individual (if applicable)  
 
19. Individual name 2 - string 
Input the name of the second target if it was an individual (if applicable)  
 
20. Individual name 3 - string 
Input the name of the third target if it was an individual (if applicable)  
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21. Individual name 4 - string 
Input the name of the fourth target if it was an individual (if applicable)  
 
22. Company target - categorical 
0 - the action was not carried out against a company. 
1 - the action was carried out against a company. 
 
23. Company name - string 
Input the name of the target if it was a company. 
 
24. Farm target - categorical 
0 - the target was not a farm. 
1 - the target was a farm. 
 
25. Farm name - string 
Input the name of the target if it was a farm.  
 
26. Farm type – string 
Input the type of farm if known, i.e. battery hen farm, bar farm, etc.  
 
27. Shooting estate target - categorical 
0 – The target was not a shooting estate 
1 – the target was a shooting estate 
 
28. Shooting estate name – string 
Input the name of the shooting estate is applicable. 
 
29. Property damage – categorical 
0 – the incident did not involve property damage 
1 – the incident did include property damage 
 
30. Property type – string 
Input the type of property that was damaged, if applicable. 
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31. Graffiti - categorical 
0 - the incident did not include graffiti. 
1 - the incident included graffiti. 
 
 32. Graffitied object – string 
Input the object(s) that was graffitied, if applicable. 
 
33. Graffiti content – string 
Input the words or phrases that were graffitied, if applicable 
 
34. Hacking - categorical 
0 - the incident did not include hacking. 
1 - the incident included hacking. 
 
35. Arson - categorical 
0 - the incident did not include arson. 
1 - the incident included arson. 
 
36. Animal liberation - categorical 
0 – the incident did not include animal liberation. 
1 - the incident included animal liberation. 
 
37. Type of animal – string 
Input the type of animal(s) liberated, if applicable 
 
38. Number of animals - numeric 
Input the number of animals liberated, if known and applicable. 
 
39. Glues locked - categorical 
0 - the incident did not include locks being glued. 
1 - the incident included locks being glued. 
 
40. Theft – categorical 
0 – the incident did not involve a theft 
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1 – the incident did involve a theft 
 
 41. Theft of – string 
Input the item(s) that was stolen, if applicable. 
  
42. Product contamination - categorical 
0 – the incident did not involve product contamination 
1 – the incident did involve product contamination 
 
43. Type of product – string  
Input the type of product that was contaminated, if applicable. 
 
44. Contaminated with – string 
Input what the product was contaminated with, if applicable. 
 
45. Threat made - categorical 
0 - the incident did not include a threat being made. 
1 - the incident included a threat being made (either directly to the target or to anyone 
else, including, but not exclusive to, individuals, companies or groups of people) 
 
46. String threat - string 
Type in the full threat exactly as it appears in the incident report. 
 
47. Day - categorical 
0 - the incident did not occur during the day.  
1 -  incident occurred during the day. Day is classed as any explicit mention to the 
daytime, sunlight, afternoon, morning, specific time between am and 6pm. 
 
48. Night - categorical 
0 - the incident did not occur during the night. 
1 - the incident did occur during the night. Night is classed as any mention of 
nighttime, darkness, evening, early hours, dead of night, specific time between6pm 
and 6am. 
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49. Visited home – categorical 
0 – if the incident did not involve a visit to an individual’s home address 
1 0 if the incident did involve a visit to an individual’s home address 
 
50. Address shared - categorical 
0 – the target’s address was not shared. 
1 – the target’s address was shared.  
 
51. Email shared - categorical 
0 – an email address belonging to the target was not shared. 
1 – an email address belonging to the target was shared. 
 
52. Phone number shared – categorical  
0 – a phone number belonging to the target was not shared 
1 – a phone number belonging to the target was shared 
 
53. Name shared - categorical 
0 - the name of an individual was not shared. 
1 – the name of an individual was shared. 
 
54. Photo of individual shared - categorical 
0 - a photo of an individual target was not shared. 
1 - a photo of an individual target was shared.  
 
55. Bank account shared – categorical 
0 – bank account details belonging to the target were not shared 
1 – bank account details belonging to the target were shared 
 
56. Call for action - categorical 
0 - a call for action was not made. 
1 - a call for action was made. A call for action is defined as any request from the 
activists for others to take part in action, or any encouragement for others to do so. 
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57. Reported to police - categorical 
0 - the incident was not known to be reported to the police. 
1 - the incident was known to be reported to the police. 
 
58. Campaign type - categorical 
1 – Stop the cull 
2 – Unknown/not clear 
3 – SHAC (Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty – Campaign against HLS) 
4 – End Ilkley Moor Shoot 
5 - Free Sean Kirtley 
6 – Campaign Against Bexhill – Hastings Link Road 
7 – Drop foie gras (any act against foie gras suppliers) 
8 – Campaign against Harlan 
9 – Campaign against Air France/KLM 
10 – Campaign against AstraZeneca 
11 – Campaign against Wickham Labs 
12 – Campaign against Oxford University 
13 – Campaign against Newchurch farm / Darley Oaks Farm 
14 – Campaign against Cardiff University 
15 – Campaign against hunting (hunt sabs) 
16 – Campaign against circuses 
17 – Campaign against Pfizer 
18 – Campaign against Leeds University 
19 – General animal liberation 
20 – Campaign against animal transportation 
21 – Campaign against GSK 
 
59. Reason - string  
Input the reason for the chosen target/action if not made clear elsewhere (especially if 
a secondary or tertiary target).  
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Appendix B: Faculty of Health and Medical Sciences Ethics Committee Letter of 
Approval 
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Appendix C: Frequency Tables for Study 1 
Table 17: Types of action reported for all incidents (N=1,064) 
Action Frequency % of all incidents 
Property damage 651 61.2 
Graffiti 353 33.2 
Animal Liberation 204 19.2 
Arson 35 3.3 
Theft 23 2.2 
Suspicious package/hoax devices posted 15 1.4 
Nuisance post/emails/faxes/phone calls  10 0.9 
Smear campaign 8 0.8 
Threatening letter 8 0.8 
Hoax bomb 7 0.7 
Fireworks let off at property 6 0.6 
Product contamination 5 0.5 
Fraud 5 0.5 
Locked in/out (by other means than glue) 5 0.5 
Hacking 5 0.5 
Online exposure 3 0.3 
Home visit (no further details) 3 0.3 
Personal safety alarm set off at house 2 0.2 
Bomb 2 0.2 
Stink bombs 2 0.2 
Weeds left to grow 1 0.1 
Threatening phone calls/texts 1 0.1 
Sharp objects posted through letter box 1 0.1 
Restaurant sabotage 1 0.1 
Protest 1 0.1 
Posters 1 0.1 
Nuisance deliveries and bookings 1 0.1 
Note left at house 1 0.1 
Nails left on driveway 1 0.1 
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Marbles left at house 1 0.1 
Information gathering 1 0.1 
Grave desecration 1 0.1 
Attempted arson 1 0.1 
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Table 18: Full list of types of property damaged (N=651) 
Property Type 
Frequency % of property 
damage incidents 
Vehicle(s) 293 45.0 
Locks  107 16.4 
Windows  67 10.3 
Traps, cages and shooting paraphernalia 60 9.2 
Fence 45 6.9 
Building, other 20 3.1 
Cash point(s) 17 2.6 
House 15 2.3 
Unknown 14 2.2 
Sign 13 2.0 
Machinery 13 2.0 
Telephone mast 8 1.2 
Racetrack paraphernalia 8 1.2 
Fishing equipment 8 1.2 
Shutters and doors 7 1.1 
Farm equipment 5 0.8 
Fur items 4 0.6 
Eggs 3 0.5 
Circus, various items 2 0.3 
Vending machine 2 0.3 
Gates  2 0.3 
Posters 2 0.3 
Golf course 2 0.3 
Shed 2 0.3 
Red diesel stores 1 0.2 
Packaged meat 1 0.2 
CCTV 1 0.2 
Garden 1 0.2 
Driveway 1 0.2 
Grave 1 0.2 
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Garage 1 0.2 
Eggs  1 0.2 
Stop tap 1 0.2 
Phone boxes 1 0.2 
Bird netting 1 0.2 
Milk tanker 1 0.2 
Meat trailers 1 0.2 
Restaurant toilets 1 0.2 
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Table 19: Full list of the names of groups who claimed the incidents (N=775) 
Name of Group 
Frequency % of all incidents 
ALF 669 62.9 
Animal Rights Militia 9 0.8 
ALF/ELF 9 0.8 
Militant Forces Against Huntingdon 7 0.7 
Poultry Liberation Front 5 0.5 
Harvey and Wanda 5 0.5 
ALF Tupper 5 0.5 
Lobster Liberation Front 4 0.4 
Stop the cull 2 0.2 
Angry Foxes Cell/ACAB 2 0.2 
Foie Gras Retribution Squad 2 0.2 
Primate retribution squad 2 0.2 
ALF and Hunt Retribution Squad 2 0.2 
Fish Liberation Squad 2 0.2 
Countryside Resistance 2 0.2 
Paint Pixies 2 0.2 
Provisional HSA 2 0.2 
Grouse Liberation Front 2 0.2 
Guinea-Pig Avengers 2 0.2 
Animal Avengers 2 0.2 
FAI/ELF 1 0.1 
FAI 1 0.1 
Geeky Badgers 1 0.1 
BrockCyberClan 1 0.1 
Locust Liberation League 1 0.1 
Pig Liberation Front 1 0.1 
London AR Front (LARF) 1 0.1 
Provisional RSPCA 1 0.1 
The Rebellious Spray-Paint Brigade 1 0.1 
Pixie 1 0.1 
Vegan Vengeance 1 0.1 
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The Stinky Bandits 1 0.1 
Breeders Attack Unit 1 0.1 
Anti-Capitalist Action Brighton 1 0.1 
Angling Retribution Squad 1 0.1 
Militant Antispeciesists 1 0.1 
Oxford Arson Squad 1 0.1 
Boar Liberation Front/ ALF 1 0.1 
Cambridge Exterior Designers, Inc/ALF 1 0.1 
ALF Militants Group 1 0.1 
Boar Liberation Front 1 0.1 
Real Felix the Fox 1 0.1 
ALF Attack Unit 1 0.1 
ALF Volunteers in Action 1 0.1 
Justice League 1 0.1 
NETCU-ALF Division 1 0.1 
Fur Retribution Squad 1 0.1 
ALF Longdogs 1 0.1 
Provisional RSPB 1 0.1 
Militant Sabs 1 0.1 
Aunty Sab 1 0.1 
Pret Sketch Crew 1 0.1 
The Berkshire Brigade 1 0.1 
ALF/Huntingdon Hate Squad 1 0.1 
Mr Sealey 1 0.1 
Church Fenton Against Animal Circuses 1 0.1 
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Table 20: Full list of company target types (N=756) 
Company type 
Frequency % of all incidents 
Pharmaceutical company 96 9.0 
Transport company (other) 60 5.6 
Butchers/meat suppliers 40 3.8 
University/college 40 3.8 
Bank 32 3.0 
Industrial suppliers 32 3.0 
Animal testing lab/facility 27 2.5 
Shop selling fur and/or leather 24 2.3 
Fast food chain 22 2.1 
Construction company/contractors 21 2.0 
Building/facilities services and suppliers 21 2.0 
Circus 20 1.9 
Commercial lettings 20 1.9 
Restaurants 19 1.8 
Lab suppliers 16 1.5 
Phone and internet supplier 16 1.5 
Other 16 1.5 
Angling/hunting club 13 1.2 
Healthcare company 13 1.2 
Environmental Agency 12 1.1 
Investment company 11 1.0 
Waste management/recycling 11 1.0 
Racing track/stadium 10 0.9 
Pet shops/breeders 9 0.8 
Consumer products company 9 0.8 
Chemical company 8 0.8 
Airline 7 0.7 
Dairy/milk supplier 7 0.7 
Security company 7 0.7 
Multiple 7 0.7 
Packaging suppliers 7 0.7 
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Unknown 7 0.7 
Garden/aquatic/wildlife centre 6 0.6 
Council 6 0.6 
Betting shops 5 0.5 
Abattoir/Slaughterhouse 5 0.5 
Transport company (animals) 5 0.5 
Fish mongers 5 0.5 
Fishing industry 5 0.5 
Foie gras seller/supplier 5 0.5 
Manufacturing company 5 0.5 
Insurance company 5 0.5 
Hunting/Angling shops 4 0.4 
Supermarket 4 0.4 
Charity 4 0.4 
Auditors 4 0.4 
Accountants 4 0.4 
Animal feed/supplies 3 0.3 
Office suppliers 3 0.3 
Political party 3 0.3 
Breeding facility (lab animals) 3 0.3 
Police force 2 0.2 
Zoo 2 0.2 
Embassy 2 0.2 
Life sciences 2 0.2 
Pest control 2 0.2 
Chemist/Pharmacy 1 0.1 
Vets 1 0.1 
Hotel 1 0.1 
Golf Club 1 0.1 
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Table 21: Full list of campaign types for all incidents (N=1,064) 
Campaign type 
Frequency % of all incidents 
Campaign against Huntingdon Life 
Sciences (SHAC) 
331 31.1 
General animal liberation 174 16.4 
Campaign against hunting/angling 90 8.5 
Campaign against Oxford University 60 5.6 
Campaign against butchers/meat industry 50 4.7 
Campaign against Newchurch farm 43 4.0 
Campaign against fur/leather 28 2.6 
Campaign against foie gras 23 2.2 
Campaign against circuses 23 2.2 
Campaign against animal testing (other) 22 2.1 
Campaign against Novartis 21 2.0 
Campaign against fast food chains 21 2.0 
Campaign against the badger cull 19 1.8 
Campaign against dog/horse racing 16 1.5 
Other 15 1.4 
Campaign Against Wickham Labs 15 1.4 
Campaign against animal transportation 15 1.4 
Campaign against fishing businesses 12 1.1 
Campaign against GSK 11 1.0 
Campaign against pet shops 9 0.8 
Campaign against farming 9 0.8 
Campaign against B&K 8 0.8 
Campaign against Aberystwyth 
University 
7 0.7 
Campaign against milk industry 7 0.7 
Various 6 0.6 
Campaign against Astra Zeneca 5 0.5 
Campaign against Highgate Farm 5 0.5 
Campaign against testing at Universities 
(other) 
5 0.5 
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Campaign against Harlan 4 0.4 
Campaign against Cardiff University 3 0.3 
Campaign against Sequani 3 0.3 
Campaign against zoos 2 0.2 
Campaign Against Pfizer 1 0.1 
Campaign against Leeds University 1 0.1 
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Appendix D: Table of Graffiti Messages 
Table 22: Full list of verbatim graffiti content (N=201) 
Graffiti content 
Frequency % of all graffiti 
incidents 
#10 UPS Worker, Puppy Killer 1 0.3 
ACAB 1 0.3 
Air France KLM - Monkey Killers 1 0.3 
ALF 14 4.0 
ALF slogans 1 0.3 
ALF slogans and a cross 1 0.3 
ALF; ANIMAL KILLER; SCUM 1 0.3 
ALF; AR slogans 1 0.3 
ALF; DROP HLS 1 0.3 
ALF; ELF; SCUM 1 0.3 
ALF; FOR BARRY 1 0.3 
ALF; HRS 2 0.6 
ALF; HUNT SCUM 1 0.3 
ALF; meat is murder 1 0.3 
ALF; scum; killer 1 0.3 
ALF; we'll be back; we'll shut you down 1 0.3 
ALF; You bet they die 1 0.3 
[name], Puppy Killer; Andrew Baker, Parish House, 
Hook Hill out of our village; Kick Andrew Baker 
out of town 
1 0.3 
Animal Abuser at No. 7 1 0.3 
animal abuser; animal killer; ALF 1 0.3 
Animal abusers 1 0.3 
Animal Abusers 1 0.3 
animal abusers; scum 1 0.3 
ANIMAL KILLER LIVES HERE; SCUM; 
MURDERER 
1 0.3 
animal killer; murderer 1 0.3 
Animal Killer; Scum 1 0.3 
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animal killers 1 0.3 
ANIMAL KILLERS; CPS FUELS - SCUM 1 0.3 
ANIMALS ARE NOT MACHINES; MEAT = 
MURDER; ALF/ELF 
1 0.3 
ANIMALS YOU KNOW WHO YOUR MATES 
ARE ALF 
1 0.3 
(Anti foie gras messages) 1 0.3 
(anti-HLS slogans) 2 0.6 
(anti-Sequani slogans) 1 0.3 
Badger Killers; NFU - Murdering Scum 1 0.3 
Ban Foie Gras 1 0.3 
BAN LIVE EXPORTS; BAN LIVE EXPORTS 
NOW 
1 0.3 
Bayer Butchers Beagles - Smash HLS 1 0.3 
BHF Tortures Animals; Scum 1 0.3 
BLOOD; ALF 1 0.3 
Boycott Harrods. Fur is Dead. 1 0.3 
Bucket of paint, unknown 1 0.3 
Cardiff uni kills animals 1 0.3 
CLOSE DOWN THE MONKEY FARMS!; 
MONKEY MURDERERS 
1 0.3 
Close H.L.S Puppy Killers 1 0.3 
Covance Killer 1 0.3 
[name] - Puppy Killer; Shame on you David; Drop 
HLS; Puppy Killer 
1 0.3 
DELTOITTE & TOUCHE ANIMAL ABUSERS; 
WWW.SHAC.NET; ALF 
1 0.3 
DHL Deliver to Hell; Close Sequani Puppy Killers 1 0.3 
DHL KILL DOGS 1 0.3 
Die hunt scum; Stop hunting; ALF 1 0.3 
[name] Family Bunny Butchers; [name] Animal 
Abusers 
1 0.3 
DROP HLS 3 0.8 
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Drop HLS now 1 0.3 
Drop HLS; ALF 1 0.3 
Drop HLS; Dump HLS 1 0.3 
DROP LSR SHARES; SCUM; DROP HLS; ALF 1 0.3 
Drop Oxford Uni 1 0.3 
drop oxford uni; ALF 1 0.3 
DROP OXFORD UNI; ALF 1 0.3 
[name] is a Puppy Killer 1 0.3 
Eat yourself We're free - the boar; ALF 1 0.3 
Family murderers 1 0.3 
Fishermen Stink; Fishing is Cruelty 1 0.3 
Fishing Kills. Go Vegan. 1 0.3 
Foie gras hell hole 1 0.3 
FOR BARRY 1 0.3 
Fox killers 1 0.3 
Free Dan Amos; www.shac.net 1 0.3 
Free Sean Kirtley; Fuck SOCPA; Fuck NETCU 1 0.3 
Free the animals or you will face the consequences. 
We are watching you, ALF. 
1 0.3 
Fuck you NETCU; Free Greg Avery; SMASH HLS 
PUPPY KILLERS; YOUR TAXES FUND HLS 
TORTURE CAMP 
1 0.3 
FUCKIN SHUT BY ORDERS OF ALF 1 0.3 
fur is murder; ALF 1 0.3 
GLAXO ANIMAL KILLER IN YOUR VILLAGE 1 0.3 
GSK Murder Animals @ HLS 1 0.3 
[name] Quit Now Before You Lose It All 1 0.3 
Hands Off The Animals 2 0.6 
HLS SCUM 1 0.3 
HLS SCUM; ANIMAL ABUSERS; 
WWW.SHAC.NET; ALF 
1 0.3 
[name] PUPPY KILLER; ALF 1 0.3 
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INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES SUPPORT ANIMAL 
ABUSE AT H.L.S; PUPPY KILLERS 
1 0.3 
KILLERS; ALF 1 0.3 
KILLERS; ALF WATCHING YOU; CRUEL 
BASTARD; SCUM 
1 0.3 
Killers; CPS Fuels Kills Animals; puppy killers; 
ALF; Dump HLS 
1 0.3 
L'Oreal Stop Cruel Animal Tests; For The Animals 
Killed By L'Oreal 
1 0.3 
LEECH KILLS PUPPIES; ALF 1 0.3 
Leeds Uni Butcher Beagles' Stop Leeds Uni Animal 
Tests 
1 0.3 
Liberate 1 0.3 
LOST SOMETHING?; FUCK SHOOTING 1 0.3 
Mars - Stop Cruel Animal Tests 1 0.3 
McMurder; Meat is Murder 1 0.3 
MEAT = MURDER 1 0.3 
Meat is a holocaust 1 0.3 
meat is murder 1 0.3 
MEAT IS MURDER 4 1.1 
Meat is murder; Go Vegan 1 0.3 
MEAT IS MURDER; SCUM; ALF 1 0.3 
Meat is Murder; Until the Suffering Ends; ALF 
logo 
1 0.3 
(Messages about being linked to puppy killers) 1 0.3 
MIA Import Beagles For Torture 1 0.3 
Mmmm, Cow Puss - Go Vegan 1 0.3 
MONKEY KILLER; DUMP HLS 1 0.3 
Murderer 1 0.3 
Murderer in Your Village 1 0.3 
Murderer in your village; Murderer at the Ricks; 
Puppy Killer 
1 0.3 
Murderer, McShit 1 0.3 
 
147 
MURDERERS 1 0.3 
Murdering Scum; ALF; Glaxo Kills 1 0.3 
(Name, address and 'sordid' interests) 1 0.3 
no badger cull", ALF", cull farmers not badgers 1 0.3 
NO BLOODSPORTS; ALF 1 0.3 
NO OXFORD ANIMAL LAB - ALF 1 0.3 
Novartis Kill Puppies @ HLS 1 0.3 
number 22 is animal killer 1 0.3 
number 3 is animal killer; ALF 1 0.3 
PAEDO SCUM DROP HLS OR GO BANG!; GSK 
+ HLS = ALF 
1 0.3 
Pfizer/Wilkinson Swords Kills Puppies @HLS 1 0.3 
Puppy Killer; HLS 1 0.3 
puppy cruelty 1 0.3 
puppy killer 1 0.3 
Puppy killer 2 0.6 
Puppy Killer 2 0.6 
PUPPY KILLER 1 0.3 
PUPPY KILLER; ALF; SCUM 1 0.3 
Puppy Killer; Close HLS 1 0.3 
puppy killers 1 0.3 
Puppy Killers 1 0.3 
Puppy Killers (and others, unknown) 1 0.3 
puppy killers; murderers live here 1 0.3 
puppy killers; scum; ALF 1 0.3 
raped from cows; scum 1 0.3 
(message was spread... that [name] is a pathetic, 
murdering piece of shit) 
1 0.3 
SANDOZ KILLS DOGS 1 0.3 
Scum 1 0.3 
SCUM 1 0.3 
SCUM; ALF 2 0.6 
SCUM; ANIMAL LIBERATION; CRUEL SICKO 1 0.3 
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SCUM; BLOOD ON YOUR MONEY 1 0.3 
Scum; Free the Lobsters; Lobster Liberation; ALF 1 0.3 
Scum; Greyhound killers 1 0.3 
Simple [name] Animal Killer; ALF Watching You 1 0.3 
(Slogans stating he is an animal abuser) 1 0.3 
something to show that he is the number 1 target of 
ALF 
1 0.3 
Sprayed - Check, Smash - Check, Burnt...? 1 0.3 
stop animal experiments-ALF 1 0.3 
STOP KILLING ANIMALS; ALF LOGO 1 0.3 
Stop Selling Foie Gras; Ban Foie Gras 1 0.3 
Stop The Shoot 1 0.3 
UPS+HLS=scum; Puppy Killer; ALF 1 0.3 
VIVISECTION KILLS; NOVARTIS/GSK 
PRODUCTS TESTED AT HLS; HLS CLOSE 
THEM DOWN 
1 0.3 
Warning (unknown) 2 0.6 
We'll be back 1 0.3 
WE'RE WATCHING YOU - ALF 1 0.3 
Who's Next? 1 0.3 
Yamanouchi: Your Lease, Your Fault; offensive 
graffiti 
1 0.3 
You bet they die! 1 0.3 
You bet, They die; Killers; Murderers 1 0.3 
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Appendix E: Configural Frequency Analysis Results 
Table 23: CFA results for target and action type variables (Individual Target/Company Target/Farm Target/Woodland Target/Property 
Damage/Graffiti/Animal Liberation/Home Visit - Types and Antitypes only, N=1,064) 
Configuration 
Observed Expected Difference Statistic p Type/Antitype Detail 
11221121 54 9.224 44.776 14.743 0.00000000 Type 
Individual/Company/Prop 
damage/Graffiti/Home visit 
11221221 128 18.579 109.421 25.385 0.00000000 Type 
Individual/Company/Prop damage/Home 
visit 
11222121 54 5.852 48.148 19.903 0.00000000 Type Individual/Company/Graffiti/Home visit 
12121221 7 1.861 5.139 3.767 0.00008280 Type Individual/Farm/Prop damage/Home visit 
12122121 6 0.586 5.414 7.07 0.00000000 Type Individual/Farm/Graffiti/Home visit 
12122221 8 1.181 6.819 6.275 0.00000000 Type Individual/Farm/Home visit 
21221122 109 43.106 65.894 10.036 0.00000000 Type Company/Prop damage/Graffiti 
21221222 180 86.823 93.177 10 0.00000000 Type Company/Prop damage 
21222122 87 27.347 59.653 11.407 0.00000000 Type Company/Graffiti 
22112212 3 0.094 2.906 9.5 0.00000000 Type Farm/Woodland/Animal liberation 
22121112 8 1.024 6.976 6.892 0.00000000 Type 
Farm/Prop damage/Graffiti/Animal 
liberation 
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22121212 47 2.063 44.937 31.284 0.00000000 Type Farm/Prop damage/Graffiti 
22122212 94 1.309 92.691 81.017 0.00000000 Type Farm/Animal liberation 
22211212 9 0.6 8.4 10.845 0.00000000 Type Woodland/Prop damage/Animal liberation 
22211222 40 2.529 37.471 23.562 0.00000000 Type Woodland/Property damage 
22212212 5 0.381 4.619 7.488 0.00000000 Type Woodland/Animal liberation 
11221122 2 24.046 -22.046 -4.496 0.00000347 Antitype Individual/Company/Prop damage/Graffiti 
11221222 15 48.433 -33.433 -4.804 0.00000078 Antitype Individual/Company/Property damage 
21121222 0 21.35 -21.35 -4.621 0.00000192 Antitype Company/Farm/Property damage 
21122222 0 13.545 -13.545 -3.68 0.00011652 Antitype Company/Farm 
21221121 0 16.536 -16.536 -4.066 0.00002388 Antitype Company/Prop damage/Graffiti/Home visit 
21221212 4 20.595 -16.595 -3.657 0.00012773 Antitype 
Company/Property damage/Animal 
liberation 
21221221 0 33.307 -33.307 -5.771 0.00000000 Antitype Company/Property damage/Home visit 
21222221 0 21.13 -21.13 -4.597 0.00000215 Antitype Company/Home visit 
22221122 0 17.562 -17.562 -4.191 0.00001391 Antitype Property damage/Graffiti 
22221221 0 13.569 -13.569 -3.684 0.00011499 Antitype  Property damage/Home visit 
22221222 2 35.372 -33.372 -5.611 0.00000001 Antitype  Property damage 
22222222 1 22.44 -21.44 -4.526 0.00000301 Antitype  None of the above 
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Appendix F: Frequency Tables for Study 2 
Table 24: Full list of types of action reported for incidents with a threat (N=497) 
Action 
Frequency % of all incidents 
Property damage 315 64.7 
Graffiti 175 35.9 
Animal Liberation 46 9.4 
Arson 23 4.7 
Theft 11 2.3 
Suspicious package/hoax devices posted 12 2.5 
Nuisance post/emails/faxes/phone calls  6 1.2 
Smear campaign 3 0.6 
Threatening letter 7 1.4 
Hoax bomb 15 3.1 
Fireworks let off at property 3 0.6 
Product contamination 4 0.8 
Fraud 2 0.4 
Online exposure 1 0.2 
Home visit (no further details) 7 1.4 
Personal safety alarm set off at house 1 0.2 
Bomb 1 0.2 
Stink bombs 1 0.2 
Weeds left to grow 1 0.2 
Threatening phone calls/texts 1 0.2 
Nuisance deliveries and bookings 1 0.2 
Note left at house 1 0.2 
Nails left on driveway 1 0.2 
Attempted arson 1 0.2 
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Table 25: Full list of campaign types for incidents with a threat (N=487) 
Campaign type 
Frequency % of all incidents 
Campaign against Huntingdon Life Sciences 199 40.9 
Campaign against Oxford University 50 10.3 
General animal liberation 37 7.6 
Campaign against hunting/angling 26 5.3 
Campaign against Newchurch farm 25 5.1 
Campaign against fur/leather 13 2.7 
Campaign against butchers/meat industry 12 2.5 
Campaign against circuses 11 2.3 
Campaign against animal testing (other) 10 2.1 
Campaign against Novartis 10 2.1 
Campaign against foie gras 9 1.8 
Campaign Against Wickham Labs 9 1.8 
Campaign against the badger cull 7 1.4 
Campaign against animal transportation 7 1.4 
Campaign against GSK 7 1.4 
Campaign against Aberystwyth University 7 1.4 
Campaign against fast food chains 5 1.0 
Campaign against farming 5 1.0 
Campaign against B&K 4 0.8 
Other 4 0.8 
Campaign against dog/horse racing 4 0.8 
Various 3 0.6 
Campaign against Astra Zeneca 3 0.6 
Campaign against fishing businesses 3 0.6 
Campaign against Sequani 3 0.6 
Campaign against Harlan 2 0.4 
Campaign against Cardiff University 2 0.4 
Campaign against Highgate Farm 2 0.4 
Campaign against zoos 2 0.4 
Campaign against milk industry 2 0.4 
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Campaign against testing at Universities 
(other) 2 0.4 
Campaign against Leeds University 1 0.2 
Campaign against pet shops 1 0.2 
 
 
